MalwareBazaar Database
You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 58dffd262bb9b3c815f1017735cfa214fbbb029af8bd4cbba42c3d8db218e582. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.
Database Entry
Threat unknown
Vendor detections: 6
| SHA256 hash: | 58dffd262bb9b3c815f1017735cfa214fbbb029af8bd4cbba42c3d8db218e582 |
|---|---|
| SHA3-384 hash: | f644be82e6306cc79d00a96df0034cdb8c6988bff098a521851a622a651436941e735035f69c7afab57faf933e6981e5 |
| SHA1 hash: | 9c4266b80025e52fffc66ae37fa65f07ed440b54 |
| MD5 hash: | 9234bea364e01ce9a1364fca142ac415 |
| humanhash: | quebec-thirteen-jig-william |
| File name: | vlc-3.0.23-win64_crypted.exe |
| Download: | download sample |
| File size: | 128'000 bytes |
| First seen: | 2026-10-22 04:00:44 UTC |
| Last seen: | Never |
| File type: |  exe |
| MIME type: | application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable |
| imphash | 555aba33e471c8bf2b9fc3922635a660 |
| ssdeep | 3072:z/KExfFaWsbiQ2k9Hc3/nl6LAHkzI1UfgEA6IIyRZ:DKExfVs2/k96kAD |
| TLSH | T129C3D061858BC1E7E52E427DE527258BC5303D0893709DBF93B06E2E7D96D406BBA20F |
| TrID | 44.6% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2) 14.0% (.ICL) Windows Icons Library (generic) (2059/9) 13.8% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13) 13.7% (.EXE) Generic Win/DOS Executable (2002/3) 13.6% (.EXE) DOS Executable (generic) (2000/1) |
| Magika | pebin |
| dhash icon | 30b2b2f069f0d48a (6 x AgentTesla, 3 x Vidar, 2 x PureLogsStealer) |
| Reporter |  PeterFellow |
| Tags: | exe |
Intelligence
File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
222
Origin country :
USVendor Threat Intelligence
No detections
Malware family:
n/a
ID:
1
File name:
exe
Verdict:
No threats detected
Analysis date:
2026-10-22 04:14:29 UTC
Tags:
n/a
Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Detection:
n/a
Detection(s):
Verdict:
Clean
Score:
99.9%
Tags:
n/a
Result
Verdict:
Clean
Maliciousness:
Behaviour
Sending a custom TCP request
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
adaptive-context microsoft_visual_cc packed
Verdict:
Malicious
Labled as:
Yogi.Generic
Verdict:
Unknown
File Type:
exe x64
Verdict:
Suspicious
Score:
98%
Verdict:
Malware
File Type:
PE
Verdict:
inconclusive
YARA:
4 match(es)
Tags:
Executable PDB Path PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout Win 64 Exe x64
Threat name:
Win64.Trojan.Yogi
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-10-22 04:01:25 UTC
File Type:
PE+ (Exe)
Extracted files:
11
AV detection:
17 of 24 (70.83%)
Threat level:
5/5
Detection(s):
Suspicious file
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
58dffd262bb9b3c815f1017735cfa214fbbb029af8bd4cbba42c3d8db218e582
MD5 hash:
9234bea364e01ce9a1364fca142ac415
SHA1 hash:
9c4266b80025e52fffc66ae37fa65f07ed440b54
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.
Threat name:
Legit
Score:
0.03
File information
The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.
Comments
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You need to login to in order to write a comment. Login with your abuse.ch account.CORRECTION: this upload is the stage-1 loader only. I trimmed the file to the end of its PE image, assuming the overlay was junk padding. Per Thereallo's analysis of the same campaign (thereallo.dev, South Park S29E03 lure, Oct 2026), the overlay also carries a ChaCha20-encrypted second stage, and the file ends in a 64-byte footer (key^mask, nonce, sizes ^ fnv1a(mask)) that the loader reads from its own file. Both were cut off here, so this sample cannot reach stage 2 on its own, which likely explains the clean sandbox verdicts. Stage 2 is the stealer that uses the YouTube channel UC18vFC1xgebddr_7NsvgBYA and gist jasonterra69 dead drops (XOR key ZhxchsdfhSGdfgsgdfAJsakdaksdk2364236AH; my earlier comments/ThreatFox entry quoted only its first 27 chars) and C2 beenetprotect.com/lgz/gdata. The full original was not kept. Version info (Freeware Developers / prepares application data) matches the article's loader.
Still being distributed as of 2026-10-22 via LimeTorrents fake TV-episode torrents. Re-caught 2026-10-23 as Tulsa King S04E02 Blind Rooster 1080p WEB H264-FLUX.7z and MobLand S02E06 A Different Corner 1080p WEB H264-CAKES.7z (also VisionQuest S01E05 on 2026-10-21). The .7z is really a ZIP, 993,259,160 bytes, sha256 ad4ab37a14f0e80e8d2d2109d3a980718ddb58583da530ec5311252a5c9514bb, containing vlc-3.0.23-win64_crypted.exe (1,023,025,653 bytes, padded, sha256 53c889d81914869958a2662518706e4f4dc47a22f380599c2967ea4b5d39288d). This sample is that exe trimmed to its PE image. About 15 same-size torrents were posted on LimeTorrents on 2026-10-22 (names like H264 MeGusta 7z, H264 CAKES 7z). C2 https://beenetprotect.com/lgz/gdata (ThreatFox). YARA: FakeTorrent_Loader_HashedAPI_Win64.
Trimmed sample: these are the first 128,000 bytes (the complete PE image) of a 1,023,025,653-byte original, sha256 53c889d81914869958a2662518706e4f4dc47a22f380599c2967ea4b5d39288d. About 1 GB of random padding (overlay entropy ~7.98) was removed. The padding is there to get past AV and sandbox size limits.
Delivery: fake TV torrent “VisionQuest S01E05 Firewall 1080p WEB H264-EZTV 7z” on LimeTorrents, 2026-10-21. The “.7z” is really a ZIP (sha256 ad4ab37a14f0e80e8d2d2109d3a980718ddb58583da530ec5311252a5c9514bb) containing vlc-3.0.23-win64_crypted.exe. A sibling lure, “VisionQuest S01E03 Reboot 1080p WEB H264-EZTV”, was seen on 2026-10-19.
Behavior (Win11, isolated sandbox with fake internet): within ~40 s of launch it fetched two dead drops:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC18vFC1xgebddr_7NsvgBYA (@bubblegymes, “bubblegym”). The description holds “Config: [[OA0dDQ0HFBQHJyIHEkkQCAlJLS0JTgwAAB8S]]”, which is base64 + repeating XOR with key “ZhxchsdfhSGdfgsgdfAJsakdaks”, decoding to beenetprotect.com/lgz/gdata
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/jasonterra69/48d9e264c05843f0cdc302143b4400c8/raw (now 404)
The dead-drop requests send YouTube consent cookies and a garbled binary User-Agent. It then POSTs “guid=” to https://beenetprotect.com/lgz/gdata, followed by a GET, with UA “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36”.
C2: beenetprotect.com, A record 109.120.179.122 (AS210644 AEZA GROUP, FR), registered 2026-09-14 via Cloudflare (DNS only, not proxied), Let’s Encrypt wildcard cert issued 2026-09-14. No next stage was observed, because the sandbox had no live C2.