MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 522a870c4fc20821dc2f3a0565fe2cf8ec876ebf96e8f55b5679e4755f8bd131. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AveMariaRAT


Vendor detections: 10


Intelligence 10 IOCs YARA 7 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 522a870c4fc20821dc2f3a0565fe2cf8ec876ebf96e8f55b5679e4755f8bd131
SHA3-384 hash: 1531d670378b9eeffcc5e44d6c07ef81bf3d73e391e19c8fd6dde59dc82ab2018c63fa8976c2610a2c42c92027936757
SHA1 hash: eefd8eadd8903a85d7861536772702b229f95b5c
MD5 hash: 1982a4adfdd80684f98fd7bc16b8f87a
humanhash: grey-march-jig-mike
File name:522a870c4fc20821dc2f3a0565fe2cf8ec876ebf96e8f55b5679e4755f8bd131
Download: download sample
Signature AveMariaRAT
File size:2'806'412 bytes
First seen:2020-11-15 23:20:33 UTC
Last seen:2020-11-17 15:14:00 UTC
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash 6bac3cfe8acb6c6c4a30aaa022de2388 (308 x AveMariaRAT, 7 x njrat, 7 x Skeeeyah)
ssdeep 24576:ssFymZZcVKfIxTiEVc847flVC6faaQDbGV6eH81k6IbGD2JTu0GoZQDbGV6eH81R:fFymw4gxeOw46fUbNecCCFbNecP
Threatray 4'672 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH 84D59FF6725A048FF7337570F50BA920A089B92CCB4CA3AB5F7B390E61964C580D6677
Reporter seifreed
Tags:AveMariaRAT

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
2
# of downloads :
153
Origin country :
n/a
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Forced system process termination
Creating a window
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a file in the Windows subdirectories
Enabling the 'hidden' option for recently created files
Creating a process from a recently created file
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun with the standard Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry branch
Creating a file in the mass storage device
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process by context flags manipulation
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Unauthorized injection to a system process
Result
Verdict:
MALICIOUS
Details
Windows PE Executable
Found a Windows Portable Executable (PE) binary. Depending on context, the presence of a binary is suspicious or malicious.
Result
Threat name:
AveMaria
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
spre.troj.spyw.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Command shell drops VBS files
Contain functionality to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to hide user accounts
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates an undocumented autostart registry key
Drops executables to the windows directory (C:\Windows) and starts them
Drops PE files with benign system names
Drops VBS files to the startup folder
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sample is not signed and drops a device driver
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly
Spreads via windows shares (copies files to share folders)
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (file name check)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected AveMaria stealer
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 317510 Sample: I75HqbJtNE Startdate: 16/11/2020 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 130 Antivirus detection for dropped file 2->130 132 Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample 2->132 134 Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file 2->134 136 6 other signatures 2->136 14 I75HqbJtNE.exe 2->14         started        17 wscript.exe 2->17         started        19 svchost.exe 1 2->19         started        21 2 other processes 2->21 process3 signatures4 210 Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (file name check) 14->210 212 Contain functionality to detect virtual machines 14->212 214 Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes 14->214 216 2 other signatures 14->216 23 I75HqbJtNE.exe 1 51 14->23         started        26 cmd.exe 2 14->26         started        28 StikyNot.exe 17->28         started        process5 signatures6 160 Spreads via windows shares (copies files to share folders) 23->160 162 Writes to foreign memory regions 23->162 164 Allocates memory in foreign processes 23->164 166 Sample is not signed and drops a device driver 23->166 30 I75HqbJtNE.exe 1 3 23->30         started        34 diskperf.exe 5 23->34         started        168 Command shell drops VBS files 26->168 170 Drops VBS files to the startup folder 26->170 36 conhost.exe 26->36         started        172 Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (file name check) 28->172 174 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 28->174 38 StikyNot.exe 28->38         started        40 cmd.exe 28->40         started        process7 file8 114 C:\Windows\System\explorer.exe, PE32 30->114 dropped 218 Installs a global keyboard hook 30->218 42 explorer.exe 30->42         started        116 C:\Users\user\...\Disk.sys:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 34->116 dropped 118 C:\Users\...\SyncHost.exe:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 34->118 dropped 120 C:\Users\...\StikyNot.exe:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 34->120 dropped 45 StikyNot.exe 34->45         started        220 Spreads via windows shares (copies files to share folders) 38->220 222 Sample uses process hollowing technique 38->222 224 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 38->224 122 C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\...\x.vbs, ASCII 40->122 dropped 47 conhost.exe 40->47         started        signatures9 process10 signatures11 176 Antivirus detection for dropped file 42->176 178 Machine Learning detection for dropped file 42->178 180 Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (file name check) 42->180 186 2 other signatures 42->186 49 explorer.exe 47 42->49         started        53 cmd.exe 1 42->53         started        182 Contain functionality to detect virtual machines 45->182 184 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 45->184 55 StikyNot.exe 46 45->55         started        57 cmd.exe 1 45->57         started        process12 file13 104 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\Disk.sys, PE32 49->104 dropped 106 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\SyncHost.exe, PE32 49->106 dropped 138 Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) 49->138 140 Spreads via windows shares (copies files to share folders) 49->140 142 Writes to foreign memory regions 49->142 59 explorer.exe 3 17 49->59         started        64 diskperf.exe 49->64         started        66 conhost.exe 53->66         started        144 Allocates memory in foreign processes 55->144 146 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 55->146 68 StikyNot.exe 55->68         started        70 diskperf.exe 55->70         started        72 conhost.exe 57->72         started        signatures14 process15 dnsIp16 124 vccmd03.googlecode.com 59->124 126 vccmd02.googlecode.com 59->126 128 5 other IPs or domains 59->128 108 C:\Windows\System\spoolsv.exe, PE32 59->108 dropped 110 C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\mrsys.exe, PE32 59->110 dropped 204 System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit) 59->204 206 Creates an undocumented autostart registry key 59->206 208 Installs a global keyboard hook 59->208 74 spoolsv.exe 59->74         started        77 spoolsv.exe 59->77         started        79 spoolsv.exe 59->79         started        112 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\StikyNot.exe, PE32 64->112 dropped 81 explorer.exe 68->81         started        file17 signatures18 process19 signatures20 188 Antivirus detection for dropped file 74->188 190 Machine Learning detection for dropped file 74->190 192 Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (file name check) 74->192 83 spoolsv.exe 74->83         started        86 cmd.exe 74->86         started        194 Drops executables to the windows directory (C:\Windows) and starts them 77->194 196 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 77->196 88 spoolsv.exe 77->88         started        90 cmd.exe 77->90         started        198 Sample uses process hollowing technique 81->198 process21 signatures22 148 Spreads via windows shares (copies files to share folders) 83->148 150 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 83->150 92 spoolsv.exe 83->92         started        95 diskperf.exe 83->95         started        97 conhost.exe 86->97         started        152 Sample uses process hollowing technique 88->152 99 conhost.exe 90->99         started        process23 signatures24 200 Drops executables to the windows directory (C:\Windows) and starts them 92->200 202 Installs a global keyboard hook 92->202 101 explorer.exe 92->101         started        process25 signatures26 154 Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (file name check) 101->154 156 Sample uses process hollowing technique 101->156 158 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 101->158
Threat name:
Win32.Spyware.AveMaria
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2020-11-15 23:22:39 UTC
AV detection:
42 of 48 (87.50%)
Threat level:
  2/5
Result
Malware family:
warzonerat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:warzonerat evasion infostealer persistence rat upx
Behaviour
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Drops file in Windows directory
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Adds Run key to start application
Drops startup file
Loads dropped DLL
Executes dropped EXE
Modifies Installed Components in the registry
UPX packed file
Warzone RAT Payload
Modifies WinLogon for persistence
Modifies visiblity of hidden/system files in Explorer
WarzoneRat, AveMaria
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
021d01fe3793879f57a2942664fc7c096710e94e87ad13dc21467c12edf61546
MD5 hash:
ad9fd1564dd1c6be54747e84444b8f55
SHA1 hash:
001495af4af443265200340a08b5e07dc2a32553
Parent samples :
41b6843f504506bfe5a47155873b5e8d4a10382e6bcbbaadf069bc5d216c8b53
273c7d66a2746646c43e4c870ea99def6bfb8d7210cafac4eeda64c50b2f8e83
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237358a60a6aeaf9e2f5247fdf1c2cc04e3e3c0ff57e2c03b799d10b770361f7
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c90e5c5f118bfc7417e1a43d8ec7a1d6e91a730f336a47799b81f16a0fd6d69c
614f6326a378a9c583fc7de320ea6a60a78706283ec087afcb349ca75c083807
f19253d1e2423e2613b27354b1d8670fc63ffbb2d194ebf00e2323f712141648
93ddcee5487885a9825538b723ba30214b827617f85aef5558d232545171e8f6
2921a0fa40963ad342875ba6fc57c1629caa800f834ebf516a6cf6a59f467212
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12a6b979da40489d768e28882836de2434009bcb436c2901772bed7633d88770
SH256 hash:
fc0c90044b94b080f307c16494369a0796ac1d4e74e7912ba79c15cca241801c
MD5 hash:
6b906764a35508a7fd266cdd512e46b1
SHA1 hash:
2a943b5868de4facf52d4f4c1b63f83eacd882a2
SH256 hash:
212c398621cb642a265881194555dbddbca1e712c6327250de0d863c1220606a
MD5 hash:
6a46ef3cd052d7c2342490f7d7405b8b
SHA1 hash:
fe434dee2dab75716a8fa7c5b696a9cc859c3722
Detections:
win_ave_maria_g0 win_ave_maria_auto
Parent samples :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 hash:
6d9fee542af0fe7ba07f82387256c170e2ae54ebf5ed6f40a7c2851733287aa7
MD5 hash:
3912e62d34954fe255646ce61c4fbfec
SHA1 hash:
75e9786c85172934ead0138c7fdf20671014b403
SH256 hash:
a17a204f51511144ca97d110dee827ff8fade1088983c30d0bc2fc5ddbe92e64
MD5 hash:
641ad4e559d3865a7db4f3bfdb368766
SHA1 hash:
8cdc17830d4d8462871c9fa30a05b1243b684aa9
SH256 hash:
522a870c4fc20821dc2f3a0565fe2cf8ec876ebf96e8f55b5679e4755f8bd131
MD5 hash:
1982a4adfdd80684f98fd7bc16b8f87a
SHA1 hash:
eefd8eadd8903a85d7861536772702b229f95b5c
Detections:
win_ave_maria_g0
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:ave_maria_warzone_rat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:Chrome_stealer_bin_mem
Author:James_inthe_box
Description:Chrome in files like avemaria
Rule name:Codoso_Gh0st_1
Author:Florian Roth
Description:Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware
Reference:https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks
Rule name:Email_stealer_bin_mem
Author:James_inthe_box
Description:Email in files like avemaria
Rule name:RDPWrap
Author:@bartblaze
Description:Identifies RDP Wrapper, sometimes used by attackers to maintain persistence.
Reference:https://github.com/stascorp/rdpwrap
Rule name:suspicious_packer_section
Author:@j0sm1
Description:The packer/protector section names/keywords
Reference:http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2012/10/14/random-stats-from-1-2m-samples-pe-section-names/
Rule name:UAC_bypass_bin_mem
Author:James_inthe_box
Description:UAC bypass in files like avemaria

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

  
Delivery method
Other

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