MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 9add4b744ba1937057ff7b5a0e2b1e86e4a4cfff53faa012bd0f49d22dfdff7b. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 21


Intelligence 21 IOCs YARA 18 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: 9add4b744ba1937057ff7b5a0e2b1e86e4a4cfff53faa012bd0f49d22dfdff7b
SHA3-384 hash: e253787a8d51b464d24ebf3a29a28874d4f3c93833ee7393230c9f1affc4367432f9b39fc4b4f0ec69cdfc2e5f3a0f57
SHA1 hash: 554b47e6504255157ebf909caa935fdf0c3e51ae
MD5 hash: 6b15e3aeade276291d73b09e9c37dcc2
humanhash: kilo-don-johnny-louisiana
File name:unikay.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:155'648 bytes
First seen:2025-12-23 15:46:03 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'744 x AgentTesla, 19'608 x Formbook, 12'242 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 1536:D+C5Xzpd7DM2RGbb1wQj/71GBAbYw1L0HmDQnv7IUVclN:DfzL7gCGbb1F/oAbYwCHmDQnv7IGY
Threatray 1'983 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T1E5E3E8033317C459E63D4F706D9A4D6019B44EBF9404CA9E3CCC76DBAAF9760281A3AE
TrID 67.7% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
9.7% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.0% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.1% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter safe_securitix
Tags:AsyncRAT exe

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
91
Origin country :
ES ES
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware configuration found for:
DcRat PostExploitTool
Details
DcRat
c2 socket addresses, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
_9add4b744ba1937057ff7b5a0e2b1e86e4a4cfff53faa012bd0f49d22dfdff7b.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2025-12-23 15:47:47 UTC
Tags:
auto-reg asyncrat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.1%
Tags:
asyncrat autorun
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-debug anti-vm asyncrat base64 configsecuritypolicy evasive fingerprint hacktool lolbin mpcmdrun msconfig razy reconnaissance regedit schtasks vbnet
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2025-12-23T12:55:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2025-12-24T01:22:00Z UTC
Hits:
~100
Detections:
PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.DcRat.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Darkrat.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust Trojan.MSIL.DInvoke.sb HEUR:Trojan-PSW.MSIL.Agent.gen HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d
Verdict:
njRat
YARA:
14 match(es)
Tags:
.Net DarkCrystal RAT DcRat Executable Managed .NET njRat PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.25 Win 32 Exe x86
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
PORT: 80,443,2053,2083,8080,8848,8888
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2025-12-23 15:46:22 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
9
AV detection:
30 of 36 (83.33%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default defense_evasion execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
sun.win:8848
sun.win:443
sun.win:8080
sun.win:80
sun.win:8888
sun.win:2053
sun.win:2083
sun.win:2087
sun.win:2096
unikey.sun.win:8848
unikey.sun.win:443
unikey.sun.win:8080
unikey.sun.win:80
unikey.sun.win:8888
unikey.sun.win:2053
unikey.sun.win:2083
unikey.sun.win:2087
unikey.sun.win:2096
sarahl.ru.com:8848
sarahl.ru.com:443
sarahl.ru.com:8080
sarahl.ru.com:80
sarahl.ru.com:8888
sarahl.ru.com:2053
sarahl.ru.com:2083
sarahl.ru.com:2087
sarahl.ru.com:2096
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:8848
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:443
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:8080
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:80
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:8888
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:2053
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:2083
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:2087
unikey.sarahl.ru.com:2096
Verdict:
Malicious
Tags:
rat asyncrat Win.Packed.Razy-9807129-0
YARA:
Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc asyncrat win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
9add4b744ba1937057ff7b5a0e2b1e86e4a4cfff53faa012bd0f49d22dfdff7b
MD5 hash:
6b15e3aeade276291d73b09e9c37dcc2
SHA1 hash:
554b47e6504255157ebf909caa935fdf0c3e51ae
Detections:
AsyncRAT DCRat
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AcRat
Author:Nikos 'n0t' Totosis
Description:AcRat Payload (based on AsyncRat)
Rule name:dcrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_rkp
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Description:Detects DCRat payloads
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_DcRatBy
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing the string DcRatBy
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_WMI_EnumerateVideoDevice
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables attemping to enumerate video devices using WMI
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

AsyncRAT

Executable exe 9add4b744ba1937057ff7b5a0e2b1e86e4a4cfff53faa012bd0f49d22dfdff7b

(this sample)

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2025-12-23 15:51:00 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "9add4b744ba1937057ff7b5a0e2b1e86e4a4cfff53faa012bd0f49d22dfdff7b",
"yara_possible_family": "dcrat",
"key": "15d18b27ce887a574f777b4c6d4542214ccda4678fd29660d9a40f0cc88262e6",
"salt": "4463526174427971777164616e6368756e",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"8848",
"443",
"8080",
"80",
"8888",
"2053",
"2083",
"2087",
"2096"
],
"Hosts": [
"sun.win",
"unikey.sun.win",
"sarahl.ru.com",
"unikey.sarahl.ru.com"
],
"Version": " 1.0.7",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%AppData%",
"InstallFile": "unikey.exe",
"Key": "Tm5laGNZcEhqOEh1QW5xNDBBY1ZWbzFnVGxwVHl3UjM=",
"Mutex": "DcRatMutex_qwqdanchun",
"Certificate": "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",
"Serversignature": "EO5eQ0HaMzyt2eJw3hXoFKHzETUcXkYcju2oP7VUsR94J0cCi7LCmB0QKIvB9XfVeEpDgQjBNZ+c/+OCFN/S0Nbste1vWQRtv7ugd06j87RPtlHNizz7GRROYLf/aW2Py6LThe1dCpOovj4bNhR6rM4PR0Mh7voHV0FLjDyRGKM=",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BSOD": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "1",
"Group": "Default",
"AntiProcess": "false",
"Anti": "false"
}
}