MalwareBazaar Database

You are currently viewing the MalwareBazaar entry for SHA256 e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f. While MalwareBazaar tries to identify whether the sample provided is malicious or not, there is no guarantee that a sample in MalwareBazaar is malicious.

Database Entry

AsyncRAT

Vendor detections: 19

Intelligence 19 IOCs YARA 22 File information Comments 2

SHA256 hash:	e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f
SHA3-384 hash:	11f374ddeca7e519b1fca193a27cc1811920378f61da58bd76272aa86554d4510d3bfa27195a3cae2a5d3391510f6046
SHA1 hash:	9b357f25d522649281a2c44989ce43f1581e2d9e
MD5 hash:	f747ae721dcdcbf06aedaa75a896563e
humanhash:	carolina-utah-table-floor
File name:	Microsoft.ServiceHub.exe
Download:	download sample
Signature	AsyncRAT Create hunting rule
File size:	75'336 bytes
First seen:	2025-07-22 19:38:03 UTC
Last seen:	Never
File type:	exe
MIME type:	application/x-dosexec
imphash	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 (48'658 x AgentTesla, 19'469 x Formbook, 12'208 x SnakeKeylogger)
ssdeep	1536:RBkLvAdswPuCfWhS7zQpKqCuGbbqwNkgR7GlLVclNizzzYP:RBkLvAdswTfWhS7zQ0qRGbbqRgRqBYeK
Threatray	1'508 similar samples on MalwareBazaar
TLSH	T1FC738D002798C916E2AD4AF4EDF295424AB5D6732001DB5E7CC854CB6B9FFC646223FE
TrID	67.7% (.EXE) Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73123/4/13) 9.7% (.EXE) Win64 Executable (generic) (10522/11/4) 6.0% (.DLL) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6578/25/2) 4.6% (.EXE) Win16 NE executable (generic) (5038/12/1) 4.1% (.EXE) Win32 Executable (generic) (4504/4/1)
Magika	pebin
Reporter	burger
Tags:	AsyncRAT exe

Intelligence

File Origin

# of uploads :

# of downloads :

Origin country :

Vendor Threat Intelligence

Malware family:

n/a

ID:

File name:

64thService.exe

Verdict:

Malicious activity

Analysis date:

2025-06-29 14:20:15 UTC

Tags:

loader confuser

Link:

https://app.any.run/tasks/ec348f36-8980-4463-af2f-86febb9b4e93

Note:

ANY.RUN is an interactive sandbox that analyzes all user actions rather than an uploaded sample

Detection:

DCRat

Link:

https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/16398/

Detection(s):

Win.Packed.Razy-9807129-0

Win.Malware.Generickdz-9865912-0

Win.Trojan.AsyncRAT-9914220-0

Win.Malware.Zusy-10034587-0

Verdict:

Malicious

Score:

99.1%

Link:

https://cyber-fortress.com/docs/result/index.php?id=687fe89d84b37dd61ef0bc07

Tags:

asyncrat dropper virus msil

Result

Verdict:

Malware

Maliciousness:

Behaviour

Using the Windows Management Instrumentation requests

Сreating synchronization primitives

Running batch commands

Creating a process with a hidden window

Creating a file in the %temp% directory

Creating a file

Launching a process

Creating a process from a recently created file

Connection attempt

Unauthorized injection to a recently created process

Enabling autorun by creating a file

Verdict:

Malicious

Threat level:

10/10

Confidence:

100%

Tags:

anti-debug anti-vm asyncrat base64 configsecuritypolicy evasive fingerprint hacktool invalid-signature lolbin mpcmdrun msconfig njrat njrat rat razy reconnaissance redcap regedit schtasks signed vbnet venomrat

Link:

https://www.filescan.io/uploads/687fe8af19132d98488535d3/reports/149c21a1-7401-4643-b9f0-3e8791bbf4a1/overview

Verdict:

Malicious

Labled as:

Backdoor.Marte.VenomRAT.Generic

Link:

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f

Verdict:

Malicious

Link:

https://analyze.intezer.com/analyses/fc51bc78-dc71-45f8-ae07-c12a3c0c3563

Result

Threat name:

AsyncRAT, DcRat

Detection:

malicious

Classification:

troj.evad

Score:

100 / 100

Link:

https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1742290

Signature

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Found malware configuration

Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)

Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings

Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher

Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Yara detected AsyncRAT

Yara detected DcRat

Behaviour

Behavior Graph:

Download SVG

Score:

78%

Verdict:

Malware

File Type:

Link:

https://malprob.io/report/e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f

Verdict:

njRat

YARA:

9 match(es)

Tags:

.Net DarkCrystal RAT DcRat Executable njRat PE (Portable Executable) RAT SOS: 0.25 Win 32 Exe x86

Malware Config

C2 Extraction:

PORT: 8080
CNC: 157.97.11.134

Link:

https://app.malva.re/file/f747ae721dcdcbf06aedaa75a896563e

Detection:

dcrat

Link:

https://mwdb.cert.pl/sample/e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f/

Verdict:

Malicious

Threat:

Backdoor.MSIL.Darkrat

Link:

https://tip.neiki.dev/file/e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f

Threat name:

ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.AsyncRAT

Status:

Malicious

First seen:

2025-06-26 00:40:00 UTC

File Type:

PE (.Net Exe)

Extracted files:

AV detection:

31 of 36 (86.11%)

Threat level:

5/5

Detection(s):

Malicious file

Link:

https://check.spamhaus.org/check/?searchterm=4nhamrrtfo3whor3nwcqumu2ekjbgcch4jp7qu2s6tk5leuwmshq._file

Verdict:

malicious

Label(s):

asyncrat

AsyncRAT

26a5b9490900de42640459783686e8a85138f37c015c0099b296f8cd396c1953

AsyncRAT

4acdc95e84a15b5af10b513c1629b3fac7f398c5c44f9445934ad0d7b81ac908

AsyncRAT

4e7715a80f631187621f1840f2c44f26aea8570fb7dd24e87273873b126a3b7d

AsyncRAT

8215ed905544d217f656b5b226f71798970698eefa4f24cb48532778d8409baa

AsyncRAT

9085e6327177bb47cf43a8d8ed0c24fcfd50cde4199c5130f2b97b2508e9aabc

AsyncRAT

+ 1'498 additional samples on MalwareBazaar

Result

Malware family:

asyncrat

Score:

10/10

Tags:

family:asyncrat botnet:default rat

Link:

https://tria.ge/reports/250722-ych7zafn8x/

Behaviour

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken

AsyncRat

Asyncrat family

Malware Config

C2 Extraction:

157.97.11.134:8080

Verdict:

Malicious

Tags:

rat asyncrat Win.Packed.Razy-9807129-0

YARA:

Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc asyncrat win_asyncrat_unobfuscated

Link:

https://app.threat.zone/submission/dab26461-2df0-4f9f-981e-0ef939e27f94

Unpacked files

SH256 hash:

e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f

MD5 hash:

f747ae721dcdcbf06aedaa75a896563e

SHA1 hash:

9b357f25d522649281a2c44989ce43f1581e2d9e

Detections:

AsyncRAT

DCRat

Link:

https://www.unpac.me/results/e192a46b-8699-49ef-8f20-e99105838fd0/

Please note that we are no longer able to provide a coverage score for Virus Total.

Threat name:

iSpy Keylogger

Score:

1.00

Link:

https://yomi.yoroi.company/submissions/e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f

YARA Signatures

MalwareBazaar uses YARA rules from several public and non-public repositories, such as YARAhub and Malpedia. Those are being matched against malware samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar as well as against any suspicious process dumps they may create. Please note that only results from TLP:CLEAR rules are being displayed.

Rule name:	AcRat Create hunting rule
Author:	Nikos 'n0t' Totosis
Description:	AcRat Payload (based on AsyncRat)

Rule name:	dcrat Create hunting rule
Author:	jeFF0Falltrades

Rule name:	dcrat_kingrat Create hunting rule
Author:	jeFF0Falltrades

Rule name:	dcrat_rkp Create hunting rule
Author:	jeFF0Falltrades
Description:	Detects DCRat payloads

Rule name:	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_DcRatBy Create hunting rule
Author:	ditekSHen
Description:	Detects executables containing the string DcRatBy

Rule name:	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_WMI_EnumerateVideoDevice Create hunting rule
Author:	ditekSHen
Description:	Detects executables attemping to enumerate video devices using WMI

Rule name:	MAL_AsnycRAT Create hunting rule
Author:	SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:	Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine

Rule name:	MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption Create hunting rule
Author:	SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:	Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine

Rule name:	Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE Create hunting rule
Author:	Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:	Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.

Rule name:	Multifamily_RAT_Detection Create hunting rule
Author:	Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:	Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables

Rule name:	NET Create hunting rule
Author:	malware-lu

Rule name:	NETexecutableMicrosoft Create hunting rule
Author:	malware-lu

Rule name:	Njrat Create hunting rule
Author:	botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:	Njrat

Rule name:	PE_Digital_Certificate Create hunting rule
Author:	albertzsigovits

Rule name:	pe_imphash Create hunting rule

Rule name:	Runtime_Broker_Variant_1 Create hunting rule
Author:	Sn0wFr0$t
Description:	Detecting malicious Runtime Broker

Rule name:	Skystars_Malware_Imphash Create hunting rule
Author:	Skystars LightDefender
Description:	imphash

Rule name:	SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV Create hunting rule
Author:	SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:	Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs

Rule name:	Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage Create hunting rule
Author:	XiAnzheng
Description:	May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)

Rule name:	Sus_Obf_Enc_Spoof_Hide_PE Create hunting rule
Author:	XiAnzheng
Description:	Check for Overlay, Obfuscating, Encrypting, Spoofing, Hiding, or Entropy Technique(can create FP)

Rule name:	Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc Create hunting rule
Author:	Elastic Security

Rule name:	win_asyncrat_unobfuscated Create hunting rule
Author:	Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:	Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)

File information

The table below shows additional information about this malware sample such as delivery method and external references.

Web download

AsyncRAT

exe a388b7a16c200e2bf3894ddcaf7865106f44b8e4799512e3ee1384dba26351f6

AsyncRAT

exe e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f

(this sample)

Dropped by

SHA256 a388b7a16c200e2bf3894ddcaf7865106f44b8e4799512e3ee1384dba26351f6

Cape

https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/16398/

Dropped by

MD5 4f39a0a0d306166c3175ed599e0793ec

URLhaus

https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/3588301/

Delivery method

Distributed via web download

Dropped by

SHA256 b1e6fa4eb4d1613850f92a0025ccd7fc3df89f4e2c1d8113a3a06532a29e71d3

Dropped by

MD5 9f9bacc45aa66e24d818d396478f33f7

BLint

The following table provides more information about this file using BLint. BLint is a Binary Linter to check the security properties, and capabilities in executables.

Findings

ID	Title	Severity
CHECK_AUTHENTICODE	Missing Authenticode	high
CHECK_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS	Missing dll Security Characteristics (HIGH_ENTROPY_VA)	high

Comments

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commented on 2025-08-08 18:59:24 UTC

RAT King Parser (https://github.com/jeFF0Falltrades/rat_king_parser) Output:

{
"sha256": "e34e0646332bb763ba3b6d850a329a2292130847e25ff85352f4d5d59296648f",
"yara_possible_family": "dcrat",
"key": "1ec17bc843f4086f763dbcaaa594ded76b608029245a3f29f2df49912ad492f0",
"salt": "4463526174427971777164616e6368756e",
"config": {
"Ports": [
"8080"
],
"Hosts": [
"157.97.11.134"
],
"Version": " 1.0.7",
"Install": "true",
"InstallFolder": "%Temp%",
"InstallFile": "Microsoft.ServiceHub.Controller.exe",
"Key": "T3owSEZxeGs4N0I0Y1g0a3VjU0pveEhtWUdNajYwd0U=",
"Mutex": "Microsoft.ServiceHub.Controller.exe",
"Certificate": "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",
"Serversignature": "d306b0bRQyyXdNZR7bex8sY9goYfeHS/7nrxOFrMQR6sSFmuAEK42iAMSUuPEsHTwywGdBbuJ8D0jqyaPkAb27P8Lza158HigKw5tcI7KoxVVUYcppA54yTKm6nFtj02ocwJreV2NFMBBK66VLAskpAnlB3EeCTUABbOKy47VSk=",
"Pastebin": "null",
"BSOD": "false",
"Hwid": "null",
"Delay": "1",
"Group": "Default",
"AntiProcess": "false",
"Anti": "true"
}
}

commented on 2025-08-08 18:59:23 UTC