MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 6a8612ad8ee5e6d6ea4a422555c0491e643cbba21c98bbab5482b6e6ca6d5312. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry


AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 9


Intelligence 9 IOCs YARA 1 File information Comments
Download sample Add tag Delete this sample Report a False Positive

SHA256 hash: 6a8612ad8ee5e6d6ea4a422555c0491e643cbba21c98bbab5482b6e6ca6d5312
SHA3-384 hash: 3be7841bf78760b34ffbb87a5a6d60c32de5e43d8e595848f564e1a5580861a75df6cc5faece17ce08d3a552264c73ef
SHA1 hash: 21371b47373de697a2f095d7623e04a3e9b2111e
MD5 hash: 57e2eee5af2c0e74fd5493e30b97edf6
humanhash: arizona-angel-stream-hydrogen
File name:PO690654W22661462600110051956.pdf.vbs
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
Create hunting rule
File size:444'587 bytes
First seen:2025-01-29 08:32:43 UTC
Last seen:2025-01-30 08:54:56 UTC
File type:Visual Basic Script (vbs) vbs
MIME type:text/plain
ssdeep 12288:EWghT6onokzHxgSVW0U/cBGnciS8mJa4Cq:QhT5i9/cBGhFmJazq
TLSH T1469402368F6C6ECDB339617730D6D92815A9CCE0C458C5BB16DC98DE7DD8A0C82AB4C6
Magika vba
Reporter lowmal3
Tags:0x0-st 156-253-250-62 AsyncRAT pureeratee-duckdns-org vbs

Intelligence

File Origin
# of uploads :
3
# of downloads :
110
Origin country :
DE DE
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
97.4%
Link:
https://cyber-fortress.com/docs/result/index.php?id=6799e9b929ae628cf42ad73a
Tags:
obfuscate asyncrat xtreme sage
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm fingerprint masquerade obfuscated powershell
Link:
https://www.filescan.io/uploads/6799e7c07e7ed0811a00e425/reports/c26569b3-41b6-43a0-af83-fe5fbefabc7e/overview
Verdict:
Malicious
Labled as:
GT:VB.Zbot.9
Link:
https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/6a8612ad8ee5e6d6ea4a422555c0491e643cbba21c98bbab5482b6e6ca6d5312
Result
Verdict:
MALICIOUS
Details
Base64 Encoded Powershell Directives
Detected one or more base64 encoded Powershell directives.
Result
Threat name:
AsyncRAT
Create hunting rule
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.spyw.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Link:
https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1602042
Signature
.NET source code contains very large array initializations
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive physical memory information (via WMI, Win32_PhysicalMemory, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Plug and Play Device Information (via WMI, Win32_PnPEntity, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
Sigma detected: Powerup Write Hijack DLL
Sigma detected: Register Wscript In Run Key
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Uses dynamic DNS services
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
Download SVG
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1602042 Sample: PO690654W226614626001100519... Startdate: 29/01/2025 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 117 pureeratee.duckdns.org 2->117 119 0x0.st 2->119 125 Sigma detected: Register Wscript In Run Key 2->125 127 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->127 129 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->129 133 15 other signatures 2->133 11 wscript.exe 2 2->11         started        15 wscript.exe 2->15         started        17 wscript.exe 2->17         started        19 10 other processes 2->19 signatures3 131 Uses dynamic DNS services 117->131 process4 file5 115 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\c.bat, ASCII 11->115 dropped 159 VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions 11->159 161 Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly) 11->161 163 Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage) 11->163 165 Suspicious execution chain found 11->165 21 cmd.exe 1 11->21         started        24 cmd.exe 15->24         started        26 cmd.exe 17->26         started        167 Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module 19->167 28 cmd.exe 19->28         started        30 conhost.exe 19->30         started        32 conhost.exe 19->32         started        34 6 other processes 19->34 signatures6 process7 signatures8 139 Suspicious powershell command line found 21->139 141 Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly) 21->141 143 Bypasses PowerShell execution policy 21->143 36 cmd.exe 2 21->36         started        39 conhost.exe 21->39         started        41 cmd.exe 24->41         started        43 conhost.exe 24->43         started        45 cmd.exe 26->45         started        47 conhost.exe 26->47         started        49 cmd.exe 28->49         started        51 conhost.exe 28->51         started        process9 signatures10 135 Suspicious powershell command line found 36->135 137 Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly) 36->137 53 powershell.exe 36->53         started        58 powershell.exe 14 35 36->58         started        60 conhost.exe 36->60         started        62 powershell.exe 41->62         started        64 powershell.exe 41->64         started        66 conhost.exe 41->66         started        68 powershell.exe 45->68         started        70 conhost.exe 45->70         started        72 2 other processes 49->72 process11 dnsIp12 121 pureeratee.duckdns.org 193.187.91.218, 49873, 50787 OBE-EUROPEObenetworkEuropeSE Sweden 53->121 99 C:\Users\user\...\WindowsUpdate_226.vbs, ASCII 53->99 dropped 101 C:\Users\user\...\WindowsUpdate_226.bat, ASCII 53->101 dropped 145 Queries sensitive physical memory information (via WMI, Win32_PhysicalMemory, often done to detect virtual machines) 53->145 147 Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines) 53->147 149 Queries sensitive Plug and Play Device Information (via WMI, Win32_PnPEntity, often done to detect virtual machines) 53->149 157 2 other signatures 53->157 123 0x0.st 168.119.145.117, 443, 49709, 49792 HETZNER-ASDE Germany 58->123 103 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\norbqcql.cmdline, Unicode 58->103 dropped 151 Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen) 58->151 153 Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module 58->153 74 csc.exe 3 58->74         started        77 cmstp.exe 8 7 58->77         started        105 C:\Users\user\...\WindowsUpdate_329.bat, ASCII 62->105 dropped 155 Creates multiple autostart registry keys 62->155 79 csc.exe 64->79         started        81 cmstp.exe 64->81         started        83 csc.exe 68->83         started        85 cmstp.exe 68->85         started        87 csc.exe 72->87         started        89 cmstp.exe 72->89         started        file13 signatures14 process15 file16 107 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\norbqcql.dll, PE32 74->107 dropped 91 cvtres.exe 1 74->91         started        109 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\xhf5rl1b.dll, PE32 79->109 dropped 93 cvtres.exe 79->93         started        111 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\pkbwqmgm.dll, PE32 83->111 dropped 95 cvtres.exe 83->95         started        113 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\sq5c43e2.dll, PE32 87->113 dropped 97 cvtres.exe 87->97         started        process17
Score:
100%
Verdict:
Malware
File Type:
SCRIPT
Link:
https://malprob.io/report/6a8612ad8ee5e6d6ea4a422555c0491e643cbba21c98bbab5482b6e6ca6d5312
Detection:
n/a
Link:
https://mwdb.cert.pl/sample/6a8612ad8ee5e6d6ea4a422555c0491e643cbba21c98bbab5482b6e6ca6d5312/
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.Leonem
Create hunting rule
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2025-01-28 11:59:17 UTC
File Type:
Text (VBS)
AV detection:
8 of 38 (21.05%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Detection(s):
Suspicious file
Link:
https://check.spamhaus.org/check/?searchterm=nkdbflmo4xtnn2skiisvlqcjdzsdzo5cdsmlxk2uqk3onstnkmja._file
Result
Malware family:
n/a
Score:
  8/10
Tags:
discovery execution persistence
Link:
https://tria.ge/reports/250129-kfwqkssnay/
Behaviour
Kills process with taskkill
Suspicious behavior: CmdExeWriteProcessMemorySpam
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Drops file in System32 directory
Adds Run key to start application
Checks computer location settings
Blocklisted process makes network request
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures

MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:Base64_Encoded_Powershell_Directives
Create hunting rule

File information

The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Malspam

AsyncRAT

Visual Basic Script (vbs) vbs 6a8612ad8ee5e6d6ea4a422555c0491e643cbba21c98bbab5482b6e6ca6d5312

(this sample)

  
Delivery method
Distributed via e-mail attachment

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