MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 d9549ad3ed734261a0029adbed59926fed150f14d0e44fb85fa583a9fe6327f3. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



QuasarRAT


Vendor detections: 9


Intelligence 9 IOCs YARA 13 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: d9549ad3ed734261a0029adbed59926fed150f14d0e44fb85fa583a9fe6327f3
SHA3-384 hash: 79e2b284d2b097d28e546290dc51faa1c51a9419d8f28dec57a533d4b3058b2e25f3541d743e97b043a806f1a051e8d0
SHA1 hash: 7ec02657e55ae021720eff31e5b6cc6a9ad7f3ae
MD5 hash: f327a7c7345daf0200bc8700c02d4d1a
humanhash: lima-oxygen-cardinal-network
File name:d9549ad3ed734261a0029adbed59926fed150f14d0e44fb85fa583a9fe6327f3
Download: download sample
Signature QuasarRAT
File size:2'110'792 bytes
First seen:2020-11-06 10:53:49 UTC
Last seen:2020-11-07 16:56:11 UTC
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash afcdf79be1557326c854b6e20cb900a7 (1'102 x FormBook, 936 x AgentTesla, 399 x RemcosRAT)
ssdeep 24576:su6J33O0c+JY5UZ+XC0kGso6FaI1IXgM6YmenKKSUlmDaGJTA4Pqa6jUvOkQwKYh:2u0c++OCvkGs9Fap5aLKLkDl+dUvO9Yr
Threatray 336 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH C9A5BE41A3DC82A1CE6A4372BA36DB219B777C692634F70E1ED83D7A3E723521518353
Reporter seifreed
Tags:QuasarRAT

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
2
# of downloads :
75
Origin country :
n/a
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Sending a UDP request
Creating a window
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a process from a recently created file
Launching a process
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Creating a file
Enabling the 'hidden' option for recently created files
Creating a process with a hidden window
DNS request
Sending an HTTP GET request
Creating a file in the %AppData% subdirectories
Setting a keyboard event handler
Running batch commands
Launching the default Windows debugger (dwwin.exe)
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Connection attempt to an infection source
Unauthorized injection to a system process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Result
Verdict:
MALICIOUS
Details
Windows PE Executable
Found a Windows Portable Executable (PE) binary. Depending on context, the presence of a binary is suspicious or malicious.
Result
Threat name:
AZORult Quasar
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.spyw.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
AutoIt script contains suspicious strings
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)
Detected AZORult Info Stealer
Found malware configuration
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Icon mismatch, binary includes an icon from a different legit application in order to fool users
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
May check the online IP address of the machine
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Suspicious Svchost Process
Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks
Uses ping.exe to sleep
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Azorult
Yara detected Azorult Info Stealer
Yara detected Quasar RAT
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 310783 Sample: 1ko2V6oGae Startdate: 06/11/2020 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 91 Found malware configuration 2->91 93 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->93 95 Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample 2->95 97 15 other signatures 2->97 9 1ko2V6oGae.exe 5 2->9         started        13 SystemPropertiesPerformance.exe 1 2->13         started        15 windef.exe 2->15         started        process3 file4 71 C:\Users\...\SystemPropertiesPerformance.exe, PE32 9->71 dropped 73 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\vnc.exe, PE32 9->73 dropped 125 Detected AZORult Info Stealer 9->125 127 Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file 9->127 129 Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes 9->129 131 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 9->131 17 windef.exe 15 5 9->17         started        22 vnc.exe 9->22         started        24 1ko2V6oGae.exe 12 9->24         started        26 schtasks.exe 1 9->26         started        75 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\windef.exe, PE32 13->75 dropped 133 Antivirus detection for dropped file 13->133 28 SystemPropertiesPerformance.exe 13->28         started        30 vnc.exe 13->30         started        32 schtasks.exe 13->32         started        34 windef.exe 13->34         started        signatures5 process6 dnsIp7 77 ip-api.com 208.95.112.1, 49730, 49732, 80 TUT-ASUS United States 17->77 69 C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\...\winsock.exe, PE32 17->69 dropped 101 Antivirus detection for dropped file 17->101 103 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 17->103 105 Machine Learning detection for dropped file 17->105 107 Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier) 17->107 36 winsock.exe 14 6 17->36         started        40 schtasks.exe 1 17->40         started        109 Writes to foreign memory regions 22->109 111 Allocates memory in foreign processes 22->111 113 Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection) 22->113 115 Maps a DLL or memory area into another process 22->115 42 svchost.exe 22->42         started        79 0x21.in 24->79 44 conhost.exe 26->44         started        81 0x21.in 28->81 46 svchost.exe 30->46         started        48 conhost.exe 32->48         started        file8 signatures9 process10 dnsIp11 83 sockartek.icu 36->83 85 192.168.2.1 unknown unknown 36->85 87 ip-api.com 36->87 117 Antivirus detection for dropped file 36->117 119 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 36->119 121 Machine Learning detection for dropped file 36->121 123 2 other signatures 36->123 50 cmd.exe 36->50         started        53 schtasks.exe 36->53         started        55 WerFault.exe 36->55         started        57 conhost.exe 40->57         started        89 5.8.88.191, 443, 8080 KOMETA-ASRU Russian Federation 42->89 signatures12 process13 signatures14 99 Uses ping.exe to sleep 50->99 59 conhost.exe 50->59         started        61 chcp.com 50->61         started        63 PING.EXE 50->63         started        65 winsock.exe 50->65         started        67 conhost.exe 53->67         started        process15
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.Pincav
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2020-10-27 02:34:43 UTC
AV detection:
26 of 29 (89.66%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
azorult
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:azorult infostealer trojan
Behaviour
Creates scheduled task(s)
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Enumerates connected drives
Looks up external IP address via web service
Maps connected drives based on registry
Loads dropped DLL
Executes dropped EXE
ServiceHost packer
Azorult
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
http://0x21.in:8000/_az/
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
d9549ad3ed734261a0029adbed59926fed150f14d0e44fb85fa583a9fe6327f3
MD5 hash:
f327a7c7345daf0200bc8700c02d4d1a
SHA1 hash:
7ec02657e55ae021720eff31e5b6cc6a9ad7f3ae
SH256 hash:
4e8a99cd33c9e5c747a3ce8f1a3e17824846f4a8f7cb0631aebd0815db2ce3a4
MD5 hash:
b8ba87ee4c3fc085a2fed0d839aadce1
SHA1 hash:
b3a2e3256406330e8b1779199bb2b9865122d766
SH256 hash:
0fe774d249d7c3093dd6b8de1c9c045f6efd4553710d877828e871e1be0e54f4
MD5 hash:
8246d054df8814106a8c11ae6df1e946
SHA1 hash:
8e9e84bd726fd9042fb99139b8c7dd00fccdc0a2
Detections:
win_azorult_g1 win_azorult_auto
Parent samples :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c48cecba8431d80cfa7c6a46e6e7e49de8d031816c09505527874ce113f95df2
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562b5b8f2b94be983e46ef2e851570371473c03e324d3d951014579c8f566042
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8f44f9b4e0716329638b3cf4b2470df57e199e9b66bb58e225aa767d9d48dd7e
94f9f632bad9fa9d923de55c08186af273b060d05bd305212fce8ec782bdad7f
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4ce95594d4b615d8612589de57a0df0dfc3d059f0bc61f7df4d2bbeefe5323e4
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381c28bd8d6e3538bcdea645faa825012355305a2ea5df8ad4f526b3750484e5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3569516ca7fb25dbd76547a0d73e55e201838126e90b4f6aad641e29a87c67eb
4e2212b5c17f53f53984fa67051a2aa386147eba453d51f6bb6798b833c7ad1e
16c80a82f353e2d4ba539b68fd79b969045f03d5f51c0fe3cd0e63c909d69d31
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96393c19d6a8749a8772ad2cec560aa8715db7f4efc3edc6e33f1d5dc525af3c
30bc6d1024943ded3b3b666c9bebaea8059b6cd06d9af6ec346e113407f439db
b7b94daf07f73603e9cfe3ffc082ce9a63db71e9815c2cf1105d25653bb1d32f
6e46c37c824f13c573fea62962c995f2e614c4751db1102e842033c176014378
d1ad5fd5f6ed1ca6556b80636b019b020755c7b3586c683fcddeb9688ed0017e
2006d79276316eea72f9c19d6169a67fd71eefd25b8e1007d9a72f1a1154b1e5
48d29a8519bd574b03306f6c5e47cc9918d204a4a492acf654ce3acafa59498c
21b45cf293c8b1587d29f4a641b448ff3f817d6c99fa114841858208a0e2ae0a
53cddb13890406ae74bed519674f611b58188fb94b6485d624a60680f6d0b786
c5b1a84308686f8d0009dc18291bb28be36ea5863180cfcf5fa5206e0daa7df5
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AutoIT_Compiled
Author:@bartblaze
Description:Identifies compiled AutoIT script (as EXE).
Rule name:Chrome_stealer_bin_mem
Author:James_inthe_box
Description:Chrome in files like avemaria
Rule name:crime_win32_hvnc_banker_gen
Author:@VK_Intel
Description:Detects malware banker hidden VNC
Reference:https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1247058432223477760
Rule name:crime_win32_hvnc_zloader1_hvnc_generic
Author:@VK_Intel
Description:Detects Zloader hidden VNC
Reference:https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1240664014121828352
Rule name:HiddenVNC
Author:@bartblaze
Description:Identifies HiddenVNC, which can start remote sessions.
Rule name:IPPort_combo_mem
Author:James_inthe_box
Description:IP and port combo
Rule name:Keylog_bin_mem
Author:James_inthe_box
Description:Contains Keylog
Rule name:MAL_QuasarRAT_May19_1
Author:Florian Roth
Description:Detects QuasarRAT malware
Reference:https://blog.ensilo.com/uncovering-new-activity-by-apt10
Rule name:MSILStealer
Author:https://github.com/hwvs
Description:Detects strings from C#/VB Stealers and QuasarRat
Reference:https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT
Rule name:Quasar
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect QuasarRAT in memory
Rule name:Quasar_RAT_1
Author:Florian Roth
Description:Detects Quasar RAT
Reference:https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf
Rule name:Quasar_RAT_2
Author:Florian Roth
Description:Detects Quasar RAT
Reference:https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf
Rule name:Select_from_enumeration
Author:James_inthe_box
Description:IP and port combo

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

  
Delivery method
Other

Comments