MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 2f7226f97fc49d8e893e80ff5e3e1127d0ae76650045dbf30c36ddd0535c0af1. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



AgentTesla


Vendor detections: 19


Intelligence 19 IOCs YARA 20 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 2f7226f97fc49d8e893e80ff5e3e1127d0ae76650045dbf30c36ddd0535c0af1
SHA3-384 hash: f4d15807d15dbfd6320d5701b7a35b19faeeb0da5f3feabb8de73fce75e8d250f44be8d98711014f62c4219d38e15663
SHA1 hash: f42bfd900ed81b153c25c8b3d97ba9cd854b9c33
MD5 hash: d489480f7f1c5a788840dba27d8d3624
humanhash: colorado-north-ack-seventeen
File name:INTERGIS TBN1 VLS's Particulars.docx.scr
Download: download sample
Signature AgentTesla
File size:1'107'968 bytes
First seen:2025-02-14 04:06:33 UTC
Last seen:2025-02-14 04:26:51 UTC
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'647 x AgentTesla, 19'451 x Formbook, 12'201 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 24576:0PaHUIjmf/LF5XJV2c7XaAp+pPRMrBVVzim0CY8iMo6bt:oaHUIjmfzDXz2c+TPRug8iMJ
TLSH T1D735DFE4F793E302CF1B1678953DEDB213641DE8B080B5A71ED63F877958B202809B69
TrID 69.7% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
10.0% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.2% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.2% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
1.9% (.EXE) Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2072/23)
Magika pebin
File icon (PE):PE icon
dhash icon 78b97864b0b97852 (5 x SnakeKeylogger, 4 x AgentTesla, 4 x Formbook)
Reporter threatcat_ch
Tags:AgentTesla exe

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
2
# of downloads :
535
Origin country :
CH CH
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
agenttesla
ID:
1
File name:
INTERGIS TBN1 VLS's Particulars.docx.scr
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2025-02-14 04:10:39 UTC
Tags:
evasion stealer ftp agenttesla exfiltration

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
92.5%
Tags:
underscore lien
Result
Verdict:
Clean
Maliciousness:
Verdict:
Suspicious
Threat level:
  5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
masquerade obfuscated obfuscated packed packed packer_detected
Result
Verdict:
SUSPICIOUS
Details
Windows PE Executable
Found a Windows Portable Executable (PE) binary. Depending on context, the presence of a binary is suspicious or malicious.
Result
Threat name:
AgentTesla
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
troj.spyw.evad
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Found malware configuration
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected AntiVM3
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1614791 Sample: INTERGIS TBN1 VLS's Particu... Startdate: 14/02/2025 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 46 beirutrest.com 2->46 48 api.ipify.org 2->48 54 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic 2->54 56 Found malware configuration 2->56 58 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->58 60 13 other signatures 2->60 8 INTERGIS TBN1 VLS's Particulars.docx.scr.exe 7 2->8         started        12 VUlRwJFC.exe 5 2->12         started        signatures3 process4 file5 38 C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\VUlRwJFC.exe, PE32 8->38 dropped 40 C:\Users\...\VUlRwJFC.exe:Zone.Identifier, ASCII 8->40 dropped 42 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\tmpA549.tmp, XML 8->42 dropped 44 INTERGIS TBN1 VLS'...rs.docx.scr.exe.log, ASCII 8->44 dropped 62 Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender 8->62 64 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 8->64 14 INTERGIS TBN1 VLS's Particulars.docx.scr.exe 15 2 8->14         started        18 powershell.exe 23 8->18         started        20 powershell.exe 7 8->20         started        26 2 other processes 8->26 66 Antivirus detection for dropped file 12->66 68 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 12->68 70 Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines) 12->70 22 VUlRwJFC.exe 12->22         started        24 schtasks.exe 12->24         started        signatures6 process7 dnsIp8 50 beirutrest.com 50.87.144.157, 21, 42906, 49708 UNIFIEDLAYER-AS-1US United States 14->50 52 api.ipify.org 172.67.74.152, 443, 49707, 49711 CLOUDFLARENETUS United States 14->52 72 Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module 18->72 28 conhost.exe 18->28         started        30 WmiPrvSE.exe 18->30         started        32 conhost.exe 20->32         started        74 Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc) 22->74 76 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access) 22->76 78 Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials 22->78 80 Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc) 22->80 34 conhost.exe 24->34         started        36 conhost.exe 26->36         started        signatures9 process10
Threat name:
Win32.Exploit.Generic
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2025-02-14 03:37:12 UTC
File Type:
PE (.Net Exe)
Extracted files:
35
AV detection:
26 of 38 (68.42%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Verdict:
malicious
Label(s):
agenttesla unknown_loader_037
Similar samples:
Result
Malware family:
agenttesla
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:agenttesla discovery execution keylogger spyware stealer trojan
Behaviour
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Enumerates physical storage devices
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
Looks up external IP address via web service
Checks computer location settings
Reads WinSCP keys stored on the system
Reads data files stored by FTP clients
Reads user/profile data of local email clients
Reads user/profile data of web browsers
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Downloads MZ/PE file
AgentTesla
Agenttesla family
Verdict:
Malicious
Tags:
external_ip_lookup
YARA:
n/a
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
2f7226f97fc49d8e893e80ff5e3e1127d0ae76650045dbf30c36ddd0535c0af1
MD5 hash:
d489480f7f1c5a788840dba27d8d3624
SHA1 hash:
f42bfd900ed81b153c25c8b3d97ba9cd854b9c33
SH256 hash:
7b20da2df7723467f33026394d5f5198c7e5dc96e5400d5e7e5686e8d408d942
MD5 hash:
009233ed35ae9f2966e226c4f04a59f2
SHA1 hash:
44e4cf3a28a6b3642a4913a953c826967ca91c57
Detections:
SUSP_OBF_NET_ConfuserEx_Name_Pattern_Jan24 SUSP_OBF_NET_Reactor_Indicators_Jan24
SH256 hash:
2bfde305793352cc0da1adb8ed99447ad59f25f03c67d5756905cce802618749
MD5 hash:
90cebe77febe3d68f79fb7e03876149d
SHA1 hash:
a665a04102d72778358e1b045fe3dd46996d2fca
Detections:
win_agent_tesla_g2 INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01 INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID MALWARE_Win_AgentTeslaV2 Agenttesla_type2
Parent samples :
bbe3fb7e0f0ddf898c7f5055707dcd5847cf14801f02563f384b75ffd06ece4b
8647436d5b5e93de1fbaf9571e584ceaee4a620cd39b60472da87e694239c317
c09cba9da1f8a6c8fbda87ce1c29455118eb13876286388a7d768ba98585aa78
d9af97e029e98b7502110beee9913df5132c5e1ad620e6b8124bd395c72131d9
fcb4c6602aeea8229338eab9ed2deb97c27e07601791ef19c7e43a830079e416
053c940f835b1c6624b6b0421b680da5c984b056734db107a7d6c8dfbe1837fd
8e3db35284b6e1ea560c14a69ea4dfd6ef8e27fe9974a609116d00f2d764bfeb
c9f0c595e62ee31b17e1b62cc7be551a1cd46c3395a282fead293a5033674328
793683a76efa38f5ad0608e7a7419af3802b4a7cd5d3d428f2f1a7e6f0e6ad0e
db20bf3295f1aae23ce386ffb850622a77a474a8a1ddaf240965082ee03055bf
faf287257529efa93234ce96fd47d0d43a4884deb7ec54e337bb8ba49b1d12d8
90bca1aee1c83d0c4efc1d89a1c57b991be078a6fcff421495fb9cdbed974c70
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03438d007dd69f9021f8c37eb21cd9f817189c99f86e94136b0f6223e07a7366
20aa510e22a6e0abf81a9cdb4491977cc7035ef0f62bf4e97e880688594707a8
ff487e2ea6195cc78c6c3f1d9d23aae0902eec37964143cf85cd425252a0072b
eec4404be651d77865707efa282ec7899a97550ad25351a70a926679f6b34bdf
430ca931fb30ead2352f1f6cc4c832d5e83d0586818e47febd3d9d2dd83950de
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5565d238feb8a0e52f4185f696eac6e4d817d878ca99aab4ab16a341b3c828ed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59e8919a70ecf74746e7bac52469b520a8a4fa929e8fa8171e22342d8dc4e1d6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f687ef7cfbf2fefbfb85644f57319e28c04f9feed590a317056fef8c130c092f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 hash:
c94d846e2cdb1be9a54740b587959ab5c741ae3c40e30b4b2a10b49f3279f48c
MD5 hash:
3fe0a01522dd677ea56f0a69b4872a04
SHA1 hash:
d4cbc9272c9ea6d3ef9a2c73144c9ebdcc8189d3
Detections:
SUSP_OBF_NET_ConfuserEx_Name_Pattern_Jan24
Parent samples :
e79f272da50c989ace58144be6791c62d1fed9067c29a43f39cc72986ff0d474
30af910477a154c4b07fa1cbb928f78bc7d714329f725b2a1f2cf7f3139ce351
2d5f57ef41272fafdd56ac619de62e86bf57938c96032cfa90eaa3c48930f012
6cfb80b408d5a7e58fb2fa1f7740cd0a185f59232f80da8dbb66baeebf7a0c71
baa5f55f0f4e35aa775f2237b524a7d06b366675fb9b63e02d4e822f2f422405
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3aa419398e4918fa5f922f5d5ea8c2572c40c1b24c702ec4ff946eeb390f80c6
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6042e232fb52a8ddef6d8107806b2eb734cf4a703941e4639e5d3aa8a27d2023
089b32cad49a1917e0e5bfec67d556bbfde5f1230dbffd35d5e15e6b5ed4b1d7
98d822362f112bdb88a5f473dbf4b9773e3f58df35a45dbd6633e44d85f904a6
c6b7c7784ebcff9da356fe18cdeb164d121d9def409bfe81f445e5c77cfea314
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241a8414a8cd502eedff5360d582a8b71e0e96c188299052ff9f75a153f325b6
Malware family:
AgentTesla
Verdict:
Malicious
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:AgentTeslaV2
Author:ditekshen
Description:AgenetTesla Type 2 Keylogger payload
Rule name:AgentTeslaV3
Author:ditekshen
Description:AgentTeslaV3 infostealer payload
Rule name:AgentTeslaV5
Author:ClaudioWayne
Description:AgentTeslaV5 infostealer payload
Rule name:Agenttesla_type2
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect Agenttesla in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detect packed .NET executables. Mostly AgentTeslaV4.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects binaries (Windows and macOS) referencing many web browsers. Observed in information stealers.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many confidential data stores found in browsers, mail clients, cryptocurreny wallets, etc. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many email and collaboration clients. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing many file transfer clients. Observed in information stealers
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables referencing Windows vault credential objects. Observed in infostealers
Rule name:malware_Agenttesla_type2
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect Agenttesla in memory
Reference:internal research
Rule name:MALWARE_Win_AgentTeslaV2
Author:ditekSHen
Description:AgenetTesla Type 2 Keylogger payload
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:Sus_Obf_Enc_Spoof_Hide_PE
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:Check for Overlay, Obfuscating, Encrypting, Spoofing, Hiding, or Entropy Technique(can create FP)
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_808f680e
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_AgentTesla_ebf431a8
Author:Elastic Security
Reference:https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/attack-chain-leads-to-xworm-and-agenttesla

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Malspam

AgentTesla

Executable exe 2f7226f97fc49d8e893e80ff5e3e1127d0ae76650045dbf30c36ddd0535c0af1

(this sample)

  
Delivery method
Distributed via e-mail attachment

BLint


The following table provides more information about this file using BLint. BLint is a Binary Linter to check the security properties, and capabilities in executables.

Findings
IDTitleSeverity
CHECK_AUTHENTICODEMissing Authenticodehigh
CHECK_DLL_CHARACTERISTICSMissing dll Security Characteristics (GUARD_CF)high

Comments