MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 ff0b30522dd2e7a65e30369eb4d4e3a83ff148d718eb4770dd21bd8872f7cb43. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 20


Intelligence 20 IOCs YARA 19 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: ff0b30522dd2e7a65e30369eb4d4e3a83ff148d718eb4770dd21bd8872f7cb43
SHA3-384 hash: c4372fccf6419cf98d1700807251aa783173ad7fd0e9075ce6fb91cffc3c1c3a844086d94a4ae71cf00f2ce715443bc3
SHA1 hash: b186658b997786fb3b9ca5c75fe836701e9af532
MD5 hash: 07741a195f04650e247365f6b54a822f
humanhash: cola-victor-muppet-shade
File name:VellaraEndpointShield.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:66'048 bytes
First seen:2026-01-30 07:48:08 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'754 x AgentTesla, 19'663 x Formbook, 12'252 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 768:fD7ZBqrViP3qHi29JNAZogMTebYJLs3w1+9SCvgmqb2nopwH1oH1Ba12fB08GncI:ferGI48NrZbbNwABWE5GncVclN
Threatray 3'191 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T1B9534B012798C966E1AE4AB4BCF2550046B5D5772102DB5EBCC404DBABAFFC64A123FF
TrID 67.7% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
9.7% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.0% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.1% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter Anonymous
Tags:AsyncRAT backdoor Dotnet exe MSIL RAT stealer

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
141
Origin country :
VN VN
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware configuration found for:
DcRat PostExploitTool
Details
DcRat
c2 socket addresses, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
VellaraEndpointShield.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-01-30 07:49:58 UTC
Tags:
rat auto-reg asyncrat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.9%
Tags:
asyncrat autorun
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
DNS request
Connection attempt
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-debug anti-vm asyncrat base64 configsecuritypolicy dcrat evasive fingerprint hacktool lolbin mpcmdrun msconfig razy reconnaissance regedit schtasks unsafe vbnet windows
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2026-01-30T04:58:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-01-30T16:39:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Detections:
PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic Trojan.MSIL.DInvoke.sb HEUR:Trojan-PSW.MSIL.Agent.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Darkrat.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.DcRat.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d
Gathering data
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-01-30 07:48:27 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
1
AV detection:
22 of 24 (91.67%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:nexara defense_evasion execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
smartroots.in.net:8848
smartroots.in.net:443
smartroots.in.net:80
smartroots.in.net:8080
smartroots.in.net:6060
smartroots.in.net:4782
smartroots.in.net:4444
smartroots.in.net:6666
smartroots.in.net:5555
zhidao.cn.com:8848
zhidao.cn.com:443
zhidao.cn.com:80
zhidao.cn.com:8080
zhidao.cn.com:6060
zhidao.cn.com:4782
zhidao.cn.com:4444
zhidao.cn.com:6666
zhidao.cn.com:5555
buyonlinepar.us.com:8848
buyonlinepar.us.com:443
buyonlinepar.us.com:80
buyonlinepar.us.com:8080
buyonlinepar.us.com:6060
buyonlinepar.us.com:4782
buyonlinepar.us.com:4444
buyonlinepar.us.com:6666
buyonlinepar.us.com:5555
s666vn.press:8848
s666vn.press:443
s666vn.press:80
s666vn.press:8080
s666vn.press:6060
s666vn.press:4782
s666vn.press:4444
s666vn.press:6666
s666vn.press:5555
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
ff0b30522dd2e7a65e30369eb4d4e3a83ff148d718eb4770dd21bd8872f7cb43
MD5 hash:
07741a195f04650e247365f6b54a822f
SHA1 hash:
b186658b997786fb3b9ca5c75fe836701e9af532
Detections:
AsyncRAT DCRat
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AcRat
Author:Nikos 'n0t' Totosis
Description:AcRat Payload (based on AsyncRat)
Rule name:dcrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_rkp
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Description:Detects DCRat payloads
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_DcRatBy
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing the string DcRatBy
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_WMI_EnumerateVideoDevice
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables attemping to enumerate video devices using WMI
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

AsyncRAT

Executable exe ff0b30522dd2e7a65e30369eb4d4e3a83ff148d718eb4770dd21bd8872f7cb43

(this sample)

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2026-01-30 07:51:15 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "ff0b30522dd2e7a65e30369eb4d4e3a83ff148d718eb4770dd21bd8872f7cb43",
"yara_possible_family": "dcrat",
"key": "d632f25d2cfa32007eb48695a4f851c27d0e7f3796d0139742c93f5e470628fd",
"salt": "4463526174427971777164616e6368756e",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"8848",
"443",
"80",
"8080",
"6060",
"4782",
"4444",
"6666",
"5555"
],
"Hosts": [
"smartroots.in.net",
"zhidao.cn.com",
"buyonlinepar.us.com",
"s666vn.press"
],
"Version": " 1.0.7",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%AppData%",
"InstallFile": "VellaraEndpointShield.exe",
"Key": "ZWtnd084SnZIbWFiZExzZk4wZGRIbE5jNEJQTVNxcGc=",
"Mutex": "VSL_VellaraEndpoint_ShieldLock_7a8b9c0d",
"Certificate": "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",
"Serversignature": "cGdwtorWEA2/oj3gXrv9nnT4JHOjUOAs8zs0+tTx0tp2ylLjNyme59zG37ZT4035+AfwPZprore2WyJ/pyjrmMRvHqy69eWghS21zGeqbgXtoiHsQ8Q8nnqgYqfBlDze5Hx4DriRGQAsKBLedpNS9DLF3VwKaQuFYjYTeKNmM5c=",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BSOD": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "1",
"Group": "Nexara",
"AntiProcess": "false",
"Anti": "false"
}
}