MalwareBazaar Database
You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 0db1e8a3075ffc2f5caa91abaeabb6ba4365ae0eda64d179374614a79e317733. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.
Database Entry
Threat unknown
Vendor detections: 10
| SHA256 hash: | 0db1e8a3075ffc2f5caa91abaeabb6ba4365ae0eda64d179374614a79e317733 |
|---|---|
| SHA3-384 hash: | b61ce2ea6bf1b17028dd29b63b377ade46f2e3681831589915337199dfd61e6929ef50e5cc354c76e69bbf1ec71dae9f |
| SHA1 hash: | ea65fccbc66d64b25eff57f102b2a525db6d9e3b |
| MD5 hash: | 5dd387acef74a14a63dbc883aadee854 |
| humanhash: | london-sierra-mockingbird-cold |
| File name: | zoominstaller.exe |
| Download: | download sample |
| File size: | 284'160 bytes |
| First seen: | 2026-09-22 10:56:06 UTC |
| Last seen: | 2026-09-22 11:02:04 UTC |
| File type: | |
| MIME type: | application/x-dosexec |
| imphash | e39b37139d632481046b834bfb9680e3 |
| ssdeep | 6144:xtmaYOsDnzAoMOJUPYz2aqeRohLIRJ94l:xtpsYoMOADuotl |
| TLSH | T169547DC8AB550CFCDA734271CCA9BA44DA7E7ED90760C6BF03A073598E775858C7AA10 |
| TrID | 37.0% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (6522/11/2) 28.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1) 11.5% (.EXE) OS/2 Executable (generic) (2029/13) 11.3% (.EXE) Generic Win/DOS Executable (2002/3) 11.3% (.EXE) DOS Executable (generic) (2000/1) |
| Magika | pebin |
| dhash icon | c48244e4a4ac82c4 (3 x LummaStealer, 1 x RemcosRAT, 1 x RustyStealer) |
| Reporter | |
| Tags: | exe Operation_Conflict_Compass STRU |
SOCRadarSTRU
π¨ Operation Conflict Compass: Konni Targets Ukraine via Malicious LNK Lures | SOCRadar STRU IOCSOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) uncovered Operation Conflict Compass, a targeted campaign by the DPRK-aligned actor Konni, aimed at gathering intelligence on the ongoing trajectory of the Russian invasion of Ukrain. Initial access was likely established through spear-phishing emails containing ZIP attachments. These archives contained LNK files masquerading as PDFs, using lures focused on global food price growth due to the Strait of Hormuz situation, Russia-Ukraine peace negotiation frameworks, and social researcher resumes to deceive targets. Execution of these lures leads to the deployment of custom malware that we named VelvetCake. VelvetCake embeds no fixed post-exploitation capability set locally. It operates as a lightweight task runner that continuously retrieves and executes server-side PowerShell modules, allowing operators to modify functionality without redeploying the core payload.
π Source: https://socradar.io/blog/operation-conflict-compass-konni-ukraine-lnk-lure/
π IOC Reference:
Full IOC list available on the SOCRadar platform: https://platform.socradar.com/
Intelligence
File Origin
NLVendor Threat Intelligence
Result
Behaviour
Result
Behaviour
Unpacked files
YARA Signatures
MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.
| Rule name: | Base64_Encoded_Powershell_Directives |
|---|
| Rule name: | cobalt_strike_tmp01925d3f |
|---|---|
| Author: | The DFIR Report |
| Description: | files - file ~tmp01925d3f.exe |
| Reference: | https://thedfirreport.com |
| Rule name: | DebuggerCheck__API |
|---|---|
| Reference: | https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara |
| Rule name: | golang_bin_JCorn_CSC846 |
|---|---|
| Author: | Justin Cornwell |
| Description: | CSC-846 Golang detection ruleset |
| Rule name: | TigerRAT_pe_yaraify |
|---|---|
| Author: | hunts-yara-code |
| Description: | YARAify-tightened byte rule from 9 sample(s) -- VERIFY hits |
| Rule name: | VECT_Ransomware |
|---|---|
| Author: | Mustafa Bakhit |
| Description: | Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments. |
File information
The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.
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