MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry


AgentTesla


Vendor detections: 16


Intelligence 16 IOCs YARA 21 File information Comments
Download sample Add tag Delete this sample Report a False Positive

SHA256 hash: 89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b
SHA3-384 hash: 4d1a51b8325bff8a0c46444edb235ab5dce364a46c07095237edef071af2dafad696d4593de511ad7afdf0bcf7738edb
SHA1 hash: 185520ceb31c021b5d48440b31b09e7dfe6dac22
MD5 hash: d744962b80b75ddd26a4f39a8e8d4356
humanhash: ack-charlie-hawaii-alpha
File name:RH-098765000.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AgentTesla
Create hunting rule
File size:762'880 bytes
First seen:2025-01-24 07:46:59 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'647 x AgentTesla, 19'451 x Formbook, 12'201 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 12288:4hQu7+JZLQ81xkRbunBjtRbnRIA0FL99PvOPivjJj4OD218zVTAzwndztS:d/JZ37yyBpRbn7i9P2Pivjt4KU8VCq5
Threatray 346 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T126F4CFD03F327319DEA86934D259DDB592B51A78B044BAF66ADD3B5732CC211AE0CF02
TrID 71.1% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
10.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
2.0% (.ICL) Windows Icons Library (generic) (2059/9)
Magika pebin
File icon (PE):PE icon
dhash icon 00d8f872b2b2b000 (17 x Formbook, 2 x MassLogger, 1 x SnakeKeylogger)
Reporter threatcat_ch
Tags:AgentTesla exe

Intelligence

File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
598
Origin country :
CH CH
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Gathering data
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a window
Сreating synchronization primitives
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Enabling the 'hidden' option for recently created files
Adding an access-denied ACE
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Launching a process
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Restart of the analyzed sample
Creating a file
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Adding an exclusion to Microsoft Defender
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Suspicious
Threat level:
  5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
obfuscated packed packed packer_detected vbnet
Link:
https://www.filescan.io/uploads/6793457ef0727268592c3819/reports/fe915127-83f8-4f00-88a5-90f4a6dd7c90/overview
Verdict:
Malicious
Labled as:
Win/malicious_confidence_100%
Link:
https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b
Result
Verdict:
SUSPICIOUS
Details
Windows PE Executable
Found a Windows Portable Executable (PE) binary. Depending on context, the presence of a binary is suspicious or malicious.
Malware family:
Agent Tesla
Create hunting rule
Verdict:
Malicious
Link:
https://analyze.intezer.com/analyses/5459f2dc-0805-4bdd-9209-03663ad28ffe
Result
Threat name:
AgentTesla
Create hunting rule
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.spyw.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Link:
https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1598421
Signature
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Found malware configuration
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
Download SVG
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1598421 Sample: RH-098765000.exe Startdate: 24/01/2025 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 46 ip-api.com 2->46 48 ftp.antoniomayol.com 2->48 50 antoniomayol.com 2->50 56 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->56 58 Found malware configuration 2->58 60 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->60 62 12 other signatures 2->62 8 RH-098765000.exe 7 2->8         started        12 YUNDEs.exe 5 2->12         started        signatures3 process4 file5 38 C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\YUNDEs.exe, PE32 8->38 dropped 40 C:\Users\user\...\YUNDEs.exe:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 8->40 dropped 42 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\tmp2450.tmp, XML 8->42 dropped 44 C:\Users\user\...\RH-098765000.exe.log, ASCII 8->44 dropped 64 Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines) 8->64 66 Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines) 8->66 68 Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function) 8->68 76 4 other signatures 8->76 14 RH-098765000.exe 15 2 8->14         started        18 powershell.exe 23 8->18         started        20 powershell.exe 23 8->20         started        22 schtasks.exe 1 8->22         started        70 Antivirus detection for dropped file 12->70 72 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 12->72 74 Machine Learning detection for dropped file 12->74 24 YUNDEs.exe 12->24         started        26 schtasks.exe 12->26         started        signatures6 process7 dnsIp8 52 antoniomayol.com 162.241.62.63, 21, 37356, 49708 UNIFIEDLAYER-AS-1US United States 14->52 54 ip-api.com 208.95.112.1, 49707, 49711, 80 TUT-ASUS United States 14->54 78 Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module 18->78 28 WmiPrvSE.exe 18->28         started        30 conhost.exe 18->30         started        32 conhost.exe 20->32         started        34 conhost.exe 22->34         started        80 Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc) 24->80 82 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access) 24->82 84 Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials 24->84 86 Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc) 24->86 36 conhost.exe 26->36         started        signatures9 process10
Score:
100%
Verdict:
Malware
File Type:
PE
Link:
https://malprob.io/report/89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b
Detection:
agenttesla
Create hunting rule
Link:
https://mwdb.cert.pl/sample/89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b/
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Trojan.CrypterX
Create hunting rule
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2025-01-24 07:47:05 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
11
AV detection:
12 of 38 (31.58%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Detection(s):
Suspicious file
Link:
https://check.spamhaus.org/check/?searchterm=retawb5oluefrw4kcsulptm6fqn42bspkwlopygouftfy7ymjfvq._file
Verdict:
malicious
Label(s):
unknown_loader_037
Create hunting rule
agenttesla
Create hunting rule
Similar samples:
07c65671acce67cfa5a214ce2285563f6b3eaeadd5afbcd21bcaa42a536f7ba6
AgentTesla
13fd36bd0ad2ef303ded0dac6b7cd6d4326ffebb08ff914eb44a6e75c52e8289
AgentTesla
458e5bd8e3508c15449bfd4c9931a59cd2a6a95ed9e6bb5b0090aa6641a29c77
AgentTesla
4b24c70ea3b3b855220f38d41b54c8c00a2e1f9c8fdfb3432c6bb9ab30480e64
AgentTesla
89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b
AgentTesla
c91b31fb14eff751d72b07b53b3d1d71a63dce9cc61bbef4c939cbd671090585
AgentTesla
error
AgentTesla
+ 336 additional samples on MalwareBazaar
Result
Malware family:
agenttesla
Create hunting rule
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:agenttesla discovery execution keylogger spyware stealer trojan
Link:
https://tria.ge/reports/250124-jmh8dsxnfy/
Behaviour
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Looks up external IP address via web service
Checks computer location settings
Reads WinSCP keys stored on the system
Reads data files stored by FTP clients
Reads user/profile data of local email clients
Reads user/profile data of web browsers
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
AgentTesla
Agenttesla family
Verdict:
Malicious
Tags:
n/a
YARA:
n/a
Link:
https://app.threat.zone/submission/34a98804-2ad9-462f-bd58-c82d5e37b14d
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
d48ee1f6f04504d641c8769aeef83185c8de8745458a3fbc362cd53c20ef10d9
MD5 hash:
e89f78e780b64eeb920d5dfebd033ffa
SHA1 hash:
b964dc9e8f5350d3a917b6a26b58853099859d8b
Detections:
win_agent_tesla_g2
Create hunting rule
INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01
Create hunting rule
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxHookingDLL
Create hunting rule
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers
Create hunting rule
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store
Create hunting rule
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients
Create hunting rule
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients
Create hunting rule
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID
Create hunting rule
MALWARE_Win_AgentTeslaV2
Create hunting rule
Agenttesla_type2
Create hunting rule
Link:
https://www.unpac.me/results/053f06ec-22f8-4075-8531-839bbe4e6e85/
Parent samples :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 hash:
ffb97d9798a95e8bf0762ef3261ec76c3d510e2e12fb1e53a433c184c02dbb10
MD5 hash:
0cfaf885e248d58f7b236e6efdf716d0
SHA1 hash:
b25d9f8855fc09d2aec9882e5d8605e28108eb43
Detections:
SUSP_OBF_NET_ConfuserEx_Name_Pattern_Jan24
Create hunting rule
Link:
https://www.unpac.me/results/053f06ec-22f8-4075-8531-839bbe4e6e85/
Parent samples :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10a5c29d6a44de5b996598f71820bff8c29cc6b5229d2c7ec0664b601d81068d
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6c8c1ce5b36a379f6fd545629aa03270575b179e4194c31f6db163bf06de6cc6
000131c03f015a78307daa5d0d21c2fc6b286f54a51b5ad14b237433e77b3ea6
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10b78bea9f7acc71be5868fb39e4941c06ec08c4b0ea25b0957ec6b63fe37e20
1e1cda620f33f8a4e039351b55ea841fb09e0212ca2dd44cbbcd52fc88ef8f61
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36b2c227683d3aea101fb59edb33edb1ba28ec0753a32a5ce42b1959d6716965
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3600d33c7e14a371b391e1e949a16454a26014007dca981bdcd177dbd234f797
1e90ed469f2242b4882864a20ab1357789b1851f14074cc97a263ddae613a53d
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19c81289b55d23365b8c4f7c6f951063b3aa05c10a4d8025dedd0893903fcb59
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12cb84b318ee85c5d7b4ec15d5f6fb2c26a43f93c68e98c6f40c2e2b17bcdf65
5dc75fc4ff5d018e6f56ed3f2676781e2ae1a341a878ee5ef36513376b75a310
0d6a9673eb3db83be393b8e85fceb372b5fbad79ce1c56bd92ea4b6b3166f657
cf8609a0bf3ca9ed3e5e39abab534229213e4df0316cd0478032cf59e0f2f3dd
0531f60ef00a3998d4932da7000a10630fae4b355cb81db091008f3899e039a8
0b9d81ffc7bd0ddeed01b5a0adc279cd4a79003ce9253fc7e096fcdc63ec371c
004de56c87ec09f1022747d6713c26328397dec1a683f76aa178a48da776c82c
543a5190118c546db54b03846c3927a4cefc69809b5854fdd0fecf1763dfed2f
ee6be21c96c562717375ac6d428d00777826ddd74a59b8a1559eb353950f5d93
5c7dfeaaab049b0c4a2b6fe06c7d6d8d54202ab9b5ba637b73faa01bccb5debc
0f5ddd1e5c66b90c7a37c276228ef498be1297d5cf3823afd72b0ad08b08987a
e0f397c466a112a3c04c99cdd5a1fbacd2131a90d520d5245f5d0a2336e53233
8032eec5f8978a6eb901f96583472cc3bef407b41a3357ec253b8204305b69b2
b9581e9af28f052e463acd6117271db974830bba5a7ba5825068596947e872bd
0fdc25f5430a61cd969c0bcb2e5ed6965d4eb4dc73374649eeaf5a6b77498d6d
SH256 hash:
d0882ca5c17bb37b49fac659d1477ca076881268ddb39fadb697dfad4a43bf43
MD5 hash:
968ea1f2ce4feb8562087f663d25d8ef
SHA1 hash:
1335e2d01aa45e8800dadf2150e382afa59544e3
Detections:
SUSP_OBF_NET_ConfuserEx_Name_Pattern_Jan24
Create hunting rule
SUSP_OBF_NET_Reactor_Indicators_Jan24
Create hunting rule
Link:
https://www.unpac.me/results/053f06ec-22f8-4075-8531-839bbe4e6e85/
SH256 hash:
89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b
MD5 hash:
d744962b80b75ddd26a4f39a8e8d4356
SHA1 hash:
185520ceb31c021b5d48440b31b09e7dfe6dac22
Link:
https://www.unpac.me/results/053f06ec-22f8-4075-8531-839bbe4e6e85/
Malware family:
AgentTesla
Create hunting rule
Verdict:
Malicious
Link:
https://www.vmray.com/analyses/_mb/89260b07ae5d/report/overview.html
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures

MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AgentTeslaV2
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekshen
Description:AgenetTesla Type 2 Keylogger payload
Rule name:AgentTeslaV3
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekshen
Description:AgentTeslaV3 infostealer payload
Rule name:AgentTeslaV5
Create hunting rule
Author:ClaudioWayne
Description:AgentTeslaV5 infostealer payload
Rule name:Agenttesla_type2
Create hunting rule
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect Agenttesla in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Create hunting rule
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detect packed .NET executables. Mostly AgentTeslaV4.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects binaries (Windows and macOS) referencing many web browsers. Observed in information stealers.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many confidential data stores found in browsers, mail clients, cryptocurreny wallets, etc. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many email and collaboration clients. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many file transfer clients. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxHookingDLL
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects binaries and memory artifacts referencing sandbox DLLs typically observed in sandbox evasion
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing Windows vault credential objects. Observed in infostealers
Rule name:malware_Agenttesla_type2
Create hunting rule
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect Agenttesla in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:MALWARE_Win_AgentTeslaV2
Create hunting rule
Author:ditekSHen
Description:AgenetTesla Type 2 Keylogger payload
Rule name:NET
Create hunting rule
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Create hunting rule
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:pe_imphash
Create hunting rule
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Create hunting rule
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:Sus_Obf_Enc_Spoof_Hide_PE
Create hunting rule
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:Check for Overlay, Obfuscating, Encrypting, Spoofing, Hiding, or Entropy Technique(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_9f4a80b2
Create hunting rule
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_AgentTesla_ebf431a8
Create hunting rule
Author:Elastic Security
Reference:https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/attack-chain-leads-to-xworm-and-agenttesla

File information

The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Malspam

AgentTesla

Executable exe 89260b07ae5d0858db8a14a8b7cd9e2c1bcd064f5596e7e0cea1665c7f0c496b

(this sample)

  
Delivery method
Distributed via e-mail attachment

BLint

The following table provides more information about this file using BLint. BLint is a Binary Linter to check the security properties, and capabilities in executables.

Findings
IDTitleSeverity
CHECK_AUTHENTICODEMissing Authenticodehigh
CHECK_DLL_CHARACTERISTICSMissing dll Security Characteristics (HIGH_ENTROPY_VA)high

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