MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 ad14f3e10ababe1bc66802b2ba0e927639d50b8f4c8795009f0ecb9d7385644c. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 22


Intelligence 22 IOCs YARA 19 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: ad14f3e10ababe1bc66802b2ba0e927639d50b8f4c8795009f0ecb9d7385644c
SHA3-384 hash: d174da6fd3590d296e7859faa7bfc5649f1f866c75bdd68a237cb8f3a59ec91cae09aee041e6c935d3de17bb54696751
SHA1 hash: 2940dd79491a933d6e03c9a31675fcfde61c57c3
MD5 hash: 6507c9a87ddb7658473280a1dd46b50c
humanhash: sad-foxtrot-early-bluebird
File name:microsoft_support.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:65'024 bytes
First seen:2025-12-18 15:07:12 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'744 x AgentTesla, 19'608 x Formbook, 12'242 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 768:65G6KlZRniP/tkiY9Jquvwszp0aZeF1+ISCv7mqb2nJpwH1owA090qIZm8GxYVcD:62ZRAiVxpGFeGbbcwDA0WjGxYVclN
Threatray 1'921 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T1E5536B002798C926E2AD46F8ACF2550146B5D5372006DB5E7CC814DBAB9FFCA5A133EF
TrID 67.7% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
9.7% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.0% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.1% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter safe_securitix
Tags:AsyncRAT botnet c2 DCRat exe

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
138
Origin country :
ES ES
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware configuration found for:
DcRat PostExploitTool
Details
DcRat
c2 socket addresses, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
microsoft_support.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2025-12-18 15:09:11 UTC
Tags:
rat auto-reg asyncrat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
97.4%
Tags:
autorun dropper virus sage
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
Sending a custom TCP request
DNS request
Connection attempt
Сreating synchronization primitives
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
  7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-debug anti-vm base64 configsecuritypolicy evasive fingerprint hacktool lolbin mpcmdrun msconfig reconnaissance regedit schtasks vbnet
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2025-12-18T12:20:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2025-12-19T00:56:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Detections:
HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.DcRat.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Darkrat.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic Trojan.MSIL.DInvoke.sb HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust HEUR:Trojan-PSW.MSIL.Agent.gen
Verdict:
njRat
YARA:
11 match(es)
Tags:
.Net DarkCrystal RAT DcRat Executable Managed .NET njRat PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.25 Win 32 Exe x86
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
PORT: 80,443,2053,2083,8080,8848,8888
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2025-12-18 15:08:13 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
1
AV detection:
22 of 24 (91.67%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default defense_evasion execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Executes dropped EXE
Checks computer location settings
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
star.co.com:8848
star.co.com:443
star.co.com:8080
star.co.com:80
star.co.com:8888
star.co.com:2053
star.co.com:2083
star.co.com:2087
star.co.com:2096
star.co.com:8443
Verdict:
Malicious
Tags:
rat asyncrat Win.Packed.Razy-9807129-0
YARA:
Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc asyncrat win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
ad14f3e10ababe1bc66802b2ba0e927639d50b8f4c8795009f0ecb9d7385644c
MD5 hash:
6507c9a87ddb7658473280a1dd46b50c
SHA1 hash:
2940dd79491a933d6e03c9a31675fcfde61c57c3
Detections:
AsyncRAT DCRat
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AcRat
Author:Nikos 'n0t' Totosis
Description:AcRat Payload (based on AsyncRat)
Rule name:dcrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_rkp
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Description:Detects DCRat payloads
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_DcRatBy
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing the string DcRatBy
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_WMI_EnumerateVideoDevice
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables attemping to enumerate video devices using WMI
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

AsyncRAT

Executable exe ad14f3e10ababe1bc66802b2ba0e927639d50b8f4c8795009f0ecb9d7385644c

(this sample)

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2025-12-18 15:11:01 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "ad14f3e10ababe1bc66802b2ba0e927639d50b8f4c8795009f0ecb9d7385644c",
"yara_possible_family": "dcrat",
"key": "d07cc12fdbe2d0123cec81350de4b89ec3edaf8ef1de4e18d80c8c8bd1a2289c",
"salt": "4463526174427971777164616e6368756e",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"8848",
"443",
"8080",
"80",
"8888",
"2053",
"2083",
"2087",
"2096",
"8443"
],
"Hosts": [
"star.co.com"
],
"Version": " 1.0.7",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%AppData%",
"InstallFile": "microsoft_support.exe",
"Key": "SVo3WmRYN1lUUjVRQjhtcUI4a2VRMThDbXBlY2VCUk8=",
"Mutex": "DcRatMutex_qwqdanchun",
"Certificate": "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",
"Serversignature": "OqgidBQvYMokDurerqgtFTyQIFFzbYFUbg5gQRwoxc2j9zTuknwlqwZ2+WmfSTGI2YYyv0HL/m2b7NORXadCRDbcIL5Uek2mDHV4FdylE24TrnjhLgKHlZmqivV9k59BcS4mMmE2ALxWdio8QsLLPs2uJOUdj9kKI+RvXZ67jyM=",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BSOD": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "1",
"Group": "Default",
"AntiProcess": "false",
"Anti": "false"
}
}