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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 43d465e80dc34e3aa79c228e61404c83bab19afa63545f47d49435a8ff208fd5. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 22


Intelligence 22 IOCs YARA 29 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 43d465e80dc34e3aa79c228e61404c83bab19afa63545f47d49435a8ff208fd5
SHA3-384 hash: 554b6d63c7725f0e4a8bd298ce583b4e7264de9cc34929b6f290882ad583c39fc0771d4f57116d2a0ac20205d37a38eb
SHA1 hash: 117247cf69d4b2aac633b314d3530b24f03a59fa
MD5 hash: 164548d73e249f6e27631923170abec2
humanhash: nuts-lima-fillet-hamper
File name:43d465e80dc34e3aa79c228e61404c83bab19afa63545f47d49435a8ff208fd5.exe
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:48'640 bytes
First seen:2026-10-04 16:58:47 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (49'298 x AgentTesla, 20'717 x Formbook, 12'402 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 768:guYHKTsufqG9vSLjWUvlPRmo2qb7b8Cl4GXIPIPwgT3CJ0bWGp4SCPZ75KmldA+z:guYHKTsjMvSX204GXtPwgLbWYpa57ldN
TLSH T19F234C0037E98137F2BE0F786DF26245857AB6677603D54E2CC441D75A23FC29A42AFA
TrID 70.4% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
6.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2)
4.8% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika pebin
Reporter Tuxxin
Tags:AsyncRAT exe

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
238
Origin country :
US US
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
asyncrat
ID:
1
File name:
exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-10-04 17:17:14 UTC
Tags:
auto-reg rat asyncrat

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.9%
Tags:
asyncrat autorun
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Сreating synchronization primitives
Launching a service
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Running batch commands
Creating a process with a hidden window
Creating a file in the %AppData% directory
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
Creating a window
DNS request
Connection attempt
Sending a custom TCP request
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm asyncrat base64 config-extracted fingerprint lolbin obfuscated obfuscated reconnaissance reg schtasks vbnet
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2026-10-04T11:34:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-10-06T11:41:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Result
Threat name:
AsyncRAT
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Found malware configuration
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Potential Privilege Escalation using Task Scheduler highest RunLevel
Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1981991 Sample: 8BNp3XLjnH.exe Startdate: 04/10/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 34 main-tg88.store 2->34 38 Found malware configuration 2->38 40 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->40 42 Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample 2->42 44 7 other signatures 2->44 8 8BNp3XLjnH.exe 7 2->8         started        12 ChromeUpdate.exe 2 2->12         started        signatures3 process4 dnsIp5 30 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\ChromeUpdate.exe, PE32 8->30 dropped 32 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\8BNp3XLjnH.exe.log, ASCII 8->32 dropped 46 Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag 8->46 48 Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) 8->48 15 cmd.exe 1 8->15         started        18 cmd.exe 1 8->18         started        36 main-tg88.store 104.21.1.99, 443, 49744, 49745 CLOUDFLARENET-CloudflareIncUS Canada 12->36 50 Antivirus detection for dropped file 12->50 52 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 12->52 file6 signatures7 process8 signatures9 54 Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules 15->54 56 Potential Privilege Escalation using Task Scheduler highest RunLevel 15->56 20 conhost.exe 15->20         started        22 schtasks.exe 1 15->22         started        24 ChromeUpdate.exe 3 18->24         started        26 conhost.exe 18->26         started        28 timeout.exe 1 18->28         started        process10
Verdict:
AsyncRAT
YARA:
14 match(es)
Tags:
.Net AsyncRAT Executable Managed .NET PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout RAT SOS: 0.81 Win 32 Exe x86
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
CNC: main-tg88.store
PORT: 443
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-10-04 16:58:52 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
1
AV detection:
33 of 38 (86.84%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:main-tg88.store defense_evasion discovery execution persistence rat
Behaviour
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Enumerates physical storage devices
Executes a command shell one-liner
Reads the TCP/IP host and domain name from the registry
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Checks computer location settings
Executes dropped EXE
Async RAT payload
Family: AsyncRat
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
main-tg88.store:443
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
43d465e80dc34e3aa79c228e61404c83bab19afa63545f47d49435a8ff208fd5
MD5 hash:
164548d73e249f6e27631923170abec2
SHA1 hash:
117247cf69d4b2aac633b314d3530b24f03a59fa
Detections:
AsyncRAT win_asyncrat_w0 asyncrat INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:AsyncRat
Author:kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:AsyncRat Payload
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:CP_Script_Inject_Detector
Author:DiegoAnalytics
Description:Detects attempts to inject code into another process across PE, ELF, Mach-O binaries
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Family_V_0_5_8
Author:Trezzza
Description:Detects AsyncRAT version 0.5.8 and some other versions of AsyncRAT. The name reflects the analysed sample.
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (https://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, packers and suspicious executables. NOTE: This rule may produce false positives. Updated May 2026 to reduce False Positives.
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:rat_win_asyncrat
Author:Sekoia.io
Description:Detect AsyncRAT based on specific strings
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:SUSP_Reverse_Run_Key
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects a Reversed Run Key
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
Rule name:win_asyncrat_j1
Author:Johannes Bader @viql
Description:detects AsyncRAT
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:WIN_Malware_XWorm_ForgeAuto_6b06c990_Extrait
Author:Marjoriefort
Description:Detects XWorm (pe, etat extrait)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

AsyncRAT

Executable exe 43d465e80dc34e3aa79c228e61404c83bab19afa63545f47d49435a8ff208fd5

(this sample)

  
Delivery method
Distributed via web download

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