MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 40b95ef52169126b3732d14479f1497715ec0f5bf1bc6fd0104188f7911f5fef. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AsyncRAT


Vendor detections: 12


Intelligence 12 IOCs 1 YARA 31 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 40b95ef52169126b3732d14479f1497715ec0f5bf1bc6fd0104188f7911f5fef
SHA3-384 hash: 4b824e1a05ec04357418616a263d6c960f5a51fe3dbfa2bc6cb3407639506af854db28e51b4068b3e6d21f3d3812d234
SHA1 hash: f7d847beafb523257f36b88e2f9529fe9f1c6833
MD5 hash: a7b1c14b2ab638fc017943b01b739c60
humanhash: india-chicken-hotel-bacon
File name:HSBC CONFIRMATION SEPA 22.07.26 ASY.js
Download: download sample
Signature AsyncRAT
File size:790'530 bytes
First seen:2026-07-22 08:50:14 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Java Script (JS) js
MIME type:text/plain
ssdeep 6144:249cELb31C2LTRhSt8eBaz8aQDY0oNXgqsLveNzltxCFzKsKMUF5/Qj7zHfAdlTN:J3M2J+aKig/qPMUFhQj7zHYdVB71Bn3
TLSH T191F41AF323CF694B7D1573AE510D2E98CB59D0794E82A9C0F0EF02D45B0B15E9AA09BD
Magika javascript
Reporter abuse_ch
Tags:AsyncRAT js RAT


Avatar
abuse_ch
AsyncRAT C2:
217.60.241.34:6606

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)


Below is a list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this malware samples.

IOCThreatFox Reference
217.60.241.34:6606 https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1855221/

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
195
Origin country :
NL NL
Vendor Threat Intelligence
No detections
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm aspnet_compiler base64 base64 cscript downloader encrypted evasive evasive fingerprint lolbin obfuscated obfuscated powershell reconnaissance repaired taskkill wscript
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
js
First seen:
2026-07-22T05:33:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-07-23T22:41:00Z UTC
Hits:
~100
Result
Threat name:
AsyncRAT, FormBook, zgRAT
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.spyw.expl.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found malware configuration
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
JavaScript file contains suspicious strings
JavaScript source code contains functionality to generate code involving a shell, file or stream
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Unusual module load detection (module proxying)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected zgRAT
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1946404 Sample: HSBC CONFIRMATION SEPA 22.0... Startdate: 22/07/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 50 www.skriningusus.com 2->50 52 www.lusa911.ink 2->52 54 7 other IPs or domains 2->54 68 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->68 70 Found malware configuration 2->70 72 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->72 74 13 other signatures 2->74 12 wscript.exe 3 2->12         started        15 svchost.exe 1 1 2->15         started        signatures3 process4 dnsIp5 102 JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions 12->102 104 Suspicious powershell command line found 12->104 106 Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly) 12->106 108 4 other signatures 12->108 18 powershell.exe 16 12->18         started        21 taskkill.exe 1 12->21         started        60 127.0.0.1 unknown unknown 15->60 signatures6 process7 signatures8 62 Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function) 18->62 64 Writes to foreign memory regions 18->64 66 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 18->66 23 aspnet_compiler.exe 1 2 18->23         started        27 conhost.exe 18->27         started        29 aspnet_compiler.exe 18->29         started        33 4 other processes 18->33 31 conhost.exe 21->31         started        process9 dnsIp10 56 217.60.241.34, 49714, 49717, 7707 PFCLOUDPfcloudUGDE Netherlands 23->56 90 Writes to foreign memory regions 23->90 92 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 23->92 35 MSBuild.exe 23->35         started        signatures11 process12 signatures13 76 Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection) 35->76 78 Maps a DLL or memory area into another process 35->78 80 Queues an APC in another process (thread injection) 35->80 82 3 other signatures 35->82 38 qSbshBQhx8ij.exe 35->38 injected process14 signatures15 84 Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file 38->84 86 Maps a DLL or memory area into another process 38->86 88 Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR) 38->88 41 icacls.exe 13 38->41         started        process16 signatures17 94 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access) 41->94 96 Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc) 41->96 98 Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection) 41->98 100 3 other signatures 41->100 44 7osBmWZcoUp5m.exe 41->44 injected 48 firefox.exe 41->48         started        process18 dnsIp19 58 parking.d.parity.domains 216.227.142.170, 49718, 80 FDCSERVERS-FDCserversnetUS United States 44->58 110 Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file 44->110 signatures20
Gathering data
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.Generic
Status:
Suspicious
First seen:
2026-07-22 08:50:54 UTC
File Type:
Text (JavaScript)
AV detection:
9 of 24 (37.50%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
asyncrat
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:asyncrat botnet:default defense_evasion discovery execution rat suricata
Behaviour
Kills process with taskkill
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Checks computer location settings
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Family: AsyncRat
Suricata alert: AsyncRAT Malware Default X.509 Certificate Detected - Inbound
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
217.60.241.34:6606
217.60.241.34:7707
217.60.241.34:8808
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AsyncRat
Author:kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:AsyncRat Payload
Rule name:AsyncRAT_057B
Author:kirkderp
Description:AsyncRAT 0.5.7B -- minimal .NET RAT with PBKDF2 key derivation and MessagePack serialization
Reference:https://github.com/kirkderp/yara
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
Rule name:Base64_Encoded_Powershell_Directives
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:DetectEncryptedVariants
Author:Zinyth
Description:Detects 'encrypted' in ASCII, Unicode, base64, or hex-encoded
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (https://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, packers and suspicious executables. NOTE: This rule may produce false positives. Updated May 2026 to reduce False Positives.
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:rat_win_asyncrat
Author:Sekoia.io
Description:Detect AsyncRAT based on specific strings
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
Rule name:SUSP_Reverse_Run_Key
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects a Reversed Run Key
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
Rule name:win_asyncrat_j1
Author:Johannes Bader @viql
Description:detects AsyncRAT
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments