MalwareBazaar Database
You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 ee5322a880cecfdf50b58720838d0d54b4f6cf8384d77d5701c8f714d50f10b6. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.
Database Entry
Mirai
Vendor detections: 5
| SHA256 hash: | ee5322a880cecfdf50b58720838d0d54b4f6cf8384d77d5701c8f714d50f10b6 |
|---|---|
| SHA3-384 hash: | e978af05944545be991f6fe4eebde66fcc2afd4d26e3fdaf1bc7a9821a8bd2cac0072037a56eb2c1f1ea61228016b37a |
| SHA1 hash: | 8e525343d5665a53c1302d39c8cce1a2317b0784 |
| MD5 hash: | e923e5c41f55a85e483252e8e7d58bfb |
| humanhash: | jersey-beryllium-lemon-green |
| File name: | ee5322a880cecfdf50b58720838d0d54b4f6cf8384d77d5701c8f714d50f10b6 |
| Download: | download sample |
| Signature | Mirai |
| File size: | 446'496 bytes |
| First seen: | 2026-08-28 16:42:08 UTC |
| Last seen: | Never |
| File type: | elf |
| MIME type: | application/x-executable |
| ssdeep | 6144:QuBZn/Mi/Gx+x/Nv1sgQV7Fj7477F16qKpjJ5XC5h5uqS:/Zkiux+xlNsX7l747GqK0RlS |
| TLSH | T1D1946C1BA9D084BDC4D5C0B48B9FC307EA32F8596130BE9B57D96F613E26EA0A31D741 |
| telfhash | t1a6b1433a04fab92571d6c910b302f6bd2cb2222583e975713453a8d9edddbc24d77c62 |
| TrID | 50.1% (.) ELF Executable and Linkable format (Linux) (4022/12) 49.8% (.O) ELF Executable and Linkable format (generic) (4000/1) |
| Magika | elf |
| Reporter | |
| Tags: | antidebug backdoor dtls elf mbedtls mirai RAT x86-64 |
Intelligence
File Origin
USVendor Threat Intelligence
Result
Behaviour
Botnet C2s
YARA Signatures
MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.
| Rule name: | BLOWFISH_Constants |
|---|---|
| Author: | phoul (@phoul) |
| Description: | Look for Blowfish constants |
| Rule name: | DetectEncryptedVariants |
|---|---|
| Author: | Zinyth |
| Description: | Detects 'encrypted' in ASCII, Unicode, base64, or hex-encoded |
| Rule name: | enterpriseapps2 |
|---|---|
| Author: | Tim Brown @timb_machine |
| Description: | Enterprise apps |
| Rule name: | linux_generic_ipv6_catcher |
|---|---|
| Author: | @_lubiedo |
| Description: | ELF samples using IPv6 addresses |
| Rule name: | MD5_Constants |
|---|---|
| Author: | phoul (@phoul) |
| Description: | Look for MD5 constants |
| Rule name: | RANSOMWARE |
|---|---|
| Author: | ToroGuitar |
| Rule name: | RIPEMD160_Constants |
|---|---|
| Author: | phoul (@phoul) |
| Description: | Look for RIPEMD-160 constants |
| Rule name: | SHA1_Constants |
|---|---|
| Author: | phoul (@phoul) |
| Description: | Look for SHA1 constants |
| Rule name: | SHA512_Constants |
|---|---|
| Author: | phoul (@phoul) |
| Description: | Look for SHA384/SHA512 constants |
| Rule name: | TH_Generic_MassHunt_Linux_Malware_2026_CYFARE |
|---|---|
| Author: | CYFARE |
| Description: | Generic Linux malware mass-hunt rule - 2026 |
| Reference: | https://cyfare.net/ |
| Rule name: | unixredflags3 |
|---|---|
| Author: | Tim Brown @timb_machine |
| Description: | Hunts for UNIX red flags |
File information
The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.
Comments
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You need to login to in order to write a comment. Login with your abuse.ch account.Linux x86-64 backdoor. Static, stripped, not packed. No family name: it matches
nothing I could find. Found on an internet-facing host after compromise.
C2 is DTLS over UDP, built on mbedTLS. The DTLS code is complete: reassembly,
epochs, retransmission, HelloVerifyRequest cookies. Client and server state
machines are both present and it calls bind(), so it can listen as well as
beacon. It verifies the peer certificate. It also speaks HTTP.
Capabilities: shell (/bin/sh via fork/execve with pipes), full file read/write
and delete, directory listing (getdents64), setuid/setgid, setsid daemonising,
kill, setrlimit and scheduler control, and mprotect. Interactive access, not a
bot.
Anti-debug: reads /proc/self/status and checks TracerPid twice. It never calls
ptrace, so ptrace-based bypasses do not apply.
Strings are obfuscated with repeating-key XOR at 0x402f9d (buf[i] ^= key[i %
strlen(key)]). Two 64-byte ASCII keys, which should work on sibling samples:
0x455950 &s7xNXr97qNg8fAA]Q#J1eSmXvwS!A]nvRBtwB;.frq<pUN>s9SVuR)Qn**km0e
0x455970 vRBtwB;.frq<pUN>s9SVuR)Qn**km0e;B??$7h89Ew6Z<pb&[7G!m9@dR?4rj5D
The C2 address is not in the file, in any encoding I could find. Config is
decrypted at runtime from a dropped file or the first packet.