MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 5ef4854ae64579b17c0bec988ba62658ed442c8a174c1648531d9ba2748c9a97. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



HawkEye


Vendor detections: 7


Intelligence 7 IOCs YARA 5 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 5ef4854ae64579b17c0bec988ba62658ed442c8a174c1648531d9ba2748c9a97
SHA3-384 hash: cf6baa6d34d147711fb52c41ab093781c642bcefbaa2c1959673541c47497e79e9fb97207e912dc11e151fb42b654835
SHA1 hash: d743a69d73909690ac5b3469978c0e3258e7052b
MD5 hash: b5733570aee4cb1675ed9c36e672ddb5
humanhash: autumn-friend-artist-mango
File name:RFQ-ELCKSEL2007.exe
Download: download sample
Signature HawkEye
File size:699'392 bytes
First seen:2020-08-06 05:46:54 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'740 x AgentTesla, 19'600 x Formbook, 12'241 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 12288:yP3SQEIrgZymfZWBE7jWzbFC/weQ41E/NrqkaoQH2SYHnHNtD5lPZ7grpiA:0E+5AWcWz0/wO1E/5qTH2S4HLnPyQA
Threatray 322 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH CBE40194339E6B62D9FC9FF1554C318013F4BC66ED42E3695E8130F626B3B40C6A4AA7
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:exe HawkEye


Avatar
abuse_ch
Malspam distributing HawkEye:

HELO: gmail.com
Sending IP: 81.171.9.143
From: 조미선(Cho Misun) <chomi0605@panpacific.co.kr>
Reply-To: BBI <surnit9041@gmail.com>
Subject: VESSEL B/L NO : ELCKSEL20070292 SHIPPING DOC
Attachment: RFQ-ELCKSEL2007.rar (contains "RFQ-ELCKSEL2007.exe")

HawkEye SMTP exfil server:
mail.grandinnabalibeach.com:587

HawkEye SMTP exfil email address:
purchasing@grandinnabalibeach.com

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
89
Origin country :
n/a
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a window
Sending a UDP request
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Launching a process
Creating a process with a hidden window
Deleting a recently created file
Creating a file
DNS request
Sending an HTTP GET request
Sending a custom TCP request
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Enabling the 'hidden' option for recently created files
Reading critical registry keys
Creating a file in the mass storage device
Stealing user critical data
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Unauthorized injection to a system process
Enabling a "Do not show hidden files" option
Enabling threat expansion on mass storage devices by creating the autorun.inf autorun file
Result
Threat name:
HawkEye MailPassView
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
phis.troj.spyw.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Detected HawkEye Rat
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location
Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Yara detected AntiVM_3
Yara detected MailPassView
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 258306 Sample: RFQ-ELCKSEL2007.exe Startdate: 06/08/2020 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 43 Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules) 2->43 45 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->45 47 Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location 2->47 49 11 other signatures 2->49 7 RFQ-ELCKSEL2007.exe 7 2->7         started        process3 file4 23 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\vysfyehCOw.exe, PE32 7->23 dropped 25 C:\Users\...\vysfyehCOw.exe:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 7->25 dropped 27 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\tmp8B7F.tmp, XML 7->27 dropped 29 C:\Users\user\...\RFQ-ELCKSEL2007.exe.log, ASCII 7->29 dropped 10 RegSvcs.exe 4 7->10         started        14 schtasks.exe 1 7->14         started        process5 dnsIp6 31 grandinnabalibeach.com 192.185.181.99, 49734, 587 UNIFIEDLAYER-AS-1US United States 10->31 33 mail.grandinnabalibeach.com 10->33 35 2 other IPs or domains 10->35 51 Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders) 10->51 53 Sample uses process hollowing technique 10->53 16 vbc.exe 1 10->16         started        19 vbc.exe 13 10->19         started        21 conhost.exe 14->21         started        signatures7 process8 signatures9 37 Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords 16->37 39 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access) 16->39 41 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry) 19->41
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Trojan.Kryptik
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2020-08-06 05:48:06 UTC
AV detection:
24 of 29 (82.76%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
hawkeye
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
keylogger trojan stealer spyware family:hawkeye
Behaviour
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Creates scheduled task(s)
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Looks up external IP address via web service
Uses the VBS compiler for execution
Reads user/profile data of web browsers
HawkEye
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:Hawkeye
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect HawkEye in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:RAT_HawkEye
Author:Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Description:Detects HawkEye RAT
Reference:http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Rule name:win_hawkeye_keylogger_auto
Author:Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Description:autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator
Rule name:win_hawkeye_keylogger_w0
Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Rule name:with_sqlite
Author:Julian J. Gonzalez <info@seguridadparatodos.es>
Description:Rule to detect the presence of SQLite data in raw image
Reference:http://www.st2labs.com

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Malspam

HawkEye

Executable exe 5ef4854ae64579b17c0bec988ba62658ed442c8a174c1648531d9ba2748c9a97

(this sample)

  
Delivery method
Distributed via e-mail attachment

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