MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 49e22d098f3713fe44f1d75757904e13e758424288b81f7bb517d356f48cf88f. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



ConnectWise


Vendor detections: 6


Intelligence 6 IOCs YARA 7 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 49e22d098f3713fe44f1d75757904e13e758424288b81f7bb517d356f48cf88f
SHA3-384 hash: a136080dfafa8e0c1f972a34bd42e775811ee61f962021a31f552d5db6a79f6e814e5c85871652a724783cc801b5e6a5
SHA1 hash: fe9864fa355777efbe3f94a83abf51fa9272b6c6
MD5 hash: c3541cf72e6fd5b278f8cc899dae304a
humanhash: ten-pip-venus-cola
File name:MPJ_1281565D®.msi
Download: download sample
Signature ConnectWise
File size:9'920'512 bytes
First seen:2024-11-25 10:19:05 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) msi
MIME type:application/x-msi
ssdeep 98304:IwJ4t1h0cG5FGJRPxow8OBwJ4t1h0cG5HwJ4t1h0cG5VwJ4t1h0cG52wJ4t1h0cW:RWh0cGwoWh0cGeWh0cG0Wh0cG9Wh0cG
Threatray 331 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T1AFA6232523FD801AE8F75A7DED3682F45971BE64CE22C11E9328B90D2A74D4096737B3
TrID 80.0% (.MSI) Microsoft Windows Installer (454500/1/170)
10.7% (.MST) Windows SDK Setup Transform script (61000/1/5)
7.8% (.MSP) Windows Installer Patch (44509/10/5)
1.4% (.) Generic OLE2 / Multistream Compound (8000/1)
Magika msi
Reporter FXOLabs
Tags:ConnectWise msi

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
93
Origin country :
BR BR
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
70%
Tags:
connectwise
Result
Threat name:
ScreenConnect Tool
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
evad
Score:
72 / 100
Signature
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Contains functionality to hide user accounts
Enables network access during safeboot for specific services
Modifies security policies related information
Possible COM Object hijacking
Reads the Security eventlog
Reads the System eventlog
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1562228 Sample: MPJ_1281565D#U00ae.msi Startdate: 25/11/2024 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 72 48 server-nix3a3cd951-relay.screenconnect.com 2->48 50 instance-c89u33-relay.screenconnect.com 2->50 54 .NET source code references suspicious native API functions 2->54 56 Contains functionality to hide user accounts 2->56 58 Possible COM Object hijacking 2->58 60 AI detected suspicious sample 2->60 8 msiexec.exe 94 49 2->8         started        12 ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe 17 25 2->12         started        15 msiexec.exe 6 2->15         started        signatures3 process4 dnsIp5 30 ScreenConnect.Wind...dentialProvider.dll, PE32+ 8->30 dropped 32 C:\...\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe, PE32 8->32 dropped 34 C:\Windows\Installer\MSI3D60.tmp, PE32 8->34 dropped 38 9 other files (none is malicious) 8->38 dropped 64 Enables network access during safeboot for specific services 8->64 66 Modifies security policies related information 8->66 17 msiexec.exe 8->17         started        19 msiexec.exe 1 8->19         started        21 msiexec.exe 8->21         started        52 server-nix3a3cd951-relay.screenconnect.com 147.75.63.88, 443, 49704, 49705 PACKETUS Switzerland 12->52 68 Reads the Security eventlog 12->68 70 Reads the System eventlog 12->70 23 ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe 2 12->23         started        36 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\MSI31E4.tmp, PE32 15->36 dropped file6 signatures7 process8 signatures9 26 rundll32.exe 11 17->26         started        62 Contains functionality to hide user accounts 23->62 process10 file11 40 C:\Users\user\...\ScreenConnect.Windows.dll, PE32 26->40 dropped 42 C:\...\ScreenConnect.InstallerActions.dll, PE32 26->42 dropped 44 C:\Users\user\...\ScreenConnect.Core.dll, PE32 26->44 dropped 46 4 other files (none is malicious) 26->46 dropped 72 Contains functionality to hide user accounts 26->72 signatures12
Result
Malware family:
n/a
Score:
  8/10
Tags:
discovery persistence privilege_escalation
Behaviour
Checks SCSI registry key(s)
Checks processor information in registry
Enumerates system info in registry
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
Modifies registry class
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API
Event Triggered Execution: Installer Packages
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Drops file in Windows directory
Executes dropped EXE
Loads dropped DLL
Drops file in Program Files directory
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Authentication Package
Drops file in System32 directory
Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking
Enumerates connected drives
Sets service image path in registry
Verdict:
Suspicious
Tags:
n/a
YARA:
n/a
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:DebuggerCheck__API
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:INDICATOR_RMM_ConnectWise_ScreenConnect
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects ConnectWise Control (formerly ScreenConnect). Review RMM Inventory
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:RansomPyShield_Antiransomware
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:Check for Suspicious String and Import combination that Ransomware mostly abuse(can create FP)
Rule name:RANSOMWARE
Author:ToroGuitar
Rule name:Sus_Obf_Enc_Spoof_Hide_PE
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:Check for Overlay, Obfuscating, Encrypting, Spoofing, Hiding, or Entropy Technique(can create FP)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

  
Delivery method
Distributed via e-mail link

Comments