MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 ad99f1e23d8eb9eb25e71e080e4af6f32f7fcc96ef0f2102f16059c38de259d9. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 21


Intelligence 21 IOCs YARA 19 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: ad99f1e23d8eb9eb25e71e080e4af6f32f7fcc96ef0f2102f16059c38de259d9
SHA3-384 hash: a77993c2800f6554542d2691d6a44cb361365c6042a4e2e32b7411d0883ece4669c514ae159d57dc75aebcc08b928ecb
SHA1 hash: 0e728ccec59d2cd725a11b924a67c0db76262bb2
MD5 hash: 74d08e4ef17bb2631f3372bd7ae8226d
humanhash: single-muppet-sixteen-two
File name:InternetExplorer11.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:65'536 bytes
First seen:2026-01-04 17:16:57 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (49'013 x AgentTesla, 19'917 x Formbook, 12'332 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 1536:Tmnn75wzluQGbbAwVjET/UveGHg1VclN:qnKzLGbbACELUvaXY
Threatray 2'753 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T1AE536A002798C966E1AD4AF4BDF2550106B6D5772116CB5E7CC400CBAB9FFCA4A223FE
TrID 67.7% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
9.7% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.0% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.1% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter Anonymous
Tags:AsyncRAT botnet c2 DCRat exe RAT

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
238
Origin country :
ES ES
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware configuration found for:
DcRat PostExploitTool
Details
DcRat
c2 socket addresses, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
_ad99f1e23d8eb9eb25e71e080e4af6f32f7fcc96ef0f2102f16059c38de259d9.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-01-04 17:19:05 UTC
Tags:
auto-reg asyncrat rat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
97.4%
Tags:
autorun dropper virus sage
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
DNS request
Connection attempt
Sending a custom TCP request
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
  7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-debug anti-vm base64 configsecuritypolicy evasive explorer fingerprint hacktool lolbin mpcmdrun msconfig reconnaissance regedit schtasks vbnet
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2026-01-04T14:21:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-01-05T04:03:00Z UTC
Hits:
~100
Detections:
HEUR:Trojan-PSW.MSIL.Agent.gen HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.DcRat.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Darkrat.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d Trojan.MSIL.DInvoke.sb PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic
Verdict:
njRat
YARA:
14 match(es)
Tags:
.Net DarkCrystal RAT DcRat Executable Managed .NET njRat PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.25 Win 32 Exe x86
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
PORT: 80,443,2053,2083,8080,8848,8888
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-01-04 17:17:20 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
1
AV detection:
22 of 24 (91.67%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default defense_evasion execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
go88.mex.com:8848
go88.mex.com:443
go88.mex.com:8080
go88.mex.com:80
go88.mex.com:8888
go88.mex.com:2053
go88.mex.com:2083
go88.mex.com:2087
go88.mex.com:2096
go88.mex.com:4782
www.go88.mex.com:8848
www.go88.mex.com:443
www.go88.mex.com:8080
www.go88.mex.com:80
www.go88.mex.com:8888
www.go88.mex.com:2053
www.go88.mex.com:2083
www.go88.mex.com:2087
www.go88.mex.com:2096
www.go88.mex.com:4782
Verdict:
Malicious
Tags:
rat asyncrat Win.Packed.Razy-9807129-0
YARA:
Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc asyncrat win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
ad99f1e23d8eb9eb25e71e080e4af6f32f7fcc96ef0f2102f16059c38de259d9
MD5 hash:
74d08e4ef17bb2631f3372bd7ae8226d
SHA1 hash:
0e728ccec59d2cd725a11b924a67c0db76262bb2
Detections:
AsyncRAT DCRat
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AcRat
Author:Nikos 'n0t' Totosis
Description:AcRat Payload (based on AsyncRat)
Rule name:dcrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_rkp
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Description:Detects DCRat payloads
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_DcRatBy
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing the string DcRatBy
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_WMI_EnumerateVideoDevice
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables attemping to enumerate video devices using WMI
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2026-01-04 17:20:58 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "ad99f1e23d8eb9eb25e71e080e4af6f32f7fcc96ef0f2102f16059c38de259d9",
"yara_possible_family": "dcrat",
"key": "e16beb929a50adfbfa1876204b830525e5bc68141011c2ee6ab2a41e462f6fd5",
"salt": "4463526174427971777164616e6368756e",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"8848",
"443",
"8080",
"80",
"8888",
"2053",
"2083",
"2087",
"2096",
"4782"
],
"Hosts": [
"go88.mex.com",
"www.go88.mex.com"
],
"Version": " 1.0.7",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%AppData%",
"InstallFile": "InternetExplorer11.exe",
"Key": "N3pMd1lla0ZuMHY0ekhFRzNWUkJCekVoMGpJZnJMbzY=",
"Mutex": "DcRatMutex_qwqdanchun",
"Certificate": "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",
"Serversignature": "QHNa1Keus0op+GiM6LNhrTfXpjQfyY81SAVe+DsC+PDr0EeXYtDURg4yTrUlFNQbbFvjzX5PjxkHiU9f2BOgUYvvBE6q+TNN/F15BrDwIqzRQ73srpLE2M41Up7hCB1bGCC5iKIoY9guNjE8zEy+o3FN83DcLM25GiXjZa6Oyao=",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BSOD": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "1",
"Group": "Default",
"AntiProcess": "false",
"Anti": "false"
}
}