MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 6d23eb561ad602dd178fd4c0fdc63d145df645ff0dd68d8ce123dc868ff29f65. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 13


Intelligence 13 IOCs 1 YARA 14 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 6d23eb561ad602dd178fd4c0fdc63d145df645ff0dd68d8ce123dc868ff29f65
SHA3-384 hash: 4c0d5e4d6641ad91aedbe657f4bb16d700349553ec63fa7dc4a17395a4903f08158acbc27bdf52c997a83aa2c9032c06
SHA1 hash: f76dc0b1b75371c66a5c6b7f72ecdb22ab3c536a
MD5 hash: a734be30038f51efe28c1c019987a83e
humanhash: timing-north-snake-carbon
File name:AsyncClient.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:250'880 bytes
First seen:2026-05-01 13:30:19 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'880 x AgentTesla, 19'800 x Formbook, 12'305 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 6144:NE7ysO07pM/OoA0TQsPUBGralhvL4gUN:OzEO0RVaLzD8
Threatray 2 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T16C342894AABEDDA7C78E4BBBD010E20253F44657A5D2E386D4109AF4AC8B351E703377
TrID 70.4% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
6.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2)
4.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:AsyncRAT exe RAT


Avatar
abuse_ch
AsyncRAT C2:
2.26.124.185:6001

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)


Below is a list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this malware samples.

IOCThreatFox Reference
2.26.124.185:6001 https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1803641/

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
141
Origin country :
NL NL
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Gathering data
Malware family:
n/a
ID:
1
File name:
AsyncClient.exe
Verdict:
No threats detected
Analysis date:
2026-05-01 13:16:33 UTC
Tags:
n/a

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Result
Verdict:
Clean
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
Connection attempt
Sending a custom TCP request
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
  7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
asyncrat base64 net net_reactor obfuscated obfuscated packed reconnaissance vbnet
Result
Gathering data
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2026-05-01T10:23:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-05-01T10:26:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Detections:
Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.g Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.e Trojan.Win32.Agent.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.fb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.b PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic
Result
Threat name:
AsyncRAT, ObesityLocker
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
rans.troj.spyw.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Disable Task Manager(disabletaskmgr)
Disables the Windows task manager (taskmgr)
Drops script or batch files to the startup folder
Found malware configuration
Installs a global keyboard hook
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Queries sensitive Plug and Play Device Information (via WMI, Win32_PnPEntity, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected ObesityLocker Ransomware
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1907270 Sample: AsyncClient.exe Startdate: 01/05/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 26 api.ipify.org 2->26 32 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->32 34 Found malware configuration 2->34 36 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->36 38 10 other signatures 2->38 9 AsyncClient.exe 16 3 2->9         started        signatures3 process4 dnsIp5 28 2.26.124.185, 49686, 49697, 6001 EELtdGB United Kingdom 9->28 30 api.ipify.org 172.67.74.152, 443, 49688 CLOUDFLARENETUS United States 9->30 48 Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines) 9->48 50 Queries sensitive Plug and Play Device Information (via WMI, Win32_PnPEntity, often done to detect virtual machines) 9->50 52 Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function) 9->52 13 cmd.exe 1 9->13         started        signatures6 process7 signatures8 54 Suspicious powershell command line found 13->54 56 Bypasses PowerShell execution policy 13->56 16 powershell.exe 12 13->16         started        18 conhost.exe 13->18         started        process9 process10 20 nhnpar.exe 31 194 16->20         started        file11 24 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\ObesityLocker.bat, DOS 20->24 dropped 40 Drops script or batch files to the startup folder 20->40 42 Installs a global keyboard hook 20->42 44 Disable Task Manager(disabletaskmgr) 20->44 46 2 other signatures 20->46 signatures12
Gathering data
Threat name:
Win32.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-05-01 13:16:40 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
4
AV detection:
21 of 36 (58.33%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
n/a
Score:
  3/10
Tags:
discovery
Behaviour
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
6d23eb561ad602dd178fd4c0fdc63d145df645ff0dd68d8ce123dc868ff29f65
MD5 hash:
a734be30038f51efe28c1c019987a83e
SHA1 hash:
f76dc0b1b75371c66a5c6b7f72ecdb22ab3c536a
Detections:
win_asyncrat_w0
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:MD5_Constants
Author:phoul (@phoul)
Description:Look for MD5 constants
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_NET_Msil_Suspicious_Use_StrReverse
Author:dr4k0nia, modified by Florian Roth
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Reference:https://github.com/dr4k0nia/yara-rules
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments