MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 b9bcb58a007f500432d69d733cd9e2c41e806cdeb088c415f7c8e46debb88a1b. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 19


Intelligence 19 IOCs YARA 18 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: b9bcb58a007f500432d69d733cd9e2c41e806cdeb088c415f7c8e46debb88a1b
SHA3-384 hash: 58d7ae3b484b00eb87e1978e53fc3e2afb7e595ebb34f472e6c537318e21ffccea98bf1be5522373dcc41936c8c48d9a
SHA1 hash: 244b82b13c2eed56b2fa4d1b8803b8d59bcc7b8d
MD5 hash: 4d6f28bdb99b8e969046e68084fc9d9f
humanhash: bakerloo-sixteen-sierra-lactose
File name:NexaraEndpointGuardian.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:66'048 bytes
First seen:2026-01-28 16:01:53 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'752 x AgentTesla, 19'657 x Formbook, 12'248 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 768:P9gRaaZPiP9GBi49J59c4ROF24Xx3nzhIs1+jKSCv7mqb2nGp1H1oE5cHmQJnz8R:PkZEC5sFzzhIscGbbB16H+G2IVclN
Threatray 2'481 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T142535A042798C965E2AE8AF4BCF2950006B5D9372106DA5E7CC405DBAB9FFC646123FF
TrID 67.7% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
9.7% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.0% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.1% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter Anonymous
Tags:AsyncRAT backdoor DCRat Dotnet exe MSIL RAT


Avatar
Anonymous
.NET executable identified as AsyncRAT/DCRat remote access trojan.

Multiple AV engines detect the sample as Backdoor/AsyncRAT/MSIL:AsyncRat. The file is compiled in MSIL (.NET) and exhibits typical RAT behavior including command-and-control communication, remote execution, persistence and data exfiltration capabilities.

This sample is likely part of a botnet or remote administration malware campaign.

SHA256:
b9bcb58a007f500432d69d733cd9e2c41e806cdeb088c415f7c8e46debb88a1b

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
151
Origin country :
VN VN
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware configuration found for:
DcRat PostExploitTool
Details
DcRat
c2 socket addresses, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
NexaraEndpointGuardian.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-01-28 16:02:28 UTC
Tags:
rat auto-reg asyncrat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Gathering data
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.1%
Tags:
asyncrat autorun
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
DNS request
Connection attempt
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
  7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-debug anti-vm asyncrat base64 configsecuritypolicy evasive fingerprint hacktool lolbin mpcmdrun msconfig razy reconnaissance regedit schtasks vbnet
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2026-01-28T13:13:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-01-30T06:22:00Z UTC
Hits:
~100
Detections:
Trojan.MSIL.DInvoke.sb HEUR:Trojan-PSW.MSIL.Agent.gen HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.DcRat.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Darkrat.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic
Gathering data
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-01-28 16:02:31 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
1
AV detection:
22 of 24 (91.67%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:nexara defense_evasion execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
changingcanoes.us.com:8848
changingcanoes.us.com:443
changingcanoes.us.com:80
changingcanoes.us.com:8080
changingcanoes.us.com:6060
changingcanoes.us.com:4782
changingcanoes.us.com:4444
changingcanoes.us.com:6666
changingcanoes.us.com:5555
nra.uk.com:8848
nra.uk.com:443
nra.uk.com:80
nra.uk.com:8080
nra.uk.com:6060
nra.uk.com:4782
nra.uk.com:4444
nra.uk.com:6666
nra.uk.com:5555
asianswitch.gb.net:8848
asianswitch.gb.net:443
asianswitch.gb.net:80
asianswitch.gb.net:8080
asianswitch.gb.net:6060
asianswitch.gb.net:4782
asianswitch.gb.net:4444
asianswitch.gb.net:6666
asianswitch.gb.net:5555
jwwp.cn.com:8848
jwwp.cn.com:443
jwwp.cn.com:80
jwwp.cn.com:8080
jwwp.cn.com:6060
jwwp.cn.com:4782
jwwp.cn.com:4444
jwwp.cn.com:6666
jwwp.cn.com:5555
d8zljb.ru.com:8848
d8zljb.ru.com:443
d8zljb.ru.com:80
d8zljb.ru.com:8080
d8zljb.ru.com:6060
d8zljb.ru.com:4782
d8zljb.ru.com:4444
d8zljb.ru.com:6666
d8zljb.ru.com:5555
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
b9bcb58a007f500432d69d733cd9e2c41e806cdeb088c415f7c8e46debb88a1b
MD5 hash:
4d6f28bdb99b8e969046e68084fc9d9f
SHA1 hash:
244b82b13c2eed56b2fa4d1b8803b8d59bcc7b8d
Detections:
AsyncRAT DCRat
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AcRat
Author:Nikos 'n0t' Totosis
Description:AcRat Payload (based on AsyncRat)
Rule name:dcrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_rkp
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Description:Detects DCRat payloads
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_DcRatBy
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing the string DcRatBy
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_WMI_EnumerateVideoDevice
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables attemping to enumerate video devices using WMI
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2026-01-28 16:06:03 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "b9bcb58a007f500432d69d733cd9e2c41e806cdeb088c415f7c8e46debb88a1b",
"yara_possible_family": "dcrat",
"key": "6aee9786380381d421f853c5f27fa412049a649bf41c73634aefb4b93a603de1",
"salt": "4463526174427971777164616e6368756e",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"8848",
"443",
"80",
"8080",
"6060",
"4782",
"4444",
"6666",
"5555"
],
"Hosts": [
"changingcanoes.us.com",
"nra.uk.com",
"asianswitch.gb.net",
"jwwp.cn.com",
"d8zljb.ru.com"
],
"Version": " 1.0.7",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%AppData%",
"InstallFile": "NexaraEndpoint.exe",
"Key": "d3VRYWNLbmJZUFVqb2loVm9PaU9DWlJEdGF1TlU2M3c=",
"Mutex": "NCS_NexaraEndpoint_GuardianLock_8f9g0h1i",
"Certificate": "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",
"Serversignature": "erP1f6F8Jstk+VdUUtvAVDLq0KyH4RPng/gWz1I4TVUd4y5Kp54pLRgdLpTvwax/cA5R2W3Sb8XOLNwWnRePkaxTplfR7WMji0+ZDl0E8B/snz2QJKg4eF+ZVMLb1+U7WedPnNjTpZbGbW+kgaHQloFj7JUW0086HpBcoOSjrPs=",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BSOD": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "1",
"Group": "Nexara",
"AntiProcess": "false",
"Anti": "false"
}
}