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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 e6b2c9a7643b588e5eedaf8cb33eef7cc7727f82ad4a3d1dc41233ce4569b11c. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry


AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 13


Intelligence 13 IOCs YARA 18 File information Comments
Download sample Add tag Delete this sample Report a False Positive

SHA256 hash: e6b2c9a7643b588e5eedaf8cb33eef7cc7727f82ad4a3d1dc41233ce4569b11c
SHA3-384 hash: 7ea3e0b6b541e0d038cd332d087ed7321b8a3bd546637ca9139d304912c5d7e867747d50e17bd3a7e995a2781774fb7a
SHA1 hash: de21f29399b4d8a162b29da27dac9d7f4ae42cdd
MD5 hash: 33095124f672cef377a5ee58dfa2f01a
humanhash: princess-missouri-mobile-oxygen
File name:SOLICITUD DE COTIZACIÓN BATSO.vbs
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
Create hunting rule
File size:191'529 bytes
First seen:2026-10-29 07:11:01 UTC
Last seen:2026-10-29 12:39:35 UTC
File type:Visual Basic Script (vbs) vbs
MIME type:text/plain
ssdeep 3072:Zi6d4td5HgUGmjxmpK3qbD86uq5MwNHm1Pk2dAUdQIWADDou9eSxmcjBnoJd9lWp:Z3k2UrtfqMXq5M5PCUGQMoKso43
TLSH T1E914F1863D457B5FE6C936AC0E50EA1F67882096932F79823CCB0E55C6B9073D9F99C0
Magika vba
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:AsyncRAT RAT vbs

Intelligence

File Origin
# of uploads :
2
# of downloads :
237
Origin country :
SE SE
Vendor Threat Intelligence
No detections
Detection:
XWorm
Create hunting rule
Link:
https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/95928/
Detection(s):
SecuriteInfo.com.VB.Trojan.Valyria.11904.47512936.UNOFFICIAL
Create hunting rule

Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
96.5%
Link:
https://cyber-fortress.com/docs/result/index.php?id=6ae2f1a3b175ade21dce7c69
Tags:
valyria houdini shell sage
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm cmd encrypted fingerprint lolbin lolbin obfuscated schtasks wscript
Link:
https://www.filescan.io/uploads/6ae2f19b644d33fa93e4211a/reports/69d427ee-8619-46f5-b710-c0424ab446c9/overview
Verdict:
Malicious
Labled as:
Valyria
Link:
https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e6b2c9a7643b588e5eedaf8cb33eef7cc7727f82ad4a3d1dc41233ce4569b11c
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
vbs
First seen:
2026-10-28T14:06:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-10-30T22:22:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10000
Link:
https://opentip.kaspersky.com/e6b2c9a7643b588e5eedaf8cb33eef7cc7727f82ad4a3d1dc41233ce4569b11c/results?tab=lookup
Result
Threat name:
XWorm
Create hunting rule
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Link:
https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1994476
Signature
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
AI detected malicious Powershell script
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Command shell drops VBS files
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Potential malicious VBS script found (has network functionality)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments
Sigma detected: Cscript/Wscript Uncommon Script Extension Execution
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript called in batch mode (surpress errors)
WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected XWorm
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
Download SVG
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1994476 Sample: SOLICITUD DE COTIZACI#U00d3... Startdate: 29/10/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 72 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->72 74 Found malware configuration 2->74 76 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->76 78 15 other signatures 2->78 8 wscript.exe 2 2->8         started        12 wscript.exe 2 2->12         started        process3 file4 60 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\lt9l9qkx.dat, ASCII 8->60 dropped 88 VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions 8->88 90 Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines) 8->90 92 Suspicious powershell command line found 8->92 96 5 other signatures 8->96 14 wscript.exe 3 8->14         started        94 WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script) 12->94 18 wscript.exe 12->18         started        signatures5 process6 file7 62 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\mfp_x28227.xml, XML 14->62 dropped 64 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\item_05bb19f3.ps1, ASCII 14->64 dropped 98 Suspicious powershell command line found 14->98 100 Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly) 14->100 102 Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage) 14->102 20 powershell.exe 16 14->20         started        23 cmd.exe 3 14->23         started        26 cmd.exe 2 14->26         started        34 2 other processes 14->34 66 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\mfp_x48629.xml, XML 18->66 dropped 68 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\temp_e502bed9.ps1, ASCII 18->68 dropped 104 WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script) 18->104 28 powershell.exe 18->28         started        30 cmd.exe 18->30         started        32 cmd.exe 18->32         started        36 2 other processes 18->36 signatures8 process9 file10 80 Suspicious execution chain found 20->80 38 RegAsm.exe 2 20->38         started        42 conhost.exe 20->42         started        58 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\PhotoStudio.vbs, ASCII 23->58 dropped 82 Command shell drops VBS files 23->82 44 conhost.exe 23->44         started        84 Potential malicious VBS script found (has network functionality) 26->84 46 conhost.exe 26->46         started        52 2 other processes 28->52 48 conhost.exe 30->48         started        50 conhost.exe 32->50         started        54 2 other processes 34->54 56 2 other processes 36->56 signatures11 process12 dnsIp13 70 23.132.164.57, 49709, 7007 NETIFACE-ASGB Netherlands 38->70 86 Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines) 38->86 signatures14
Score:
89%
Verdict:
Malware
File Type:
SCRIPT
Link:
https://malprob.io/report/e6b2c9a7643b588e5eedaf8cb33eef7cc7727f82ad4a3d1dc41233ce4569b11c
Verdict:
Malware
YARA:
2 match(es)
Tags:
COM Behavior Trace DeObfuscated Obfuscated SOS: 0.24 T1027 T1059.005 VBScript
Link:
https://app.malva.re/file/33095124f672cef377a5ee58dfa2f01a
Detection:
n/a
Link:
https://mwdb.cert.pl/sample/e6b2c9a7643b588e5eedaf8cb33eef7cc7727f82ad4a3d1dc41233ce4569b11c/
Threat name:
Script-WScript.Trojan.Multiverze
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Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-10-28 19:37:08 UTC
File Type:
Text
AV detection:
12 of 23 (52.17%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Detection(s):
Malicious file
Link:
https://check.spamhaus.org/check/?searchterm=42zmtj3ehnmi4xxnv6glgpxpptdxe74cvvfd2hoeciz44rljweoa._file
Result
Malware family:
xworm
Create hunting rule
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:xworm defense_evasion discovery execution persistence rat trojan
Link:
https://tria.ge/reports/261029-hz3xwsxw3n/
Behaviour
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Executes a command shell one-liner
Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Enumerates video capture drivers
Executes a VBScript file via the Windows Script Host.
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Checks computer location settings
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Detect Xworm Payload
Family: Xworm
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
23.132.164.57:7007
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.
Threat name:
Malicious File
Score:
1.00
Link:
https://yomi.yoroi.company/submissions/e6b2c9a7643b588e5eedaf8cb33eef7cc7727f82ad4a3d1dc41233ce4569b11c

YARA Signatures

MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:ByteCode_MSIL_Backdoor_AsyncRAT
Create hunting rule
Author:ReversingLabs
Description:Yara rule that detects AsyncRAT backdoor.
Rule name:Detect_PowerShell_Obfuscation
Create hunting rule
Author:daniyyell
Description:Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands commonly used in malicious scripts.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_NoneWindowsUA
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects Windows executables referencing non-Windows User-Agents
Rule name:MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects AsyncRAT
Rule name:MALWARE_Win_XWorm
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects XWorm
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Family_V_0_5_8
Create hunting rule
Author:Trezzza
Description:Detects AsyncRAT version 0.5.8 and some other versions of AsyncRAT. The name reflects the analysed sample.
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Create hunting rule
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Create hunting rule
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Create hunting rule
Rule name:rat_win_xworm_v3
Create hunting rule
Author:Sekoia.io
Description:Finds XWorm (version XClient, v3) samples based on characteristic strings
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Create hunting rule
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Create hunting rule
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Create hunting rule
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Create hunting rule
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:WIN_Malware_XWorm_ForgeAuto_6b06c990_Extrait
Create hunting rule
Author:Marjoriefort
Description:Detects XWorm (pe, etat extrait)
Rule name:WIN_Sample_Unique_69354b41
Create hunting rule
Author:Marjoriefort
Description:Specimen unique (soumission Bazaar) - strings distinctifs propres au sample
Reference:69354b41e10daf03d3f3af881b32d5c0fec56b1cfe96629fd4c5263413a42854.exe
Rule name:win_xworm_w0
Create hunting rule
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Description:Detects win.xworm.
Rule name:xworm
Create hunting rule
Author:jeFF0Falltrades

File information

The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Cape
Cape
https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/95928/

Comments