MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 0e074c82987b77386950abfd4d7df09c059e28235bd3b35214b0e75ec0039580. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



Fuery


Vendor detections: 19


Intelligence 19 IOCs YARA 25 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 0e074c82987b77386950abfd4d7df09c059e28235bd3b35214b0e75ec0039580
SHA3-384 hash: fed87ee3d8967ed7db770c468929b338be726b6dee59ba2aa2e2a31a286106adcb0f197de77a1220ac5aef8a6d46e0f4
SHA1 hash: 8166d8e7cc4eb5c14b860f35ffbe37ab936c7b19
MD5 hash: 7e46593048300e257dc5d582c1dcd388
humanhash: johnny-diet-wolfram-snake
File name:0e074c82987b77386950abfd4d7df09c059e28235bd3b35214b0e75ec0039580
Download: download sample
Signature Fuery
File size:2'437'120 bytes
First seen:2025-10-01 18:58:16 UTC
Last seen:Never
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'653 x AgentTesla, 19'464 x Formbook, 12'205 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep 49152:RTIsxP5ViHLYMgUMB/JyuMvzRVuyoovIebL50D7On6FR7TaNuz4Vr4RKwPy:rvV34nWebLOnygTP4Vruy
Threatray 3'606 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH T193B53308CAEF4E7CF0355B7F6E30B1BA65F614C1B142668D20578A8AC81E273575ABF4
TrID 71.1% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13)
10.2% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4)
6.3% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2)
4.3% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
2.0% (.ICL) Windows Icons Library (generic) (2059/9)
Magika pebin
Reporter JAMESWT_WT
Tags:exe Fuery goldsilber-io

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
1
# of downloads :
72
Origin country :
IT IT
Vendor Threat Intelligence
Malware family:
ID:
1
File name:
0e074c82987b77386950abfd4d7df09c059e28235bd3b35214b0e75ec0039580
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2025-10-01 18:59:59 UTC
Tags:
amadey auto generic redline stealer botnet rdp unlocker-eject tool loader autoit arch-exec stealc auto-startup evasion rat njrat bladabindi auto-reg banker grandoreiro purecrypter darkvision remote backdoor anti-evasion

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Verdict:
Malicious
Score:
99.9%
Tags:
dropper emotet shell sage
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Creating a file in the Windows directory
Enabling the 'hidden' option for recently created files
Running batch commands
Launching a process
Creating a service
Launching the process to interact with network services
Launching a service
Restart of the analyzed sample
Сreating synchronization primitives
Searching for synchronization primitives
Creating a process from a recently created file
Launching the default Windows debugger (dwwin.exe)
Creating a file in the %temp% directory
Creating a file
Creating a window
Searching for the window
Enabling autorun for a service
Connection attempt to an infection source
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Sending an HTTP POST request to an infection source
Verdict:
Likely Malicious
Threat level:
  7.5/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
crypt obfuscated obfuscated packed packed packer_detected stealer zusy
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x32
First seen:
2025-08-19T06:17:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2025-09-22T10:48:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Detections:
PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic BSS:Exploit.Win32.Generic Trojan.BAT.Agent.cot VHO:Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Convagent.gen Trojan-PSW.Lumma.HTTP.Download Trojan.Nymaim.HTTP.ServerRequest Trojan.Agentb.TCP.C&C BSS:Trojan.Win32.Generic Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Deyma.sb HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Deyma.gen HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Crypt.gen
Gathering data
Threat name:
ByteCode-MSIL.Trojan.Amadey
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2025-08-19 09:24:31 UTC
AV detection:
20 of 24 (83.33%)
Threat level:
  5/5
Result
Malware family:
Score:
  10/10
Tags:
family:amadey family:darkvision family:deerstealer family:gcleaner family:milleniumrat family:njrat family:salatstealer family:stealc family:vidar botnet:avatar botnet:c6402af46b8d0b3aebe5991fe2c15dffn botnet:fbf543 botnet:tr1pernn botnet:veilcore collection credential_access defense_evasion discovery execution loader persistence rat spyware stealer themida trojan upx
Behaviour
Checks processor information in registry
Delays execution with timeout.exe
Enumerates system info in registry
Kills process with taskkill
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
Modifies registry key
Runs net.exe
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Script User-Agent
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious behavior: LoadsDriver
Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection
Suspicious behavior: NtCreateUserProcessBlockNonMicrosoftBinary
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Views/modifies file attributes
outlook_office_path
outlook_win_path
Browser Information Discovery
Enumerates physical storage devices
Program crash
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Drops file in Program Files directory
Drops file in Windows directory
Launches sc.exe
AutoIT Executable
Drops file in System32 directory
Enumerates processes with tasklist
Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
UPX packed file
Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles
Accesses cryptocurrency files/wallets, possible credential harvesting
Adds Run key to start application
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2
Looks up external IP address via web service
Power Settings
Checks BIOS information in registry
Checks computer location settings
Creates new service(s)
Disables service(s)
Drops startup file
Executes dropped EXE
Identifies Wine through registry keys
Loads dropped DLL
Modifies file permissions
Reads WinSCP keys stored on the system
Reads user/profile data of local email clients
Reads user/profile data of web browsers
Stops running service(s)
Themida packer
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Badlisted process makes network request
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Downloads MZ/PE file
Sets service image path in registry
Uses browser remote debugging
Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
Amadey family
DarkVision Rat
Darkvision family
DeerStealer
Deerstealer family
Detect SalatStealer payload
Detects Amadey x86-bit Payload
Detects DeerStealer
Detects MilleniumRAT stealer
GCleaner
Gcleaner family
MilleniumRat
Milleniumrat family
Njrat family
Salatstealer family
Stealc
Stealc family
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
Vidar
Vidar family
njRAT/Bladabindi
salatstealer
Amadey
Malware Config
C2 Extraction:
http://94.154.35.25
https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198783900411
https://telegram.me/rif0lm
http://178.16.54.175
conference-plate.gl.at.ply.gg:23974
31.57.38.89
185.156.73.98
45.91.200.135
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
0e074c82987b77386950abfd4d7df09c059e28235bd3b35214b0e75ec0039580
MD5 hash:
7e46593048300e257dc5d582c1dcd388
SHA1 hash:
8166d8e7cc4eb5c14b860f35ffbe37ab936c7b19
SH256 hash:
b4f74c3b9762fea9958646ade46b1d3b583c5edfede8592e345a292c107a0f68
MD5 hash:
4ba3e12f9dff36ceab18396a72028b2d
SHA1 hash:
59ea3a35ad9fe045c142ae810e02056a27305144
SH256 hash:
3c1d5c22e5c6389f090d5ee3df3c05c7050ff0d312f393dc760f4493958c3e96
MD5 hash:
8107893f6b65b789b98f4ecbaa83d284
SHA1 hash:
4fa873258640cc089ae8cdec314b0b32f807e142
SH256 hash:
c39c4466f622b7320076076ea3eb13fa0f784b9b097dff46d802f905fc39d851
MD5 hash:
a7993e5a520b17fec65435fb4838a08f
SHA1 hash:
18fe6286473a03735e7b701d4bfaf61ad35da7ad
SH256 hash:
c36ed034d523da1f54d43176334d4bda9f9adcb940948646b43902a620ebda45
MD5 hash:
156f4a8f006779a3493d9d476f1e8dda
SHA1 hash:
c1b667b0ff98bbb1d2495b4fd5dda1eeca494799
Detections:
Amadey
Parent samples :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 hash:
b6bf5bd6989becdfeca2aa028a29d263e349f17e63b0c267e53954aeeada140e
MD5 hash:
0928f11d54e2e4d2ed63e9ab3b090e34
SHA1 hash:
d44ac448bdedfe55edc306f87a5aa1a7c2d1cfc1
Detections:
Amadey SUSP_OBF_NET_Eazfuscator_String_Encryption_Jan24
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:APT_Sandworm_ArguePatch_Apr_2022_1
Author:Arkbird_SOLG
Description:Detect ArguePatch loader used by Sandworm group for load CaddyWiper
Reference:https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
Rule name:botnet_plaintext_c2
Author:cip
Description:Attempts to match at least some of the strings used in some botnet variants which use plaintext communication protocols.
Rule name:cobalt_strike_tmp01925d3f
Author:The DFIR Report
Description:files - file ~tmp01925d3f.exe
Reference:https://thedfirreport.com
Rule name:CP_AllMal_Detector
Author:DiegoAnalytics
Description:CrossPlatform All Malwares Detector: Detect PE, ELF, Mach-O, scripts, archives; overlay, obfuscation, encryption, spoofing, hiding, high entropy, network communication
Rule name:CP_Script_Inject_Detector
Author:DiegoAnalytics
Description:Detects attempts to inject code into another process across PE, ELF, Mach-O binaries
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__API
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:DetectEncryptedVariants
Author:Zinyth
Description:Detects 'encrypted' in ASCII, Unicode, base64, or hex-encoded
Rule name:FreddyBearDropper
Author:Dwarozh Hoshiar
Description:Freddy Bear Dropper is dropping a malware through base63 encoded powershell scrip.
Rule name:golang_bin_JCorn_CSC846
Author:Justin Cornwell
Description:CSC-846 Golang detection ruleset
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_Embedded_Crypto_Wallet_Browser_Extension_IDs
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detect binaries embedding considerable number of cryptocurrency wallet browser extension IDs.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects binaries (Windows and macOS) referencing many web browsers. Observed in information stealers.
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxComputerNames
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing possible sandbox analysis VM names
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxHookingDLL
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects binaries and memory artifacts referencing sandbox DLLs typically observed in sandbox evasion
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxUserNames
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing possible sandbox analysis VM usernames
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SQLQuery_ConfidentialDataStore
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects executables containing SQL queries to confidential data stores. Observed in infostealers
Rule name:Macos_Infostealer_Wallets_8e469ea0
Author:Elastic Security
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
Rule name:pe_detect_tls_callbacks
Rule name:pe_imphash
Rule name:RANSOMWARE
Author:ToroGuitar
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
Rule name:ThreadControl__Context
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:vmdetect
Author:nex
Description:Possibly employs anti-virtualization techniques
Rule name:WIN_WebSocket_Base64_C2_20250726
Author:dogsafetyforeverone
Description:Detects configuration strings used by malware to specify WebSocket command-and-control endpoints inside Base64-encoded data. It looks for prefixes such as '#ws://' or '#wss://' that were found in QuasarRAT configuration data.

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Comments