MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 efa9015c2a50a3b7184d201badbe5037764e8dbf61d4267f1479f2150f219d02. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



Formbook


Vendor detections: 19


Intelligence 19 IOCs YARA 22 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: efa9015c2a50a3b7184d201badbe5037764e8dbf61d4267f1479f2150f219d02
SHA3-384 hash: f1eca72830321fa5eb648e22c9b34a4b66faefcc6f47c0b6c3b977510d6cf5ab72e4112076409f01d359d6acf3dc2b22
SHA1 hash: 31d6c3884f76b1fdef7784ebcfd5023f0798280c
MD5 hash: 6384a444f857ae97788bafad515dc9f3
humanhash: lake-bravo-undress-eight
File name:TNT Havayolları #8013580.exe
Download: download sample
Signature Formbook
File size:899'072 bytes
First seen:2025-05-02 06:23:59 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'649 x AgentTesla, 19'461 x Formbook, 12'202 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 24576:gbOx+y+w+Ls4HjZ1bc48WlkLlAGXHtACf:1BFQs4V1bcvzPiC
Threatray 3'434 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T1E015F1447714CB06C9610BB18A26E3F123789D9EE812D7936FE53EDFB832B149A047D6
TrID 71.1% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
10.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
2.0% (.ICL) Windows Icons Library (generic) (2059/9)
Magika pebin
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:exe FormBook TNT

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
442
Origin country :
NL NL
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
agenttesla
ID:
1
File name:
TNT Havayolları #8013580.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2025-05-02 06:47:16 UTC
Tags:
evasion stealer ftp exfiltration agenttesla

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.1%
Tags:
agenttesla lien
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a window
Сreating synchronization primitives
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Enabling the 'hidden' option for recently created files
Adding an access-denied ACE
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Launching a process
Searching for synchronization primitives
Launching the default Windows debugger (dwwin.exe)
Adding an exclusion to Microsoft Defender
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
  7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
obfuscated packed packed packer_detected
Result
Threat name:
AgentTesla
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.spyw.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Found malware configuration
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected AntiVM3
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1679637 Sample: TNT Havayollar#U0131 #8013580.exe Startdate: 02/05/2025 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 49 ip-api.com 2->49 61 Found malware configuration 2->61 63 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->63 65 Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location 2->65 67 13 other signatures 2->67 8 TNT Havayollar#U0131 #8013580.exe 7 2->8         started        12 ZVIjJO.exe 5 2->12         started        14 svchost.exe 2->14         started        signatures3 process4 dnsIp5 41 C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZVIjJO.exe, PE32 8->41 dropped 43 C:\Users\user\...\ZVIjJO.exe:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 8->43 dropped 45 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\tmp9500.tmp, XML 8->45 dropped 47 C:\...\TNT Havayollar#U0131 #8013580.exe.log, ASCII 8->47 dropped 69 Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function) 8->69 71 Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender 8->71 73 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 8->73 17 powershell.exe 23 8->17         started        20 powershell.exe 23 8->20         started        22 TNT Havayollar#U0131 #8013580.exe 15 2 8->22         started        25 schtasks.exe 1 8->25         started        75 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 12->75 77 Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines) 12->77 79 Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines) 12->79 27 ZVIjJO.exe 12->27         started        29 schtasks.exe 12->29         started        53 127.0.0.1 unknown unknown 14->53 file6 signatures7 process8 dnsIp9 55 Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module 17->55 31 conhost.exe 17->31         started        33 WmiPrvSE.exe 17->33         started        35 conhost.exe 20->35         started        51 ip-api.com 208.95.112.1, 49681, 49682, 80 TUT-ASUS United States 22->51 37 conhost.exe 25->37         started        57 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access) 27->57 59 Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc) 27->59 39 conhost.exe 29->39         started        signatures10 process11
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.GenSteal
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2025-05-01 12:18:09 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
12
AV detection:
20 of 23 (86.96%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
n/a
Score:
  8/10
Tags:
discovery execution
Behaviour
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Enumerates physical storage devices
Program crash
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Checks computer location settings
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
c1e6d029f74e71f88ab5981e6b0816e40068e508bfc2dba53c605719fecbfe04
MD5 hash:
84c0478fff41b21a6b7fe9543637769f
SHA1 hash:
348289721986c0519bde9473eacf46893416272d
Detections:
SUSP_OBF_NET_ConfuserEx_Name_Pattern_Jan24 SUSP_OBF_NET_Reactor_Indicators_Jan24
SH256 hash:
7c7afd6fc75f255fefdc539b39f354e098f9ac1598cf5f2f51e10c104f6e1851
MD5 hash:
2dd80e785114fc2f92a342608e93ba5b
SHA1 hash:
4be8713b7b2a796bbb63329278b2221c45090ac6
Detections:
win_agent_tesla_g2 INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01 INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxHookingDLL INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID MALWARE_Win_AgentTeslaV2 Agenttesla_type2
Parent samples :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 hash:
b242ad7fad9723e769340e8d6de52706a504dc76d5ad905d4be8a78c5797e7af
MD5 hash:
2aa140d7e89a34db2261ea546d554348
SHA1 hash:
7bca5d640578d47445ee6933fbeaac6cda78eb10
Detections:
INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_SmartAssembly
Parent samples :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b3752b8138360ee7ab6f3583c942f1d2ee806f7ede9123ada34abbf27a055633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5f63d86d5175fe1b15194dedb48e5eadb0ae1f4656b3ca86a2055df558bdcafc
071c7e6ccfdfb3e88afad91f2e52148213aeb6c36d11155b940f6eaf57642cf0
fa07c7fc145471495727561a074add9874a3572f46dc6c340c3ed1d8646c032f
01b4740a5c1779f464a381836e4b5e95e8e360b46cd95d492cbee029ef06f029
6a39c812d087f3b770de7c05669007bb83d9fb0fc9563d17ee726c96d872af59
8fac642a58b28ce2d0d152bb0dfefc539f85dcbadc6fcd3de2bd9b060b4625c7
9e3ce6488f70a8cddb11c36dc9dc9cdd9cfffabd699d56237843377df8afa5c0
2d51ee60b5d5dc2bdd5de9319b9d174862af7bb205addfbe895bd59df9ac4a64
fd1f814527b20c677b1d8b366be6b75c08219b5c315f0d0d9f8535a13aba2c47
078cd1b6995a95e2057591899a7050da5799ad226afefd75fd442060efd1b027
083f0da491a84fd49f5abfc07b65d65931c1be5675a6a878495bc80880d98865
be0de5c578271405defd5391355546b521881957b891d7423f1d0a7d04cc6bb3
d4020dbe1d51f7f27e253deeb65f1fed6b788091f5adad460f035256ae198a81
b7c25110371e04e935dffad7ec2364cef2725b474f2d62064a369d0e1d3247ce
de1c33694def3b635687a1be3fd3ea586273ef148a664b566b02b187ef2688db
4b6a5d12756b9e746f8bb79d52298927a1116f659e89b8727d0f3f188e1638d9
96abdb9ad0db8612acab489da720957eb633e12c74e6de77d3e81dab6b7b63b5
83720bec38d91097735649d6c29d406f7c1d7521f67e69cafce0437743cf3ebb
ba9856286b079931468e0a80830ae8855efdf38462f467dc7bc91f8a0ccd39e5
736f86e7a431a4307a6ca7ff1650d32a8cb8d68426f6336f87b2041978541d6e
e22479542da314d41da623dd86740e38da3563ea109c0f258e1f6c8993fd468f
73d47bc6706b395ab8a96c53d23af3eaf4faf4c8b92f595b0714c8040096bd5b
b9b8fb27a1f249497e04a36a2c0add5059138a953982e91fa26b293e7c15ef41
f86c8270277c5a7e0213bd9b864d39602f4e46364323b18ea931eba3573ac2aa
b7c7a3bd36dc7993df91c0a108529dd073751f8dc823672f47e5ba128be0f4db
SH256 hash:
efa9015c2a50a3b7184d201badbe5037764e8dbf61d4267f1479f2150f219d02
MD5 hash:
6384a444f857ae97788bafad515dc9f3
SHA1 hash:
31d6c3884f76b1fdef7784ebcfd5023f0798280c
Malware family:
AgentTesla
Verdict:
Malicious
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AgentTeslaV2
Author:ditekshen
Description:AgenetTesla Type 2 Keylogger payload
Rule name:AgentTeslaV3
Author:ditekshen
Description:AgentTeslaV3 infostealer payload
Rule name:AgentTeslaV5
Author:ClaudioWayne
Description:AgentTeslaV5 infostealer payload
Rule name:AgentTesla_DIFF_Common_Strings_01
Author:schmidtsz
Description:Identify partial Agent Tesla strings
Rule name:Agenttesla_type2
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect Agenttesla in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detect packed .NET executables. Mostly AgentTeslaV4.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects binaries (Windows and macOS) referencing many web browsers. Observed in information stealers.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many confidential data stores found in browsers, mail clients, cryptocurreny wallets, etc. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many email and collaboration clients. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many file transfer clients. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxHookingDLL
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects binaries and memory artifacts referencing sandbox DLLs typically observed in sandbox evasion
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing Windows vault credential objects. Observed in infostealers
Rule name:malware_Agenttesla_type2
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect Agenttesla in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:MALWARE_Win_AgentTeslaV2
Author:ditekSHen
Description:AgenetTesla Type 2 Keylogger payload
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_9f4a80b2
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_AgentTesla_ebf431a8
Author:Elastic Security
Reference:https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/attack-chain-leads-to-xworm-and-agenttesla

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

BLint


The following table provides more information about this file using BLint. BLint is a Binary Linter to check the security properties, and capabilities in executables.

Findings
IDTitleSeverity
CHECK_AUTHENTICODEMissing Authenticodehigh
CHECK_DLL_CHARACTERISTICSMissing dll Security Characteristics (HIGH_ENTROPY_VA)high

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