MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry

AsyncRAT

Vendor detections: 20

Intelligence 20 IOCs YARA 23 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash:	e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7
SHA3-384 hash:	049792d9ba3ecfdbc2617e8081ee934af760242154db44bafe4956e97b4ddf2e5a34812bda56c1f6b67d49bb9a4424da
SHA1 hash:	ddca151d4d96fe062efa306c9c3f68a00267791a
MD5 hash:	21c0d80b1c30f7b7c1d3c402bf4a50d4
humanhash:	five-orange-fruit-bakerloo
File name:	vibesync.exe
Download:	download sample
Signature	AsyncRAT Create hunting rule
File size:	213'504 bytes
First seen:	2026-05-14 05:49:02 UTC
Last seen:	Never
File type:	exe
MIME type:	application/x-dosexec
imphash	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (49'006 x AgentTesla, 19'914 x Formbook, 12'332 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep	3072:hubyT5Pk2g0mgbSnnPZYA6iQoqqs4VQeO3:hubWNMgbkPE5oLjVjO
Threatray	1 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH	T1B824501C05F08667E5BB8BB356AED138067B55A17C0A40CE74D427AA3AFFA85C6C3707
TrID	70.4% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13) 6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2) 6.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2) 4.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1) 4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika	pebin
dhash icon	2814716971d4c42b (5 x QuasarRAT, 1 x AsyncRAT)
Reporter	Anonymous
Tags:	anarchyrat AsyncRAT autorun Dotnet exe obfuscated RAT

Anonymous

vibesync.exe is an AnarchyRAT/AsyncRAT trojan (MSIL) flagged by 52/71 vendors on VirusTotal (TROJAN.MSIL/ASYNCRAT). Score 100/100 on threat.rip and AnyRun. Tags: anarchyrat, asyncrat, auto-reg, spreader. Compiled with VB.NET (.NET 4.0.30319), size 208.5 KB. Shares identical Imphash (f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744) with multiple samples from the same campaign including DcRAT (exodusvip.exe), DcRAT (aa88pro.exe), and QuasarRAT (Client.exe) — all built by the same threat actor. Creation time: 2023-10-16 21:40:53 UTC. First submitted: 2026-05-14. SHA256: e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

Intelligence

File Origin

# of uploads :

# of downloads :

193

Origin country :

Vendor Threat Intelligence

Malware configuration found for:

AsyncRAT

Details

AsyncRAT

c2 socket addresses or a dead drop resolver url, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group

Link:

https://research.acce.ciphertechsolutions.com/results/606381f9-15ae-4430-a4fc-88c0597938f4/

Malware family:

asyncrat

ID:

File name:

vibesync.exe

Verdict:

Malicious activity

Analysis date:

2026-05-14 05:39:56 UTC

Tags:

auto-reg rat asyncrat

Link:

https://app.any.run/tasks/0f5e13d8-b0ad-4850-bfee-6535609fc216

Note:

ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample

Detection:

AsyncRAT

Link:

https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/65840/

Detection(s):

Win.Packed.Razy-9625918-0

Win.Packed.AsyncRAT-9856570-1

YARA.SEKOIA_Rat_Win_Asyncrat.UNOFFICIAL

Verdict:

Malicious

Score:

99.9%

Link:

https://cyber-fortress.com/docs/result/index.php?id=6a05602b46d6967b3d903b31

Tags:

asyncrat autorun

Result

Verdict:

Malware

Maliciousness:

Behaviour

Сreating synchronization primitives

Running batch commands

Creating a process with a hidden window

Creating a file in the %AppData% directory

Creating a file in the %temp% directory

Creating a file

Launching a service

Launching a process

Creating a process from a recently created file

DNS request

Connection attempt

Sending a custom TCP request

Unauthorized injection to a recently created process

Enabling autorun by creating a file

Verdict:

Malicious

Threat level:

10/10

Confidence:

100%

Tags:

anti-vm asyncrat asyncrat base64 config-extracted dcrat fareit fingerprint lolbin obfuscated razy reconnaissance reg schtasks unsafe vbnet windows

Link:

https://www.filescan.io/uploads/6a05625d2fcb905ec2964788/reports/8302bc87-df42-4d92-9655-87e19c4c998c/overview

Verdict:

Malicious

Labled as:

Application.MSILheracles.Generic

Link:

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

Verdict:

Malicious

File Type:

exe x32

First seen:

2026-05-14T02:44:00Z UTC

Last seen:

2026-05-16T00:38:00Z UTC

Hits:

~10

Detections:

Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.c Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.b HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust

Link:

https://opentip.kaspersky.com/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7/results?tab=lookup

Verdict:

Malicious

Link:

https://analyze.intezer.com/analyses/ee423784-211e-4cd4-b3f3-b3f8dfe7246d

Score:

100%

Verdict:

Malware

File Type:

Link:

https://malprob.io/report/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

Verdict:

AsyncRAT

YARA:

14 match(es)

Tags:

.Net AsyncRAT Executable Managed .NET PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.21 Win 32 Exe x86

Malware Config

C2 Extraction:

PORT: 43,53,80,443,8080,8888

Link:

https://app.malva.re/file/21c0d80b1c30f7b7c1d3c402bf4a50d4

Detection:

asyncrat

Link:

https://mwdb.cert.pl/sample/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7/

Verdict:

Malicious

Threat:

Family.ANARCHYRAT

Link:

https://tip.neiki.dev/file/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

Threat name:

ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT

Status:

Malicious

First seen:

2026-05-14 05:40:22 UTC

File Type:

PE (.Net Exe)

Extracted files:

AV detection:

23 of 24 (95.83%)

Threat level:

5/5

Detection(s):

Suspicious file

Link:

https://check.spamhaus.org/check/?searchterm=4qnwag4cppsn54rvvhkan6bw264yd7pqrud64agt5sojaa7uallq._file

Verdict:

malicious

Label(s):

asyncrat

Similar samples:

error

AsyncRAT

Gathering data

Unpacked files

SH256 hash:

e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

MD5 hash:

21c0d80b1c30f7b7c1d3c402bf4a50d4

SHA1 hash:

ddca151d4d96fe062efa306c9c3f68a00267791a

Detections:

AsyncRAT

Link:

https://www.unpac.me/results/74e9fc5e-2a9d-4ca2-bfdf-f3dcfab3d067/

Malware family:

AsyncRAT

Verdict:

Malicious

Link:

https://www.vmray.com/analyses/_mb/e41b601b827b/report/overview.html

Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

Threat name:

iSpy Keylogger

Score:

1.00

Link:

https://yomi.yoroi.company/submissions/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

YARA Signatures

MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:	AsyncRat Create hunting rule
Author:	kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:	AsyncRat Payload

Rule name:	asyncrat Create hunting rule
Author:	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:	detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:	internal research

Rule name:	AsyncRAT_057B Create hunting rule
Author:	kirkderp
Description:	AsyncRAT 0.5.7B -- minimal .NET RAT with PBKDF2 key derivation and MessagePack serialization
Reference:	https://github.com/kirkderp/yara

Rule name:	asyncrat_kingrat Create hunting rule
Author:	jeFF0Falltrades

Rule name:	DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI Create hunting rule
Reference:	https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara

Rule name:	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse Create hunting rule
Author:	ditekSHen
Description:	Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys

Rule name:	malware_asyncrat Create hunting rule
Author:	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:	detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:	internal research

Rule name:	malware_asyncrat Create hunting rule
Description:	detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:	https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp

Rule name:	Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE Create hunting rule
Author:	Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:	Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.

Rule name:	msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse Create hunting rule
Author:	dr4k0nia
Description:	Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse

Rule name:	Multifamily_RAT_Detection Create hunting rule
Author:	Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:	Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables

Rule name:	NET Create hunting rule
Author:	malware-lu

Rule name:	NETexecutableMicrosoft Create hunting rule
Author:	malware-lu

Rule name:	Njrat Create hunting rule
Author:	botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:	Njrat

Rule name:	pe_imphash Create hunting rule

Rule name:	Skystars_Malware_Imphash Create hunting rule
Author:	Skystars LightDefender
Description:	imphash

Rule name:	Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage Create hunting rule
Author:	XiAnzheng
Description:	May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)

Rule name:	VECT_Ransomware Create hunting rule
Author:	Mustafa Bakhit
Description:	Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.

Rule name:	Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc Create hunting rule
Author:	Elastic Security

Rule name:	win_asyncrat_bytecodes Create hunting rule
Author:	Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:	Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

Rule name:	win_asyncrat_j1 Create hunting rule
Author:	Johannes Bader @viql
Description:	detects AsyncRAT

Rule name:	win_asyncrat_unobfuscated Create hunting rule
Author:	Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:	Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

Rule name:	win_asyncrat_w0 Create hunting rule
Author:	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:	detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:	internal research

File information

The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

any.run

https://app.any.run/tasks/0f5e13d8-b0ad-4850-bfee-6535609fc216

Link

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

Link

https://app.threat.zone/submission/a8b791f8-8b91-4fd8-8ecd-62caf9180ea3/overview

Link

https://www.threat.rip/file/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

Link

https://hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7

Delivery method

Other

Cape

https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/65840/

Comments

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commented on 2026-05-14 05:50:59 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "e41b601b827be4def235a9d406f836d7b981fdf08d07ee00d3ec9c9003f402d7",
"yara_possible_family": "asyncrat",
"key": "922e74166be558ee7373489952540037f751d71d96d45fb25e7468c81bd866f8",
"salt": "bfeb1e56fbcd973bb219022430a57843003d5644d21e62b9d4f180e7e6c33941",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"443",
"80",
"53",
"43",
"8888",
"8080"
],
"Hosts": [
"distro.it.com",
"kimuro.sa.com",
"svgroup.ru.com",
"\u51fa\u4f1a\u3044\u6c96\u7e04.jp.net",
"xn--n8j214gc5buw6bphs.jp.net"
],
"Version": "0.5.8",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%AppData%",
"InstallFile": "vibesync.exe",
"Key": "S080R2FEMlBBM0tRSmp0ZWoxSUd5U0lWZlNTZ2pJZ2k=",
"Mutex": "EuFED4W760sw",
"Certificate": "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",
"Serversignature": "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",
"Anti": "false",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BDOS": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "3",
"Group": "vibe"
}
}