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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 5722bae97daf54f30f3fcca10ced0c88ec0e64f5c1de3152c332e6178b64acf2. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 19


Intelligence 19 IOCs 1 YARA 24 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 5722bae97daf54f30f3fcca10ced0c88ec0e64f5c1de3152c332e6178b64acf2
SHA3-384 hash: 1b341439ba68d4dd143a362d7d69b98a0b3d9a144061d2fa1835ab94ebf06a090bfcec1353803608c1fd1b1eec8b1f7d
SHA1 hash: 60b6eab8f1f84234fd94e1839a09ad21136b8ab0
MD5 hash: ef9d4c47772f9b6d7fac16efa3f0ea4f
humanhash: georgia-east-avocado-pluto
File name:5722bae97daf54f30f3fcca10ced0c88ec0e64f5c1de3.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:49'152 bytes
First seen:2026-04-02 19:40:24 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (49'297 x AgentTesla, 20'714 x Formbook, 12'401 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 768:ruuwvNT8E2mLWU3FvZmo2q7B1hyJ7WGdQpPI6w5jTZP0bjzjFYoKKv0XnIERhPS1:ruuwvNT8xk2kO4uQG6w5HubjzZYoh0X4
Threatray 1'665 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T1CE234B0037E9812BF2BE4F7499F22145867EF2633603D64E2DC442D75663FC69642AFA
TrID 70.4% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
6.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2)
4.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:AsyncRAT exe RAT


Avatar
abuse_ch
AsyncRAT C2:
83.142.209.230:8808

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)


Below is a list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this malware samples.

IOCThreatFox Reference
83.142.209.230:8808 https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1780547/

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
249
Origin country :
NL NL
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Gathering data
Malware family:
ID:
1
File name:
GammaRayBlast.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-04-02 01:36:09 UTC
Tags:
rat njrat bladabindi remote xworm backdoor asyncrat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Gathering data
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Sending a custom TCP request
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
Creating a window
Connection attempt
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Malicious
Labled as:
Application.MSILheracles.Generic
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2026-04-02T05:49:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-04-03T07:55:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Detections:
Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.b PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d
Result
Threat name:
AsyncRAT
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Found malware configuration
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Potential Privilege Escalation using Task Scheduler highest RunLevel
Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1893043 Sample: 5722bae97daf54f30f3fcca10ce... Startdate: 02/04/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 35 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->35 37 Found malware configuration 2->37 39 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->39 41 9 other signatures 2->41 7 5722bae97daf54f30f3fcca10ced0c88ec0e64f5c1de3.exe 7 2->7         started        11 WorkingInstaller.exe 1 2 2->11         started        process3 dnsIp4 29 C:\Users\user\...\WorkingInstaller.exe, PE32 7->29 dropped 31 5722bae97daf54f30f...0e64f5c1de3.exe.log, ASCII 7->31 dropped 43 Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag 7->43 45 Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) 7->45 14 cmd.exe 1 7->14         started        17 cmd.exe 1 7->17         started        33 83.142.209.230, 49720, 49723, 7707 PL-METROINTERNETPL Ukraine 11->33 47 Antivirus detection for dropped file 11->47 49 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 11->49 file5 signatures6 process7 signatures8 51 Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules 14->51 53 Potential Privilege Escalation using Task Scheduler highest RunLevel 14->53 19 conhost.exe 14->19         started        21 schtasks.exe 1 14->21         started        23 WorkingInstaller.exe 3 17->23         started        25 conhost.exe 17->25         started        27 timeout.exe 1 17->27         started        process9
Verdict:
AsyncRAT
YARA:
14 match(es)
Tags:
.Net AsyncRAT Executable Managed .NET PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.80 Win 32 Exe x86
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
CNC: 83.142.209.230
PORT: 6606,7707,8808
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-04-02 19:25:49 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
1
AV detection:
23 of 24 (95.83%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default defense_evasion discovery execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
83.142.209.230:6606
83.142.209.230:7707
83.142.209.230:8808
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
5722bae97daf54f30f3fcca10ced0c88ec0e64f5c1de3152c332e6178b64acf2
MD5 hash:
ef9d4c47772f9b6d7fac16efa3f0ea4f
SHA1 hash:
60b6eab8f1f84234fd94e1839a09ad21136b8ab0
Detections:
win_asyncrat_w0 AsyncRAT
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:AsyncRat
Author:kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:AsyncRat Payload
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:SUSP_Reverse_Run_Key
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects a Reversed Run Key
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
Rule name:win_asyncrat_j1
Author:Johannes Bader @viql
Description:detects AsyncRAT
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments