MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 b63367bd7da5aad9afef5e7531cac4561c8a671fd2270ade14640cf03849bf52. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry


Rhadamanthys


Vendor detections: 10


Intelligence 10 IOCs YARA 24 File information Comments
Download sample Add tag Delete this sample Report a False Positive

SHA256 hash: b63367bd7da5aad9afef5e7531cac4561c8a671fd2270ade14640cf03849bf52
SHA3-384 hash: 52f80b6861bca2d117164468137c388c4633ac86d5cae8e72fc9883c44b9ac29cfde62a293392d839efdf6f0410dd9e5
SHA1 hash: 646d2c13230c5b64cf0e518996d5ce9883a53e26
MD5 hash: fd33e9b2d26a30171852031ae407bef5
humanhash: white-alanine-south-bacon
File name:VibeCall.exe
Download: download sample
Signature Rhadamanthys
Create hunting rule
File size:71'217'328 bytes
First seen:2025-02-28 16:48:24 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash 4b1892ce4fbcfcf064c6f69d693fc6a5 (10 x Rhadamanthys, 4 x AgentTesla, 3 x QuasarRAT)
ssdeep 1572864:Gmlrn6UeC2tOFPfL7LTm3aB91/n5sdmqJBNHxhzihaS4:GmlT6OtFLnT0aBrOdmqBHbwG
TLSH T13CF71286E3A903D8D56AC0FB85660517E6B17C491320E6DB5160E76B2F33AE35A3D333
TrID 63.5% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
12.2% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13)
12.0% (.EXE) Generic Win/DOS Executable (2002/3)
12.0% (.EXE) DOS Executable Generic (2000/1)
Magika pebin
dhash icon a053b0f0f0b44b20 (2 x Rhadamanthys)
Reporter g0njxa
Tags:CrazyEvil exe NoLogsFebruary Rhadamanthys signed

Code Signing Certificate

Organisation:Shenzhen Zhongxingda Technology Co., Ltd.
Issuer:GlobalSign GCC R45 EV CodeSigning CA 2020
Algorithm:sha256WithRSAEncryption
Valid from:2024-12-13T13:51:47Z
Valid to:2025-12-13T07:58:24Z
Serial number: 1334c4352845314a1151ae35
Cert Graveyard Blocklist:This certificate is on the Cert Graveyard blocklist
Thumbprint Algorithm:SHA256
Thumbprint: a4e032a163a9c0d74a35820ba6d9444ecb5d8453cef0a0a5460ef744d81bf358
Source:This information was brought to you by ReversingLabs A1000 Malware Analysis Platform

Intelligence

File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
547
Origin country :
GB GB
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
n/a
ID:
1
File name:
VibeCall.exe
Verdict:
Suspicious activity
Analysis date:
2025-02-28 16:51:46 UTC
Tags:
n/a
Link:
https://app.any.run/tasks/a230aba9-fdc4-4756-b8ef-02f913e88f4b

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
81.4%
Link:
https://cyber-fortress.com/docs/result/index.php?id=67c1ea0b4e50050b2e6f0e21
Tags:
malware
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a window
Creating a process with a hidden window
Searching for the window
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Сreating synchronization primitives
Searching for synchronization primitives
Launching the default Windows debugger (dwwin.exe)
Adding an exclusion to Microsoft Defender
Verdict:
Suspicious
Threat level:
  5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
adaptive-context anti-debug dotnet fingerprint lolbin microsoft_visual_cc obfuscated overlay packed signed
Link:
https://www.filescan.io/uploads/67c1e90a3c5f644bd93cc65b/reports/531ff9b9-0534-42c4-9cb9-b5ea7b991ffd/overview
Verdict:
Unknown
Link:
https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/b63367bd7da5aad9afef5e7531cac4561c8a671fd2270ade14640cf03849bf52
Result
Threat name:
RHADAMANTHYS
Create hunting rule
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.spyw.evad
Score:
99 / 100
Link:
https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1626653
Signature
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Drops PE files to the document folder of the user
Found malware configuration
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Download and Execution Cradles
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal Bitcoin Wallet information
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports
Yara detected RHADAMANTHYS Stealer
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
Download SVG
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1626653 Sample: VibeCall.exe Startdate: 28/02/2025 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 99 64 pastebin.com 2->64 66 rustaisolutionnorisk.com 2->66 68 2 other IPs or domains 2->68 86 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->86 88 Found malware configuration 2->88 90 Yara detected RHADAMANTHYS Stealer 2->90 94 6 other signatures 2->94 10 VibeCall.exe 17 2->10         started        signatures3 92 Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C) 64->92 process4 dnsIp5 80 ip-api.com 208.95.112.1 TUT-ASUS United States 10->80 82 147.45.60.20 FREE-NET-ASFREEnetEU Russian Federation 10->82 84 2 other IPs or domains 10->84 56 C:\Users\...\soundsolution_vibecall_c.exe, PE32 10->56 dropped 58 C:\Users\user\...\aisolution_vibecall_a.exe, PE32 10->58 dropped 60 C:\Users\...\videosolution_vibecall_b.exe, PE32 10->60 dropped 62 C:\Users\...\contry_solution_vibecall_e.exe, PE32 10->62 dropped 98 Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines) 10->98 100 Drops PE files to the document folder of the user 10->100 102 Bypasses PowerShell execution policy 10->102 104 Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender 10->104 15 soundsolution_vibecall_c.exe 1 10->15         started        18 contry_solution_vibecall_e.exe 1 10->18         started        20 videosolution_vibecall_b.exe 10->20         started        22 4 other processes 10->22 file6 signatures7 process8 dnsIp9 114 Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces 15->114 25 OpenWith.exe 15->25         started        37 2 other processes 15->37 29 fontdrvhost.exe 18->29         started        39 2 other processes 18->39 31 fontdrvhost.exe 20->31         started        41 2 other processes 20->41 70 pastebin.com 104.20.3.235, 443, 49739 CLOUDFLARENETUS United States 22->70 116 Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module 22->116 33 WerFault.exe 21 16 22->33         started        35 conhost.exe 22->35         started        43 2 other processes 22->43 signatures10 process11 dnsIp12 72 98.142.253.232 VELCOMCA Canada 25->72 96 Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces 25->96 45 OpenWith.exe 25->45         started        74 api.help-asus.com 79.141.162.188 HZ-US-ASBG Bulgaria 29->74 76 104.16.249.249 CLOUDFLARENETUS United States 29->76 48 fontdrvhost.exe 29->48         started        78 45.129.185.24 VDI-NETWORKUS Russian Federation 31->78 50 fontdrvhost.exe 31->50         started        signatures13 process14 signatures15 106 Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc) 45->106 108 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access) 45->108 110 Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc) 45->110 112 Tries to harvest and steal Bitcoin Wallet information 45->112 52 WerFault.exe 48->52         started        54 WerFault.exe 50->54         started        process16
Score:
81%
Verdict:
Malware
File Type:
PE
Link:
https://malprob.io/report/b63367bd7da5aad9afef5e7531cac4561c8a671fd2270ade14640cf03849bf52
Gathering data
Detection(s):
Suspicious file
Link:
https://check.spamhaus.org/check/?searchterm=wyzwppl5uwvntl7plz2tdswekyoiuzy72itqvxqumqgpaocjx5ja._file
Result
Malware family:
n/a
Score:
  8/10
Tags:
execution
Link:
https://tria.ge/reports/250228-vbr7ps1zgx/
Behaviour
Enumerates system info in registry
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Checks computer location settings
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Verdict:
Malicious
Tags:
n/a
YARA:
n/a
Link:
https://app.threat.zone/submission/7f52bfef-b4ae-412f-856f-a6887960ffc6
Malware family:
AgentTesla.v3
Create hunting rule
Verdict:
Malicious
Link:
https://www.vmray.com/analyses/_mb/b63367bd7da5/report/overview.html
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures

MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:Check_OutputDebugStringA_iat
Create hunting rule
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__API
Create hunting rule
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__MemoryWorkingSet
Create hunting rule
Author:Fernando Mercês
Description:Anti-debug process memory working set size check
Reference:http://www.gironsec.com/blog/2015/06/anti-debugger-trick-quicky/
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__QueryInfo
Create hunting rule
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:DebuggerException__SetConsoleCtrl
Create hunting rule
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:golang_bin_JCorn_CSC846
Create hunting rule
Author:Justin Cornwell
Description:CSC-846 Golang detection ruleset
Rule name:Jupyter_infostealer
Create hunting rule
Author:CD_R0M_
Description:Rule for Jupyter Infostealer/Solarmarker malware from september 2021-December 2022
Rule name:Lumma_Stealer_Detection
Create hunting rule
Author:ashizZz
Description:Detects a specific Lumma Stealer malware sample using unique strings and behaviors
Reference:https://seanthegeek.net/posts/compromized-store-spread-lumma-stealer-using-fake-captcha/
Rule name:MD5_Constants
Create hunting rule
Author:phoul (@phoul)
Description:Look for MD5 constants
Rule name:NET
Create hunting rule
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:pe_detect_tls_callbacks
Create hunting rule
Rule name:PE_Digital_Certificate
Create hunting rule
Author:albertzsigovits
Rule name:pe_no_import_table
Create hunting rule
Description:Detect pe file that no import table
Rule name:RANSOMWARE
Create hunting rule
Author:ToroGuitar
Rule name:reverse_http
Create hunting rule
Author:CD_R0M_
Description:Identify strings with http reversed (ptth)
Rule name:RIPEMD160_Constants
Create hunting rule
Author:phoul (@phoul)
Description:Look for RIPEMD-160 constants
Rule name:Rooter
Create hunting rule
Author:Seth Hardy
Description:Rooter
Rule name:RooterStrings
Create hunting rule
Author:Seth Hardy
Description:Rooter Identifying Strings
Rule name:SEH__vectored
Create hunting rule
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:SHA1_Constants
Create hunting rule
Author:phoul (@phoul)
Description:Look for SHA1 constants
Rule name:Sus_Obf_Enc_Spoof_Hide_PE
Create hunting rule
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:Check for Overlay, Obfuscating, Encrypting, Spoofing, Hiding, or Entropy Technique(can create FP)
Rule name:test_Malaysia
Create hunting rule
Author:rectifyq
Description:Detects file containing malaysia string
Rule name:ThreadControl__Context
Create hunting rule
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara

File information

The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

BLint

The following table provides more information about this file using BLint. BLint is a Binary Linter to check the security properties, and capabilities in executables.

Findings
IDTitleSeverity
CHECK_DLL_CHARACTERISTICSMissing dll Security Characteristics (FORCE_INTEGRITY)high
Reviews
IDCapabilitiesEvidence
AUTH_APIManipulates User AuthorizationADVAPI32.dll::GetSidSubAuthorityCount
ADVAPI32.dll::GetSidSubAuthority
ADVAPI32.dll::RevertToSelf
COM_BASE_APICan Download & Execute componentsole32.dll::CLSIDFromProgID
ole32.dll::CreateStreamOnHGlobal
SECURITY_BASE_APIUses Security Base APIADVAPI32.dll::AdjustTokenPrivileges
ADVAPI32.dll::GetTokenInformation
ADVAPI32.dll::SetKernelObjectSecurity
SHELL_APIManipulates System ShellSHELL32.dll::ShellExecuteW
WIN32_PROCESS_APICan Create Process and ThreadsKERNEL32.dll::CreateProcessW
ADVAPI32.dll::OpenProcessToken
ADVAPI32.dll::OpenThreadToken
ADVAPI32.dll::SetThreadToken
KERNEL32.dll::VirtualAllocExNuma
KERNEL32.dll::CloseHandle
WIN_BASE_APIUses Win Base APIKERNEL32.dll::TerminateProcess
KERNEL32.dll::GetActiveProcessorGroupCount
KERNEL32.dll::LoadLibraryExW
KERNEL32.dll::LoadLibraryExA
KERNEL32.dll::LoadLibraryW
KERNEL32.dll::LoadLibraryA
WIN_BASE_EXEC_APICan Execute other programsKERNEL32.dll::SetConsoleCtrlHandler
KERNEL32.dll::GetConsoleOutputCP
WIN_BASE_IO_APICan Create FilesKERNEL32.dll::CreateDirectoryW
KERNEL32.dll::CreateFileW
KERNEL32.dll::CreateFileA
KERNEL32.dll::CreateFileMappingA
KERNEL32.dll::CreateFileMappingW
KERNEL32.dll::GetWindowsDirectoryW
WIN_BASE_USER_APIRetrieves Account InformationADVAPI32.dll::LookupPrivilegeValueW
WIN_REG_APICan Manipulate Windows RegistryADVAPI32.dll::RegGetValueW
ADVAPI32.dll::RegOpenKeyExW
ADVAPI32.dll::RegQueryValueExW

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