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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 10ab10b792effcd9c8573aca8574c20ae2ca2aa18327c39c5ee3895e4ef1f1d8. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



ZigClipper


Vendor detections: 10


Intelligence 10 IOCs YARA 3 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 10ab10b792effcd9c8573aca8574c20ae2ca2aa18327c39c5ee3895e4ef1f1d8
SHA3-384 hash: cf44a17516e4fb64da0a0ae80aca9f59fd3a5fde3049a53929fa5f615256e3306bf960e7a5037d2b3a919b6eca15bf7a
SHA1 hash: 89dca70dd6002956b8199b7b5657d5687af83304
MD5 hash: bab0f09a1ea9d9b89497a239cdf12244
humanhash: fillet-green-hamper-yankee
File name:aa9bawrnVyud5WCQ.msi
Download: download sample
Signature ZigClipper
File size:11'747'328 bytes
First seen:2026-11-20 23:41:08 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) msi
MIME type:application/x-msi
ssdeep 196608:yae89CIFRaH/6UmqlrUvNBlU81TqGf0TK5a8YV2VYBSXeMMpsIrP1v/ysriaW:yae89wH/HUvvlUXe88Y2A8Ij1SqiT
TLSH T1DAC633F8B48387F9CB5E0337B5D161E916673CA851636C0E0859B301FB7A438EB7A964
TrID 88.4% (.MST) Windows SDK Setup Transform script (61000/1/5)
11.5% (.) Generic OLE2 / Multistream Compound (8000/1)
Magika msi
Reporter kkwook20
Tags:DLL-Sideloading f95zone MSBuild msi ZigClipper


Avatar
kkwook20
Fake F95zone mirror (f95zone.to.it) -> ko7u8b.space gate -> trojanized game archive. Renamed genuine vlc.exe sideloads malicious libvlc.dll; per-user WiX MSI (fake AVerMedia RECentral Runtime / Stream Engine Service) runs wscript WSF -> copied MSBuild.exe inline csproj loader (Resources.resx hex chunks) -> trojanized ARSoft.Tools.Net stage2 -> RC4 -> VM-protected .NET stage3, module stomping wmp.dll/edgehtml.dll. Victim host contacted 104.21.40.183:443 (Cloudflare-fronted). Sandbox-evasive. Triage: https://tria.ge/261120-1kt1jsxx6r https://tria.ge/261120-1q36eaxy4r

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
13
Origin country :
KR KR
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Result
Verdict:
Suspicious
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a window
Creating synchronization primitives
Searching for synchronization primitives
Creating a file in the Windows subdirectories
Creating a file
Launching a process
Creating a process from a recently created file
Creating a process with a hidden window
Sending a custom TCP request
Gathering data
Result
Threat name:
ZigClipper
Detection:
malicious
Classification:
evad.spyw
Score:
100 / 100
Signature
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Hides threads from debuggers
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Tries to detect the ACPI power-button (likely to detect VMs)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript called in batch mode (surpress errors)
WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script)
Yara detected ZigClipper
Behaviour
Behavior Graph:
behaviorgraph main Behavior Graph ID: 2010981 Sample: aa9bawrnVyud5WCQ.ms... Startdate: 21/11/2026 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 dd5e349222_0 commercialogs.com main->dd5e349222_0 dd5e349168_0 bsc-mainnet.public.blastapi.io main->dd5e349168_0 summary_network_0_main 3 other IPs or domains main->summary_network_0_main sd5e505973_0 Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic main->sd5e505973_0 sd5e508203_0 Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file main->sd5e508203_0 sd5e511697_0 Yara detected ZigClipper main->sd5e511697_0 summary_signature_0_main 4 other signatures main->summary_signature_0_main p1_1 msiexec.exe 103 56 main->p1_1 started p6_1 wscript.exe 10 6 main->p6_1 started p0_1 msiexec.exe 3 main->p0_1 started fd5e499726_1 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\MSBuild.exe, PE32+ p1_1->fd5e499726_1 dropped fd5e499668_1 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\DashboardPublisher.wsf, XML p1_1->fd5e499668_1 dropped sd5e505965_1 Wscript called in batch mode (surpress errors) p1_1->sd5e505965_1 p4_2 wscript.exe 1 p1_1->p4_2 started sd5e510302_1 WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script) p6_1->sd5e510302_1 p7_2 MSBuild.exe 5 p6_1->p7_2 started sd5e511614_2 Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage) p4_2->sd5e511614_2 sd5e510302_2 WScript reads language and country specific registry keys (likely country aware script) p4_2->sd5e510302_2 p5_3 MSBuild.exe 14 97 p4_2->p5_3 started fd5e501869_2 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\WindowsCodecsRaw.dll, PE32+ p7_2->fd5e501869_2 dropped sd5e505936_2 Hides threads from debuggers p7_2->sd5e505936_2 sd5e511299_2 Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier) p7_2->sd5e511299_2 sd5e511701_2 Tries to detect the ACPI power-button (likely to detect VMs) p7_2->sd5e511701_2 id5e499335_3 bsc-mainnet.public.blastapi.io 104.20.38.203, 443, 49879 CLOUDFLARENET-CloudflareIncUS Canada p5_3->id5e499335_3 id5e499354_3 commercialogs.com 104.21.45.121, 443, 49880, 49881 CLOUDFLARENET-CloudflareIncUS Canada p5_3->id5e499354_3 fd5e501058_3 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\MSBuild.exe (copy), PE32+ p5_3->fd5e501058_3 dropped fd5e501849_3 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\WindowsCodecsRaw.dll, PE32+ p5_3->fd5e501849_3 dropped fd5e501715_3 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\MSBuild.exe (copy), PE32+ p5_3->fd5e501715_3 dropped summary_file_3_p5_3 4 other files p5_3->summary_file_3_p5_3 dropped sd5e505936_3 Hides threads from debuggers p5_3->sd5e505936_3 sd5e511299_3 Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier) p5_3->sd5e511299_3 sd5e511701_3 Tries to detect the ACPI power-button (likely to detect VMs) p5_3->sd5e511701_3 layer_1 layer_2 layer_3 layer_4 layer_5 layer_6 layer_7 layer_8 layer_9 layer_10 layer_11 layer_12 layer_13
Verdict:
Malware
YARA:
4 match(es)
Tags:
.Net CAB:COMPRESSION:MSZIP Executable Javascript Managed .NET Office Document PDB Path PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout SOS: 0.27 T1059.007 WSF File
Gathering data
Threat name:
Win32.Trojan.Generic
Status:
Suspicious
First seen:
2026-11-21 00:52:03 UTC
File Type:
Binary (Archive)
Extracted files:
40
AV detection:
8 of 37 (21.62%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Gathering data
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:exploit_any_poppopret
Author:Jeff White [karttoon@gmail.com] @noottrak
Description:Identify POP -> POP -> RET opcodes for quick ROP Gadget creation in target binaries.
Rule name:FreddyBearDropper
Author:Dwarozh Hoshiar
Description:Freddy Bear Dropper is dropping a malware through base63 encoded powershell scrip.
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

ZigClipper

Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) msi 10ab10b792effcd9c8573aca8574c20ae2ca2aa18327c39c5ee3895e4ef1f1d8

(this sample)

  
Delivery method
Distributed via web download

Comments