MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 443250c909c83c83d1d83ca3cbd2a78d733975846bc1a37070ff35270b15fbbd. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 21


Intelligence 21 IOCs YARA 22 File information Comments 1

SHA256 hash: 443250c909c83c83d1d83ca3cbd2a78d733975846bc1a37070ff35270b15fbbd
SHA3-384 hash: a669e4ad59672a71f5993f2c2ff055128fc022f247fc52545dc60bf629dca09e3d424b10f088346dc904b0ced828db33
SHA1 hash: f8fcbbc72fe2802ea01742184e085b2aaf2ca9cb
MD5 hash: 49e9af3d4585bd4260a10610109d9413
humanhash: monkey-orange-seven-sierra
File name:file
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:48'640 bytes
First seen:2026-02-15 23:41:28 UTC
Last seen:2026-02-15 23:47:45 UTC
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'799 x AgentTesla, 19'722 x Formbook, 12'280 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 768:MvUQgNIL4+M0+Liw+hhQDXKNZi2JYb+gegUr1htWvEgK/JDZVc6KN:Mv1gjs/hhyXiKbB0r1CnkJDZVclN
Threatray 1'866 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T190235C403798C136E2BD4BB5ADF3A2458275D26B6903C649BCC810EA2B53FC597136FE
TrID 70.4% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
6.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2)
4.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter Bitsight
Tags:AsyncRAT dropped-by-amadey exe fbf543


Avatar
Bitsight
url: http://130.12.180.43/files/8546428528/IyVls5r.exe

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
12
# of downloads :
192
Origin country :
US US
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware configuration found for:
DcRat
Details
DcRat
c2 socket addresses, a version, a mutex, an SSL certificate and server signature, an interval, varying flags, and possibly a filepath and a group
Malware family:
ID:
1
File name:
file
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-02-15 23:42:44 UTC
Tags:
dcrat rat auto-reg asyncrat remote darkcrystal

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
97.4%
Tags:
asyncrat autorun
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
Connecting to a non-recommended domain
Connection attempt
Sending a custom TCP request
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-debug anti-vm asyncrat base64 configsecuritypolicy dcrat evasive hacktool lolbin mpcmdrun msconfig reconnaissance regedit vbnet venomrat
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
Detections:
Trojan.Win32.Agent.sb HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.SheetRat.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.gen Backdoor.MSIL.Darkrat.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.sb Backdoor.MSIL.Crysan.d Trojan.Agentb.TCP.C&C PDM:Trojan.Win32.Tasker.cust Backdoor.DCRat.TCP.C&C
Verdict:
DcRat
YARA:
15 match(es)
Tags:
.Net DarkCrystal RAT DcRat Executable Managed .NET PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.23 Win 32 Exe x86
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
CNC: 45.154.98.174
PORT: 8080
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-02-15 23:57:36 UTC
AV detection:
22 of 23 (95.65%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default defense_evasion execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
AsyncRat
Asyncrat family
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
45.154.98.174:8080
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
443250c909c83c83d1d83ca3cbd2a78d733975846bc1a37070ff35270b15fbbd
MD5 hash:
49e9af3d4585bd4260a10610109d9413
SHA1 hash:
f8fcbbc72fe2802ea01742184e085b2aaf2ca9cb
Detections:
AsyncRAT DCRat
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AcRat
Author:Nikos 'n0t' Totosis
Description:AcRat Payload (based on AsyncRat)
Rule name:CP_Script_Inject_Detector
Author:DiegoAnalytics
Description:Detects attempts to inject code into another process across PE, ELF, Mach-O binaries
Rule name:dcrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:dcrat_rkp
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Description:Detects DCRat payloads
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_B64_Artifacts
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables embedding bas64-encoded APIs, command lines, registry keys, etc.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_DcRatBy
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing the string DcRatBy
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_WMI_EnumerateVideoDevice
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables attemping to enumerate video devices using WMI
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_DCRat_1aeea1ac
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

AsyncRAT

Executable exe 443250c909c83c83d1d83ca3cbd2a78d733975846bc1a37070ff35270b15fbbd

(this sample)

  
Dropped by
Amadey
  
Delivery method
Distributed via web download

Comments



Avatar
commented on 2026-02-15 23:45:59 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "443250c909c83c83d1d83ca3cbd2a78d733975846bc1a37070ff35270b15fbbd",
"yara_possible_family": "dcrat",
"key": "057df0f1f5209564e99c1fb6d1dd21dd78e171ec1280b7a1e9c2034344165a70",
"salt": "4463526174427971777164616e6368756e",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"8080"
],
"Hosts": [
"45.154.98.174"
],
"Version": " 1.0.7",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%Temp%",
"InstallFile": "chromeeee.exe",
"Key": "RFN1aE9CdGNqSzBocERoajMwdGFnQm52VE12QnJMdEo=",
"Mutex": "DcRatMutex_qwqdanchun",
"Certificate": "MIICMDCCAZmgAwIBAgIVAKK34sw7dAMSx2tpGm2r0pBIHW/HMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAMGQxFTATBgNVBAMMDERjUmF0IFNlcnZlcjETMBEGA1UECwwKcXdxZGFuY2h1bjEcMBoGA1UECgwTRGNSYXQgQnkgcXdxZGFuY2h1bjELMAkGA1UEBwwCU0gxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNOMB4XDTI1MDUwNjIzMTU0NloXDTM2MDIxMzIzMTU0NlowEDEOMAwGA1UEAwwFRGNSYXQwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAJTOvA+sFo9fb+Pf6K8Q5anzZ+IuUuLtC7KWp29tQi+KvRlyn9aDyvvfNWb97X75jVN/53jPtZLOVYaBAHGeg2YhljBtQLI+3wKbICCxkh17nFgwR0DdTyr19HWa7G66om8V96TcgcEuquxfId62x9dq6AeWkLJg2dcLQzNOuue5AgMBAAGjMjAwMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQ/BIkyNLMuQ2uyHLGA5GVAyw5e1TAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAA4GBAAhjOCiqC/2Za4BSX35z+qidlnqHfIzMfqNVpButeYByzT62QTC0Bc96iMdBK24B1iY0d5k4sJLj5lKUnx7FWdYvW4zp+zTL243I69lEemuOAOg+X3A2Be3wiU7KU+EPPXPDFMAuB/CC9vq5vZYB0YXXcX0oekzBiPSrh1EvUS51",
"Serversignature": "RGZGhpjf762Ichgl3L8CxV7zHBfDHrhyg9J6aZse+UmNPTkJwSfRIkN8Bp4DZkIjHab/Dp1cfC8tz8aGUUhh8Lfzy35UhKBOaggCGJrEJctbnxSLyjRpnwZugKQh7dcmG+OWCv8umcdpeh/hbe0wO13a5c02d5n9ymCBSpvHgVk=",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BSOD": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "1",
"Group": "Default",
"AntiProcess": "false",
"Anti": "false"
}
}