MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 cb9eeb8a64e9071c3df8cd0a1f3867ddc1ce1169028344be4af8e36a35451790. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 21


Intelligence 21 IOCs YARA 20 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: cb9eeb8a64e9071c3df8cd0a1f3867ddc1ce1169028344be4af8e36a35451790
SHA3-384 hash: ed849e4c0ac7f7fb504fd3a39b42327efaa04ef1f82f6155a28f9230d1bf17f33c673fea20ed981d550ddfd512b21f7d
SHA1 hash: da47f2c80e7229654a0ca8041dfbd8e7f271a2e0
MD5 hash: 84a533b478d117c1c6635a6d29611aea
humanhash: ohio-november-aspen-social
File name:DPRK.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:218'624 bytes
First seen:2026-03-18 08:56:21 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'843 x AgentTesla, 19'775 x Formbook, 12'297 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 1536:ouIXlT8kD2iRsJS52UzJrbbtwfbBjqjWEjzNd5yXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXe:ouIVT8kD2lJScUzlbbtOJ2zN/egPVeo
Threatray 1'746 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T14324976915DB6D8FE1770A7C00A4323069669C9C3C429D0AF95F7EB7CEF2A4494822FD
TrID 70.4% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
6.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2)
4.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:AsyncRAT exe RAT

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
137
Origin country :
SE SE
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware configuration found for:
AsyncRAT
Details
AsyncRAT
c2 socket addresses or a dead drop resolver url, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
DPRK.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-03-17 17:09:01 UTC
Tags:
asyncrat auto-reg

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.9%
Tags:
asyncrat autorun
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Sending a custom TCP request
Сreating synchronization primitives
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
Creating a window
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Connection attempt to an infection source
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm asyncrat asyncrat base64 fareit fingerprint lolbin maze obfuscated obfuscated razy reconnaissance reg schtasks unsafe vbnet
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
Detections:
PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.b PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust
Result
Threat name:
AsyncRAT
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Found malware configuration
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Potential Privilege Escalation using Task Scheduler highest RunLevel
Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1885451 Sample: DPRK.exe Startdate: 18/03/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 34 Found malware configuration 2->34 36 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->36 38 Antivirus detection for dropped file 2->38 40 10 other signatures 2->40 7 DPRK.exe 7 2->7         started        process3 file4 28 Democratic People'...public of Korea.exe, PE32 7->28 dropped 30 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\DPRK.exe.log, ASCII 7->30 dropped 44 Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag 7->44 46 Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) 7->46 11 cmd.exe 1 7->11         started        14 cmd.exe 1 7->14         started        signatures5 process6 signatures7 48 Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules 11->48 50 Potential Privilege Escalation using Task Scheduler highest RunLevel 11->50 16 conhost.exe 11->16         started        18 schtasks.exe 1 11->18         started        20 Democratic People's Republic of Korea.exe 2 14->20         started        24 conhost.exe 14->24         started        26 timeout.exe 1 14->26         started        process8 dnsIp9 32 193.161.193.99, 1329, 39417, 49697 BITREE-ASRU Russian Federation 20->32 42 Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag 20->42 signatures10
Gathering data
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-03-17 17:09:10 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
18
AV detection:
29 of 36 (80.56%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default defense_evasion discovery execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
193.161.193.99:39417
193.161.193.99:1329
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
cb9eeb8a64e9071c3df8cd0a1f3867ddc1ce1169028344be4af8e36a35451790
MD5 hash:
84a533b478d117c1c6635a6d29611aea
SHA1 hash:
da47f2c80e7229654a0ca8041dfbd8e7f271a2e0
Detections:
win_asyncrat_w0 AsyncRAT
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AsyncRat
Author:kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:AsyncRat Payload
Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
Rule name:win_asyncrat_j1
Author:Johannes Bader @viql
Description:detects AsyncRAT
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2026-03-18 09:01:16 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "cb9eeb8a64e9071c3df8cd0a1f3867ddc1ce1169028344be4af8e36a35451790",
"yara_possible_family": "asyncrat",
"key": "987bdafdb26562331cac43ff92e57f90242bc83baa3f896e6eab79e7508e5446",
"salt": "bfeb1e56fbcd973bb219022430a57843003d5644d21e62b9d4f180e7e6c33941",
"config": {
"obfuscated_key_1": "39417,1329",
"obfuscated_key_2": "193.161.193.99",
"obfuscated_key_3": "0.5.8",
"obfuscated_key_4": "true",
"obfuscated_key_5": "%AppData%",
"obfuscated_key_6": "Democratic People's Republic of Korea.exe",
"obfuscated_key_7": "R0owdHprVThUc2ZpMVdMM0t5clBSYnQzNmk2b1I5V0U=",
"obfuscated_key_8": "rXIP0ayF4g6p",
"obfuscated_key_9": "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",
"obfuscated_key_10": "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",
"obfuscated_key_11": "true",
"obfuscated_key_12": "null",
"obfuscated_key_13": "true",
"obfuscated_key_14": "null",
"obfuscated_key_15": "10",
"obfuscated_key_16": "Default"
}
}