MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 4b5a876b1c230b28c0862d5f8158b3657016709855bf3329d8fea6cada3adbfe. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



ZharkBot


Vendor detections: 16


Intelligence 16 IOCs YARA 4 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: 4b5a876b1c230b28c0862d5f8158b3657016709855bf3329d8fea6cada3adbfe
SHA3-384 hash: 7de13375db816ed705e25ac14b0dac1bd6a1205d87b5320f39df8eb64b1be589ef7304b54bd72558b559f3246fc06b58
SHA1 hash: 4bef9109eaeace4107c47858eef2d9d3487e45f0
MD5 hash: b45668e08c03024f2432ff332c319131
humanhash: triple-eight-low-mobile
File name:b45668e08c03024f2432ff332c319131
Download: download sample
Signature ZharkBot
File size:3'608'064 bytes
First seen:2024-11-03 06:28:46 UTC
Last seen:2024-11-03 08:19:14 UTC
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash 4328f7206db519cd4e82283211d98e83 (533 x RedLineStealer, 18 x Arechclient2, 15 x DCRat)
ssdeep 98304:MHKnK7qkC+8TMGHgWnvLBQ0YXpS3KZFc6LUARABDgAj:MqKYx9zu0YpSaZFcJA6BDga
Threatray 42 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T14CF5333A39520A2BF4DC44B5C2DBD2510DC8DC05A7911BE3B50EF753B2A866CAF5AB60
TrID 27.1% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
20.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
18.6% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
8.5% (.ICL) Windows Icons Library (generic) (2059/9)
8.3% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13)
Magika pebin
File icon (PE):PE icon
dhash icon f4e48c9c9c8ce0f0 (1 x ZharkBot)
Reporter zbetcheckin
Tags:185-215-113-16 32 exe signed ZharkBot

Code Signing Certificate

Organisation:ViewSony game mode plus
Issuer:ViewSony game mode plus
Algorithm:sha1WithRSAEncryption
Valid from:2024-10-23T13:53:44Z
Valid to:2034-10-24T13:53:44Z
Serial number: 511babc2e5a2628a42f11ac01c517482
Intelligence: 2 malware samples on MalwareBazaar are signed with this code signing certificate
Thumbprint Algorithm:SHA256
Thumbprint: a33ecc7e5f9161f5381a4dfc3428d7f19c4dbb659ed582264c943d8990290b87
Source:This information was brought to you by ReversingLabs A1000 Malware Analysis Platform

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
2
# of downloads :
446
Origin country :
FR FR
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
ID:
1
File name:
file
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2024-11-02 04:34:52 UTC
Tags:
amadey botnet stealer loader stealc lumma themida possible-phishing cryptbot rdp

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
92.5%
Tags:
powershell vmdetect autorun
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Searching for the window
Searching for analyzing tools
Launching a process
Searching for synchronization primitives
Launching the default Windows debugger (dwwin.exe)
Unauthorized injection to a system process
Verdict:
Suspicious
Threat level:
  5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm packed packed packer_detected themidawinlicense
Result
Verdict:
MALICIOUS
Details
Windows PE Executable
Found a Windows Portable Executable (PE) binary. Depending on context, the presence of a binary is suspicious or malicious.
Result
Threat name:
Zhark RAT
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
spre.troj.adwa.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
AI detected suspicious sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Drops PE files to the startup folder
Found malware configuration
Hides threads from debuggers
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
PE file contains section with special chars
Powershell drops PE file
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sigma detected: Copy file to startup via Powershell
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Zhark RAT
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1547843 Sample: WF36VSMfKA.exe Startdate: 03/11/2024 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 39 instoreperplexion.shop 2->39 41 beautyandstyles.shop 2->41 47 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->47 49 Found malware configuration 2->49 51 Antivirus detection for dropped file 2->51 53 14 other signatures 2->53 8 WF36VSMfKA.exe 1 2->8         started        12 ucloud.exe 1 2->12         started        signatures3 process4 file5 33 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\WF36VSMfKA.exe.log, ASCII 8->33 dropped 55 Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights) 8->55 57 Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs) 8->57 59 Hides threads from debuggers 8->59 67 2 other signatures 8->67 14 powershell.exe 13 8->14         started        18 RegAsm.exe 6 8->18         started        21 RegAsm.exe 8->21         started        23 RegAsm.exe 8->23         started        61 Writes to foreign memory regions 12->61 63 Allocates memory in foreign processes 12->63 65 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 12->65 25 powershell.exe 11 12->25         started        27 RegAsm.exe 6 12->27         started        signatures6 process7 dnsIp8 35 C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\...\ucloud.exe, PE32 14->35 dropped 37 C:\Users\user\...\ucloud.exe:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 14->37 dropped 69 Drops PE files to the startup folder 14->69 71 Powershell drops PE file 14->71 29 conhost.exe 14->29         started        43 beautyandstyles.shop 172.67.159.186, 443, 49713, 49732 CLOUDFLARENETUS United States 18->43 45 instoreperplexion.shop 188.114.97.3, 443, 49711, 49714 CLOUDFLARENETUS European Union 18->45 73 Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function) 18->73 31 conhost.exe 25->31         started        file9 signatures10 process11
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.Amadey
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2024-11-02 08:15:00 UTC
File Type:
PE (Exe)
Extracted files:
8
AV detection:
20 of 38 (52.63%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
zharkbot
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:zharkbot botnet discovery evasion themida trojan
Behaviour
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Program crash
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Checks whether UAC is enabled
Checks BIOS information in registry
Drops startup file
Themida packer
Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
Detects ZharkBot payload
ZharkBot
Zharkbot family
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
169e3ae16570a39c4309c3bfedc92355e41b9c3d35b7d8fbb0d9717b4c94fe51
MD5 hash:
f996323b305ee79eaced232617bc2dae
SHA1 hash:
f2a8605267d524cc7a4a4e4a39fbe10887aa483d
SH256 hash:
381d65417c5972da260fc4b94b74750b5036696a5045c9aaccbe7b9e2d2321d7
MD5 hash:
9392bd8d638e15dcacfd14d305db92bb
SHA1 hash:
e090fff5421b6ca81f352de8c674c00f680de41d
Detections:
SUSP_OBF_NET_Reactor_Indicators_Jan24
Parent samples :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 hash:
6851e02d3f4b8179b975f00bbc86602a2f2f84524f548876eb656db7ea5eaa9c
MD5 hash:
c5124caf4aea3a83b63a9108fe0dcef8
SHA1 hash:
a43a5a59038fca5a63fa526277f241f855177ce6
SH256 hash:
cb3a8a72002b901aed45402e9a752c20c1b32497d15f6a89c3e813514d1cd0a8
MD5 hash:
3a9bbd238ee5ddb66195d35929fda35f
SHA1 hash:
64cf2706d6683fd492dc1aa796ac17f2c9f8761e
Detections:
Zharkbot
SH256 hash:
4b5a876b1c230b28c0862d5f8158b3657016709855bf3329d8fea6cada3adbfe
MD5 hash:
b45668e08c03024f2432ff332c319131
SHA1 hash:
4bef9109eaeace4107c47858eef2d9d3487e45f0
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_Themida
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables packed with Themida
Rule name:PE_Digital_Certificate
Author:albertzsigovits
Rule name:PE_Potentially_Signed_Digital_Certificate
Author:albertzsigovits
Rule name:vmdetect
Author:nex
Description:Possibly employs anti-virtualization techniques

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

ZharkBot

Executable exe 4b5a876b1c230b28c0862d5f8158b3657016709855bf3329d8fea6cada3adbfe

(this sample)

  
Delivery method
Distributed via web download

BLint


The following table provides more information about this file using BLint. BLint is a Binary Linter to check the security properties, and capabilities in executables.

Findings
IDTitleSeverity
CHECK_DLL_CHARACTERISTICSMissing dll Security Characteristics (HIGH_ENTROPY_VA)high
CHECK_NXMissing Non-Executable Memory Protectioncritical

Comments



Avatar
zbet commented on 2024-11-03 06:28:47 UTC

url : hxxp://185.215.113.16/inc/hhnjqu9y.exe