MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry

DCRat

Vendor detections: 18

Intelligence 18 IOCs 1 YARA 15 File information Comments

SHA256 hash:	223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50
SHA3-384 hash:	2742c4f43261a72059bded20a4ebf97793a80c7598248cb64eec41287318791281456e9918c854dc6cb41d5b8488cd7b
SHA1 hash:	7695a822cf67d5e8ea1a6a87e7a06dcef0548ee5
MD5 hash:	208477a99dd021397a883960d0115c6d
humanhash:	jupiter-uncle-april-bluebird
File name:	Hardserialnumber.exe
Download:	download sample
Signature	DCRat Create hunting rule
File size:	1'164'932 bytes
First seen:	2026-04-30 09:50:14 UTC
Last seen:	Never
File type:	exe
MIME type:	application/x-dosexec
imphash	fcf1390e9ce472c7270447fc5c61a0c1 (905 x DCRat, 118 x NanoCore, 94 x njrat)
ssdeep	24576:U2G/nvxW3Ww0twMQNrHBXYjVzxYxEbtyXAjo7dcCHBPR2mpfmN:UbA30PQQV2XAUrR3fe
TLSH	T12D454A017E84CA12F0192633C2FF490847B8AC516BA6E71B7EBA376D55123937D1CADB
TrID	92.3% (.EXE) WinRAR Self Extracting archive (4.x-5.x) (265042/9/39) 2.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2) 1.7% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1) 1.5% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1) 0.7% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13)
Magika	pebin
dhash icon	9494b494d4aeaeac (902 x DCRat, 481 x NirCmd, 172 x RedLineStealer)
Reporter	abuse_ch
Tags:	DCRat exe RAT

abuse_ch

DCRat C2:
http://cs371620.tw1.ru/L1nc0In.php

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)

Below is a list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this malware samples.

IOC	ThreatFox Reference
http://cs371620.tw1.ru/L1nc0In.php	https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1802660/

Intelligence

File Origin

# of uploads :

# of downloads :

173

Origin country :

Vendor Threat Intelligence

Malware configuration found for:

Archives NETReactor

Details

Result

Verdict:

Malware

Maliciousness:

Behaviour

Creating a window

Searching for the window

Сreating synchronization primitives

Searching for synchronization primitives

Creating a file

Creating a process from a recently created file

Running batch commands

Creating a process with a hidden window

Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests

Launching a process

Creating a file in the Windows subdirectories

Creating a file in the Program Files subdirectories

Creating a file in the %temp% directory

Sending a UDP request

Unauthorized injection to a recently created process

Enabling autorun by creating a file

Verdict:

Malicious

Threat level:

10/10

Confidence:

100%

Tags:

anti-debug anti-vm base64 cmd cscript dcrat evasive explorer fingerprint fingerprint installer installer installer-heuristic lolbin microsoft_visual_cc obfuscated overlay packed reconnaissance schtasks sfx stealer unsafe

Link:

https://www.filescan.io/uploads/69f325e986e92bda7018ca6c/reports/aab4a4ee-2cb9-4373-97aa-9a17bfa1364f/overview

Verdict:

Malicious

Labled as:

Trojan.MSIL.Basic.8.Gen;Trojan.Uztuby

Link:

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50

Verdict:

Malicious

File Type:

exe x32

First seen:

2026-04-30T06:41:00Z UTC

Last seen:

2026-05-02T06:10:00Z UTC

Hits:

~10

Detections:

HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.DcRat.gen Trojan.Win32.Agent.sb HEUR:Trojan.Script.Agent.gen HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.gen Backdoor.MSIL.LightStone.b Backdoor.MSIL.DCRat.sb Trojan.VBS.Agent.bet PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic Backdoor.MSIL.DCRat.b Trojan-Spy.Stealer.HTTP.C&C Backdoor.Agent.HTTP.C&C

Link:

https://opentip.kaspersky.com/223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50/results?tab=lookup

Verdict:

Unknown

Link:

https://analyze.intezer.com/analyses/b7c0e6b2-1028-4bf7-a985-9f3f7266beab

Result

Threat name:

DCRat

Detection:

malicious

Classification:

troj.expl.evad

Score:

100 / 100

Link:

https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1906729

Signature

Antivirus detection for dropped file

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Creates processes via WMI

Drops PE files with benign system names

Found malware configuration

Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential Privilege Escalation using Task Scheduler highest RunLevel

Sigma detected: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations

Sigma detected: Schedule system process

Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script)

Yara detected DCRat

Behaviour

Behavior Graph:

Download SVG

Score:

99%

Verdict:

Malware

File Type:

Link:

https://malprob.io/report/223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50

Gathering data

Detection:

n/a

Link:

https://mwdb.cert.pl/sample/223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50/

Verdict:

Malicious

Threat:

Family.DCRAT

Link:

https://tip.neiki.dev/file/223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50

Threat name:

ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.DCRat

Status:

Malicious

First seen:

2026-04-30 09:37:02 UTC

File Type:

PE (Exe)

Extracted files:

AV detection:

21 of 24 (87.50%)

Threat level:

5/5

Detection(s):

Suspicious file

Link:

https://check.spamhaus.org/check/?searchterm=ei3th3dqquywao2rx4ipymjgzng72r7uvkw2jj22zuli5mdltvia._file

Verdict:

malicious

Label(s):

dcrat

Similar samples:

error

DCRat

Result

Malware family:

dcrat

Score:

10/10

Tags:

family:dcrat discovery execution infostealer persistence rat

Link:

https://tria.ge/reports/260430-lt7wfac16w/

Behaviour

Modifies registry class

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory

Uses Task Scheduler COM API

Enumerates physical storage devices

System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery

Drops file in Program Files directory

Drops file in Windows directory

Looks up external IP address via web service

Checks computer location settings

Executes dropped EXE

DCRat payload

Family: DcRat

Process spawned unexpected child process

Unpacked files

SH256 hash:

223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50

MD5 hash:

208477a99dd021397a883960d0115c6d

SHA1 hash:

7695a822cf67d5e8ea1a6a87e7a06dcef0548ee5

Detections:

win_xorist_auto

Link:

https://www.unpac.me/results/e6ff9c40-c315-44cc-9dc0-f4a640e0ad04/

SH256 hash:

de8396f4ba0b3291090fcd7f36ffb5fe2a966738fb9a2d2ed3d1732c76c25b38

MD5 hash:

e5bc800a6efdf560ee844d34598787c1

SHA1 hash:

a0d35d18304ef4eaea03ab87d9eaea8d35dce445

Detections:

SUSP_OBF_NET_Reactor_Indicators_Jan24

Link:

https://www.unpac.me/results/e6ff9c40-c315-44cc-9dc0-f4a640e0ad04/

Malware family:

DCRat

Verdict:

Malicious

Link:

https://www.vmray.com/analyses/_mb/223733ec7085/report/overview.html

Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

Threat name:

Malicious File

Score:

1.00

Link:

https://yomi.yoroi.company/submissions/223733ec708531603b51bf10fc3126cb4dfd47f4aaada4a75acd168eb06b9d50

YARA Signatures

MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:	DebuggerCheck__API Create hunting rule
Reference:	https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara

Rule name:	DetectEncryptedVariants Create hunting rule
Author:	Zinyth
Description:	Detects 'encrypted' in ASCII, Unicode, base64, or hex-encoded

Rule name:	Detect_PowerShell_Obfuscation Create hunting rule
Author:	daniyyell
Description:	Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands commonly used in malicious scripts.

Rule name:	DotNet_Reactor Create hunting rule
Author:	@bartblaze
Description:	Identifies .NET Reactor, which offers .NET code protection such as obfuscation, encryption and so on.

Rule name:	golang_bin_JCorn_CSC846 Create hunting rule
Author:	Justin Cornwell
Description:	CSC-846 Golang detection ruleset

Rule name:	MD5_Constants Create hunting rule
Author:	phoul (@phoul)
Description:	Look for MD5 constants

Rule name:	NET Create hunting rule
Author:	malware-lu

Rule name:	PureCrypter Create hunting rule
Author:	@bartblaze
Description:	Identifies PureCrypter, .NET loader and obfuscator.
Reference:	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.purecrypter

Rule name:	RIPEMD160_Constants Create hunting rule
Author:	phoul (@phoul)
Description:	Look for RIPEMD-160 constants

Rule name:	SelfExtractingRAR Create hunting rule
Author:	Xavier Mertens
Description:	Detects an SFX archive with automatic script execution

Rule name:	SHA1_Constants Create hunting rule
Author:	phoul (@phoul)
Description:	Look for SHA1 constants

Rule name:	Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage Create hunting rule
Author:	XiAnzheng
Description:	May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)

Rule name:	TH_AntiVM_MassHunt_Win_Malware_2026_CYFARE Create hunting rule
Author:	CYFARE
Description:	Detects Windows malware employing anti-VM / anti-sandbox evasion techniques across VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V, QEMU, Xen, and generic sandbox environments
Reference:	https://cyfare.net/

Rule name:	VECT_Ransomware Create hunting rule
Author:	Mustafa Bakhit
Description:	Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.

Rule name:	win_xorist_auto Create hunting rule
Author:	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Description:	Detects win.xorist.

File information

The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Cape

https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/64089/

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