MalwareBazaar Database
You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 f32d6dc8c15efe4473e5a400cacb15cb28bcde2daf74fa2c99fa86d4936c7880. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.
Database Entry
FluxEngine
Vendor detections: 5
| SHA256 hash: | f32d6dc8c15efe4473e5a400cacb15cb28bcde2daf74fa2c99fa86d4936c7880 |
|---|---|
| SHA3-384 hash: | 201344eef66f03d2ca08794f9adce1abeb6d7ebff6ae8706c26d28e04d24878678e5c456b974d00ae24f7416c589097c |
| SHA1 hash: | 478f7ebce19dc6bdc936c1233f69f4c73abd52c5 |
| MD5 hash: | fddba692fac85b5e614f22627f36dcc2 |
| humanhash: | hot-victor-jig-early |
| File name: | inewqrh.sct |
| Download: | download sample |
| Signature | FluxEngine |
| File size: | 4'852 bytes |
| First seen: | 2026-11-22 11:33:46 UTC |
| Last seen: | Never |
| File type: | |
| MIME type: | text/xml |
| ssdeep | 96:knrkHN7i/I/Q/0E5/7at6c+z00zg7od+Yd2O+3/5+INHtAG:NN7i/I/Q/9/E6c+z00zg7o4jOG/kINHf |
| TLSH | T19DA193001B254E9CBEE01EDA8C4FA11AA8F0DC717D55E19DAAFFC9D2BCB704A0435D1A |
| Magika | xml |
| Reporter | |
| Tags: | AutoIT banker ES FluxEngine PT Scriptlet sct |
Intelligence
File Origin
ESVendor Threat Intelligence
YARA Signatures
MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.
| Rule name: | Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage |
|---|---|
| Author: | XiAnzheng |
| Description: | May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP) |
File information
The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.
Web download
Comments
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You need to login to in order to write a comment. Login with your abuse.ch account.FluxEngine stage 3: installer scriptlet served at hxxps://doc.pdf-unico[.]lat/d/inewqrh (fetched 2026-11-22). Runs rundll32 InetCpl.cpl,ClearMyTracksByProcess 8, writes HKCU\Software\FluxEngine\Desktop (src, taskm), derives an 8-letter install name from COMPUTERNAME+USERNAME, unzips signed AutoIt3 (renamed <n>.exe), compiled script <n> (4fc99727) and <n>.ico into C:\<n>\, starts C:\<n>\<n>.exe C:\<n>\<n> and sets the folder +h +s.
Chain (static analysis): DOC-*.vbs -> regsvr32 /i:%TEMP%\t<digits>.sct scrobj.dll (recon scriptlet) -> installer scriptlet -> C:\<8 letters>\ with signed AutoIt3 (renamed) + compiled script -> in-memory dhlib.dll (InitModule) -> AES container from the operator panel -> hollowed attrib.exe -> FluxEngine client. C2 address is read from a DNS TXT record through the Cloudflare API with an embedded token.
Rules, IOCs: https://github.com/harperjohnsai/detections/tree/main/iocs/2026-11-fluxengine
Harper Johns, security researcher
More research: youtube.com/@HarperJohnsAI