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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 f03b8beef33330786b3f3f12e2bf2c352d4f14b8e6d5a78180205c7cccdcefb7. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



Threat unknown


Vendor detections: 6


Intelligence 6 IOCs YARA 1 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: f03b8beef33330786b3f3f12e2bf2c352d4f14b8e6d5a78180205c7cccdcefb7
SHA3-384 hash: 98b41c9f7e1323a4e2cb6eb9b69f6ade7410eb9157988c91417b5dc65789d1a8988dfff354431b206962221ab7f90dd8
SHA1 hash: fa8916bf8fbc6d005ad557d3c667a4acaf94597c
MD5 hash: 63089f358f4b727a4d8e5437870bbf5f
humanhash: chicken-eleven-tennessee-six
File name:macho_f03b8beef333.bin
Download: download sample
File size:954'528 bytes
First seen:2026-09-20 15:15:34 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:php macho
MIME type:application/x-mach-binary
ssdeep 24576:/3xHNwzCgxFk9RmsmdulILh9cOTdqNRQ0:/tNvrmduBv
TLSH T18E15F141CE7254D6F4CCDA353A3A4B334E21756086C951DE23E12E88DE763E3F62B25A
TrID 69.8% (.DYLIB) Mac OS X Mach-O universal Dynamically linked shared Library (32500/1/5)
15.0% (.O/DYLIB/BUNDLE) Mac OS X Universal Binary (generic) (7002/2)
15.0% (.CLASS) Java bytecode (7001/2/1)
Magika macho
Reporter c4ffeine
Tags:ClickFix Foxveil Loader Mach-O machO macOS


Avatar
c4ffeine
Foxveil 'cc2' build Mach-O, the SEVENTH payload served from this one URL (fat x86_64+arm64, 954,528 B), fetched via Tor 2026-09-20 15:12 UTC, origin build time 15:02:41. nginx encodes the build time in the ETag, so the operator's rebuild schedule is readable without touching the host. Every payload build observed behind this URL lands in the same minute of the hour: 2026-09-20 07:02:41, 09:02:47, 11:03:28, 14:01:46 and 15:02:41 UTC. The hour spacing varies (two hours, two hours, just under three, then one), but the HH:02-03 slot does not, which points at a scheduled repack job rather than packing per request. A separate test on an earlier build supports that: six HEAD requests down six distinct Tor circuits, landing on four different Cloudflare edges, all returned the same ETag. Hash sequence on the same URL: a3dabccd14492f4c70658ece96a3ed7b4e275ff9d70c434298bd6f863d1e24b9 (987,264 B, 2026-09-18), ec780ca8df9d10df905f3f77641f88ece7651303843802c37a57c484c6251a42 (937,424 B), 610ae82d0d872334ba68718030bdeb0c2d23ce592b4c9022fbb225b0208b884a (1,003,328 B), 233fd2c05865e6fc7034e61bf98e64f7afeb24c1b3e88539895eeff764ebb740 (937,152 B), 336f4bf8eb4d76c91f936beabe3a061b43db46d2cc85e6dc82dd22f9194191fc (952,800 B), 8e7d88f5adef0f2706fbc6df433e3c76d81c4b799389319e60a4639fc1c088a1 (953,280 B), then this one. The stage-1 zsh dropper at the same host has stayed byte-identical since 2026-09-18 12:56:51 (sha256 6e753133e537264247a08587d87b30b8d9a96caea1d6cc92d41fc8058073b8f7), re-checked at the time of this fetch: the delivery chain is fixed and only the payload rotates, which is why every build in this series arrives at 0 detections. Static analysis of four earlier builds in the series recovered the same AMOS AppleScript stealer each time, decrypted with a key derived from the SHA-256 of the loader's own __text section, so each repack rekeys itself with no separate key management. Host answers HTTP 200 only to a curl User-Agent; browser User-Agents get a 16-byte Cloudflare 520 on every path including the root. Analysis of this build is pending. Not executed.

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
71
Origin country :
US US
Vendor Threat Intelligence
No detections
Verdict:
Unknown
Threat level:
  2.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
masquerade
Score:
100%
Verdict:
Malware
File Type:
Mach-O universal binary
Malware family:
AtomicStealer
Verdict:
Malicious
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:Foxveil_Loader_B64_Variant
Description:Foxveil macOS loader, 2026-09-18 apph4/cc2 repackaging: no dlsym and no ad-hoc setup- identity, symbols resolved by walking loaded images via __dyld_image_count/__dyld_get_image_header/__dyld_get_image_vmaddr_slide, empty __AUX segment in both slices, payload stored as a long base64 chunk array

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

php macho f03b8beef33330786b3f3f12e2bf2c352d4f14b8e6d5a78180205c7cccdcefb7

(this sample)

Comments