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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 ebd9d6ef8b792ba88aa5edbd9bc093ec8739729fecc8507c8d3b158c02f09024. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 19


Intelligence 19 IOCs YARA 23 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: ebd9d6ef8b792ba88aa5edbd9bc093ec8739729fecc8507c8d3b158c02f09024
SHA3-384 hash: 8da8cfe0161de25e94bb65c10c799264753d149a2984a311c0b4cb5da5872dfcd3fcf90b87a0386f813b0b9874ef5584
SHA1 hash: 9ee6f8b5afcdef110f24835004979b899dee94ed
MD5 hash: 16a2b7f149c3196299232a6d30d414aa
humanhash: lion-hawaii-hawaii-jersey
File name:CM88APP.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:28'160 bytes
First seen:2026-09-06 19:58:09 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (49'233 x AgentTesla, 20'488 x Formbook, 12'372 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 384:ATdv2D9YfxWceOsVa/KFHbxFH9qbuUsDbQxnCJfJBndnjJ3KxB+:edvhi1VDHVFIbdBiBnOxB+
TLSH T1E5C22C0873E8C572D2FE4ABA883385009775D55B9913D76A6FC890AE2E237CD8B14FD4
TrID 70.4% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
6.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2)
4.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter rifteyy
Tags:AsyncRAT exe RAT

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
158
Origin country :
CZ CZ
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
CM88APP.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-09-06 09:24:48 UTC
Tags:
rat asyncrat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
DNS request
Connection attempt
Sending a custom TCP request
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
  7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm base64 fingerprint lolbin obfuscated reconnaissance reg schtasks vbnet
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2026-09-06T07:36:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-09-08T04:42:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Verdict:
AsyncRAT
YARA:
10 match(es)
Tags:
.Net AsyncRAT Executable Managed .NET PDB Path PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.20 Win 32 Exe x86
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
CNC: cm888.mobi
PORT: 43
Threat name:
Win32.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-09-06 16:06:00 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
1
AV detection:
33 of 38 (86.84%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat discovery rat
Behaviour
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Family: AsyncRat
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
ebd9d6ef8b792ba88aa5edbd9bc093ec8739729fecc8507c8d3b158c02f09024
MD5 hash:
16a2b7f149c3196299232a6d30d414aa
SHA1 hash:
9ee6f8b5afcdef110f24835004979b899dee94ed
Detections:
AsyncRAT win_asyncrat_w0
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AsyncRat
Author:kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:AsyncRat Payload
Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:AsyncRAT_057B
Author:kirkderp
Description:AsyncRAT 0.5.7B -- minimal .NET RAT with PBKDF2 key derivation and MessagePack serialization
Reference:https://github.com/kirkderp/yara
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp
Rule name:MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects AsyncRAT
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (https://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, packers and suspicious executables. NOTE: This rule may produce false positives. Updated May 2026 to reduce False Positives.
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:rat_win_asyncrat
Author:Sekoia.io
Description:Detect AsyncRAT based on specific strings
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:SUSP_Reverse_Run_Key
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects a Reversed Run Key
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2026-09-06 20:01:12 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "ebd9d6ef8b792ba88aa5edbd9bc093ec8739729fecc8507c8d3b158c02f09024",
"yara_possible_family": "asyncrat",
"key": "None",
"salt": "None",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"443"
],
"Hosts": [
"cm888.mobi"
],
"Version": "0.5.7B",
"Install": "false",
"InstallFolder": "AppData",
"InstallFile": "Test.exe",
"Key": "NYAN CAT",
"Mutex": "%MTX%",
"Certificate": "%Certificate%",
"Serversignature": "%Serversignature%",
"Anti": "false",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BDOS": "false",
"Delay": "0",
"Group": "Debug"
}
}