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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 74fd0bb45d835e60419dfac50d2fb2361b694b37d0d397b735880a39baddadaa. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 13


Intelligence 13 IOCs 1 YARA 26 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 74fd0bb45d835e60419dfac50d2fb2361b694b37d0d397b735880a39baddadaa
SHA3-384 hash: 43d859615d2c6b476eca4e395f5b97ed57e90803decd5ec6a61a8748e98049e8b8f91cb45ee1991f87a05a551822a17d
SHA1 hash: 6ccdb0ff83e263a254dadbd4fc6547470bec5377
MD5 hash: 67ee6305e9d1017148aa909f0c29391c
humanhash: summer-finch-crazy-video
File name:26SF10249959.pdf.vbe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:2'836 bytes
First seen:2026-09-10 02:40:06 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Visual Basic Script (vbe) vbe
MIME type:text/plain
ssdeep 48:X8aKmMP0U9iOShs+81UbHLwfn/21G4i/e1n/ua3BU2CpKgb:XpMP0U9iOKs+81mLwf/21G4i/E/u++57
TLSH T11351124B7D0AC13A943A8F635EABF41DD9F0165B5109DC21B89C84462F323ECFBD21A9
Magika vba
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:AsyncRAT RAT vbe


Avatar
abuse_ch
AsyncRAT C2:
102.220.161.94:80

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)


Below is a list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this malware samples.

IOCThreatFox Reference
102.220.161.94:80 https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1906837/

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
80
Origin country :
NL NL
Vendor Threat Intelligence
No detections
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
93.3%
Tags:
virus small
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
aspnet_compiler base64 downloader dropper encrypted evasive evasive lolbin masquerade obfuscated opendir packed powershell reconnaissance
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
vbs
First seen:
2026-09-09T22:34:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-09-12T00:18:00Z UTC
Hits:
~1000
Result
Threat name:
Remcos, AsyncRAT
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
rans.troj.spyw.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Remcos
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected Generic JS Downloader
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1971115 Sample: 26SF10249959.pdf.vbe Startdate: 10/09/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 46 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->46 48 Found malware configuration 2->48 50 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->50 52 15 other signatures 2->52 10 wscript.exe 21 2->10         started        process3 dnsIp4 44 23.95.147.80, 49712, 80 AS-COLOCROSSING-HostPapaUS United States 10->44 40 C:\Temp\UIHBKGJH.ps1, ASCII 10->40 dropped 62 System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit) 10->62 64 Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly) 10->64 66 Bypasses PowerShell execution policy 10->66 68 3 other signatures 10->68 15 powershell.exe 16 10->15         started        file5 signatures6 process7 signatures8 74 Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function) 15->74 76 Writes to foreign memory regions 15->76 78 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 15->78 18 aspnet_compiler.exe 1 4 15->18         started        22 conhost.exe 15->22         started        24 aspnet_compiler.exe 15->24         started        26 5 other processes 15->26 process9 dnsIp10 42 102.220.161.94, 443, 49719, 49720 VPSDEDICATED-ASUS Slovenia 18->42 38 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\mgjxax.exe, PE32 18->38 dropped 28 cmd.exe 1 18->28         started        file11 process12 signatures13 70 Suspicious powershell command line found 28->70 72 Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly) 28->72 31 powershell.exe 10 28->31         started        33 conhost.exe 28->33         started        process14 process15 35 mgjxax.exe 4 31->35         started        signatures16 54 Antivirus detection for dropped file 35->54 56 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 35->56 58 Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA) 35->58 60 3 other signatures 35->60
Verdict:
Malware
YARA:
2 match(es)
Tags:
COM Behavior Trace DeObfuscated MSXML2.XMLHTTP Obfuscated PowerShell Scripting.FileSystemObject SOS: 0.31 T1027 T1059 T1059.001 T1059.005 T1105 VBScript WScript.Shell
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.Malgent
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-09-10 02:40:32 UTC
File Type:
Text (VBS)
AV detection:
9 of 24 (37.50%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default discovery execution rat suricata
Behaviour
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
ConfuserEx .NET packer
Executes a VBScript file via the Windows Script Host.
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Badlisted process makes network request
Family: AsyncRat
Suricata alert: AsyncRAT Malware Default X.509 Certificate Detected - Inbound
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
102.220.161.94:80
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:detect_tiny_vbs
Author:daniyyell
Description:Detects tiny VBS delivery technique
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (https://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, packers and suspicious executables. NOTE: This rule may produce false positives. Updated May 2026 to reduce False Positives.
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:rat_win_asyncrat
Author:Sekoia.io
Description:Detect AsyncRAT based on specific strings
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:SUSP_Reverse_Run_Key
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects a Reversed Run Key
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
Rule name:win_asyncrat_j1
Author:Johannes Bader @viql
Description:detects AsyncRAT
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:WIN_FileFix_Detection
Author:dogsafetyforeverone
Description:Detects FileFix social engineering technique that launches chained PowerShell and PHP commands from file explorer typed paths
Reference:FileFix social engineering with PowerShell and PHP commands

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments