MalwareBazaar Database
You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 8ce1805f5b1ca8c4ecd4d1731caf37de33c52e686200331f4a0ea4e6b31ff606. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.
Database Entry
Threat unknown
Vendor detections: 5
| SHA256 hash: | 8ce1805f5b1ca8c4ecd4d1731caf37de33c52e686200331f4a0ea4e6b31ff606 |
|---|---|
| SHA3-384 hash: | 23e0a7b5c18dda5fe5dd314b7de785bf9640f268908791c6569186ffac593c0bed7f0398ec85d65645f4bedff3d45437 |
| SHA1 hash: | 9c519ed1980d4dc1e55d7b979cf5da0fa2a05358 |
| MD5 hash: | 50676b460438904645e30674d438f6af |
| humanhash: | network-saturn-zebra-harry |
| File name: | vq-sp-lure-trimmed.exe |
| Download: | download sample |
| File size: | 145'920 bytes |
| First seen: | 2026-10-23 02:31:14 UTC |
| Last seen: | Never |
| File type: | |
| MIME type: | application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable |
| imphash | 555aba33e471c8bf2b9fc3922635a660 |
| ssdeep | 3072:gDD1ieyNKDtaHYaEM1Y2k9Hc3/nl6LAHkzI1UfgEA6IIyRv:cD1iFKD4Ya7k96kAD |
| TLSH | T14AE3CF1350C5A0EBD52DB17DE63232A3C5743F1A8151863F92B2AE967C93201EFF925E |
| TrID | 44.6% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2) 14.0% (.ICL) Windows Icons Library (generic) (2059/9) 13.8% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13) 13.7% (.EXE) Generic Win/DOS Executable (2002/3) 13.6% (.EXE) DOS Executable (generic) (2000/1) |
| Magika | pebin |
| dhash icon | 30b2b2f069f0d48a (6 x AgentTesla, 3 x Vidar, 2 x PureLogsStealer) |
| Reporter | Anonymous |
| Tags: | exe fake-torrent iso LimeTorrents padded |
Intelligence
File Origin
USVendor Threat Intelligence
Result
Behaviour
Unpacked files
File information
The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.
Web download
exe 8ce1805f5b1ca8c4ecd4d1731caf37de33c52e686200331f4a0ea4e6b31ff606
(this sample)
Comments
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You need to login to in order to write a comment. Login with your abuse.ch account.CORRECTION: this upload is the stage-1 loader only. I trimmed the file to the end of its PE image, assuming the overlay was junk padding. Per Thereallo's analysis of the same campaign (thereallo.dev, South Park S29E03 lure, Oct 2026), the overlay also carries a ChaCha20-encrypted second stage, and the file ends in a 64-byte footer (key^mask, nonce, sizes ^ fnv1a(mask)) that the loader reads from its own file. Both were cut off here, so this sample cannot reach stage 2 on its own, which likely explains the clean sandbox verdicts. Stage 2 is the stealer that uses the YouTube channel UC18vFC1xgebddr_7NsvgBYA and gist jasonterra69 dead drops (XOR key ZhxchsdfhSGdfgsgdfAJsakdaksdk2364236AH; my earlier comments/ThreatFox entry quoted only its first 27 chars) and C2 beenetprotect.com/lgz/gdata. The full original was not kept. Same builder as 58dffd262bb9b3c815f1017735cfa214fbbb029af8bd4cbba42c3d8db218e582 (identical imphash and Rich header).