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MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 0db1e8a3075ffc2f5caa91abaeabb6ba4365ae0eda64d179374614a79e317733. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry



Threat unknown


Vendor detections: 10


Intelligence 10 IOCs YARA 6 File information Comments

SHA256 hash: 0db1e8a3075ffc2f5caa91abaeabb6ba4365ae0eda64d179374614a79e317733
SHA3-384 hash: b61ce2ea6bf1b17028dd29b63b377ade46f2e3681831589915337199dfd61e6929ef50e5cc354c76e69bbf1ec71dae9f
SHA1 hash: ea65fccbc66d64b25eff57f102b2a525db6d9e3b
MD5 hash: 5dd387acef74a14a63dbc883aadee854
humanhash: london-sierra-mockingbird-cold
File name:zoominstaller.exe
Download: download sample
File size:284'160 bytes
First seen:2026-09-22 10:56:06 UTC
Last seen:2026-09-22 11:02:04 UTC
File type:Executable exe
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
imphash e39b37139d632481046b834bfb9680e3
ssdeep 6144:xtmaYOsDnzAoMOJUPYz2aqeRohLIRJ94l:xtpsYoMOADuotl
TLSH T169547DC8AB550CFCDA734271CCA9BA44DA7E7ED90760C6BF03A073598E775858C7AA10
TrID 37.0% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2)
28.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1)
11.5% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13)
11.3% (.EXE) Generic Win/DOS Executable (2002/3)
11.3% (.EXE) DOS Executable (generic) (2000/1)
Magika pebin
dhash icon c48244e4a4ac82c4 (3 x LummaStealer, 1 x RemcosRAT, 1 x RustyStealer)
Reporter SOCRadarSTRU
Tags:exe Operation_Conflict_Compass STRU


Avatar
SOCRadarSTRU
🚨 Operation Conflict Compass: Konni Targets Ukraine via Malicious LNK Lures | SOCRadar STRU IOC

SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) uncovered Operation Conflict Compass, a targeted campaign by the DPRK-aligned actor Konni, aimed at gathering intelligence on the ongoing trajectory of the Russian invasion of Ukrain. Initial access was likely established through spear-phishing emails containing ZIP attachments. These archives contained LNK files masquerading as PDFs, using lures focused on global food price growth due to the Strait of Hormuz situation, Russia-Ukraine peace negotiation frameworks, and social researcher resumes to deceive targets. Execution of these lures leads to the deployment of custom malware that we named VelvetCake. VelvetCake embeds no fixed post-exploitation capability set locally. It operates as a lightweight task runner that continuously retrieves and executes server-side PowerShell modules, allowing operators to modify functionality without redeploying the core payload.

πŸ“š Source: https://socradar.io/blog/operation-conflict-compass-konni-ukraine-lnk-lure/

πŸ” IOC Reference:
Full IOC list available on the SOCRadar platform: https://platform.socradar.com/

Intelligence


File Origin
# of uploads :
2
# of downloads :
166
Origin country :
NL NL
Vendor Threat Intelligence
No detections
Malware family:
n/a
ID:
1
File name:
exe
Verdict:
Malicious activity
Analysis date:
2026-09-22 10:58:57 UTC
Tags:
susp-powershell arch-exec loader

Note:
ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample
Result
Verdict:
Malware
Maliciousness:

Behaviour
Launching a process
Creating a file
DNS request
Connection attempt
Sending a custom TCP request
Sending an HTTP GET request
Searching for synchronization primitives
Creating a process from a recently created file
Creating a file in the %temp% subdirectories
Creating a file in the %AppData% subdirectories
Π‘reating synchronization primitives
Creating a window
Delayed writing of the file
Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests
Deleting a recently created file
Creating a process with a hidden window
Searching for the window
Replacing files
Enabling autorun with the shell\open\command registry branches
Enabling autorun by creating a file
Verdict:
Malicious
Threat level:
  10/10
Confidence:
100%
Tags:
anti-debug anti-vm crypto fingerprint installer-heuristic lolbin microsoft_visual_cc reconnaissance schtasks
Verdict:
Malicious
Labled as:
Capa_get_geographical_location
Verdict:
Malicious
File Type:
exe x64
First seen:
2026-09-02T13:45:00Z UTC
Last seen:
2026-09-24T04:09:00Z UTC
Hits:
~10
Verdict:
inconclusive
YARA:
4 match(es)
Tags:
Executable PDB Path PE (Portable Executable) PE File Layout Win 64 Exe x64
Threat name:
Win64.Malware.Heuristic
Status:
Malicious
First seen:
2026-09-02 18:33:18 UTC
File Type:
PE+ (Exe)
Extracted files:
11
AV detection:
27 of 38 (71.05%)
Threat level:
  2/5
Result
Malware family:
n/a
Score:
  8/10
Tags:
defense_evasion execution persistence spyware trojan
Behaviour
Modifies system certificate store
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
Uses Task Scheduler COM API
Enumerates physical storage devices
Executes a VBScript file via the Windows Script Host.
Checks computer location settings
Badlisted process makes network request
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Unpacked files
SH256 hash:
0db1e8a3075ffc2f5caa91abaeabb6ba4365ae0eda64d179374614a79e317733
MD5 hash:
5dd387acef74a14a63dbc883aadee854
SHA1 hash:
ea65fccbc66d64b25eff57f102b2a525db6d9e3b
Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

YARA Signatures


MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:Base64_Encoded_Powershell_Directives
Rule name:cobalt_strike_tmp01925d3f
Author:The DFIR Report
Description:files - file ~tmp01925d3f.exe
Reference:https://thedfirreport.com
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__API
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
Rule name:golang_bin_JCorn_CSC846
Author:Justin Cornwell
Description:CSC-846 Golang detection ruleset
Rule name:TigerRAT_pe_yaraify
Author:hunts-yara-code
Description:YARAify-tightened byte rule from 9 sample(s) -- VERIFY hits
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.

File information


The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

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